Published Date: 2022-10-20
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident regarding Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' system not receiving regulatory approval happened in October 2022 [Article 133980]. |
| System | unknown |
| Responsible Organization | 1. The regulatory authorities were responsible for causing the software failure incident by not approving Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' system [133980]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Investors in Tesla were impacted by the software failure incident as Elon Musk announced that Tesla did not receive regulatory approval for its 'Full Self-Driving' system, affecting the company's plans and expectations [133980]. |
| Software Causes | 1. The software cause of the failure incident was the inability of Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' (FSD) system to receive regulatory approval due to concerns about the safety and readiness of the technology [133980]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. The failure incident was caused by Tesla not receiving regulatory approval for its 'Full Self-Driving' system due to authorities not being satisfied with the safety of the technology ([133980]). 2. The complexity of autonomous driving technology was identified as a primary problem for Tesla, indicating a technological impediment rather than a regulatory issue ([133980]). |
| Impacts | 1. Tesla did not receive regulatory approval for its 'Full Self-Driving' system, impacting the company's ability to prove the safety of its self-driving technology [133980]. 2. The software failure incident led to delays in achieving full self-driving capability, missing self-imposed targets set by Tesla [133980]. 3. The incident raised concerns about the complexity and reliability of autonomous driving technology, highlighting potential challenges beyond regulatory approval [133980]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing thorough testing procedures to ensure the software's functionality and safety before releasing it to the public [133980]. 2. Collaborating closely with regulatory authorities to understand and meet their requirements for autonomous driving technology [133980]. 3. Providing clear and accurate information to customers about the capabilities and limitations of the self-driving system to manage expectations and prevent misunderstandings [133980]. 4. Setting realistic timelines for the development and deployment of autonomous driving features to avoid overpromising and underdelivering [133980]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implementing robust testing procedures to ensure the software's functionality and safety before releasing updates [133980]. 2. Enhancing the software's capabilities to meet regulatory requirements for autonomous driving technology [133980]. 3. Addressing the complexity of autonomous driving technology by improving the software's performance and reliability [133980]. | References | 1. Elon Musk's quarterly results call [133980] 2. Statements made by Elon Musk regarding Tesla's Full Self-Driving system [133980] 3. Comments from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) [133980] 4. Insights from Gene Munster, managing partner at Loup Ventures [133980] 5. Analysis from Bryant Walker Smith, a law professor at the University of South Carolina [133980] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident related to Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' system not receiving regulatory approval has happened again within the same organization. Elon Musk announced that Tesla has once more failed to obtain approval for its FSD system, indicating a recurring issue within the company [133980]. (b) The software failure incident related to autonomous driving technology facing regulatory challenges is not unique to Tesla. The article mentions tensions between the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and Tesla, indicating that other organizations in the autonomous driving industry may also face similar regulatory hurdles [133980]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design | (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where it mentions that Tesla has faced challenges in obtaining regulatory approval for its 'Full Self-Driving' system. Despite launching the FSD system in 2020, the company has not been able to prove that its self-driving technology is safer than a human driver. Elon Musk announced plans to release an upgraded FSD software to address these concerns and convince regulators of the technology's safety [133980]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the article where it discusses how Tesla's self-driving system, despite being available as a beta version with specific features for highway assistance and traffic control, still requires active supervision from a driver. Drivers must regularly interact with the steering wheel to demonstrate attentiveness, indicating that the technology is currently categorized as Level 2 autonomy, where human supervision is necessary for partially automated functions [133980]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system, outside_system | (a) within_system: 1. The software failure incident related to Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' system is primarily within the system. Elon Musk announced that Tesla has not received regulatory approval for its FSD system due to concerns about the safety and readiness of the technology itself ([133980]). (b) outside_system: 1. The software failure incident also involves factors originating from outside the system. Regulators, such as the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), are evaluating Tesla's self-driving technology and its compliance with regulations, indicating external scrutiny and requirements impacting the software's approval ([133980]). |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The article discusses how Tesla has not received regulatory approval for its 'Full Self-Driving' system, indicating a failure in meeting safety standards set by authorities without direct human involvement in the failure [133980]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The article mentions that Tesla's self-driving system requires human intervention and does not meet the regulatory standards for autonomous vehicles, suggesting a failure related to human actions in the design and implementation of the technology [133980]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | software | (a) The articles do not mention any specific software failure incident related to hardware issues [133980]. (b) The software failure incident discussed in the articles is related to contributing factors originating in software. Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' system has faced challenges in receiving regulatory approval due to concerns about the safety and effectiveness of the autonomous driving technology [133980]. The software add-on for autonomous driving functions, including lane changing and parking, has not been able to prove its safety compared to human drivers, leading to delays in obtaining regulatory approval. Musk is working on releasing upgraded FSD software to address these concerns and convince regulators of the technology's safety and reliability. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | non-malicious | (a) The articles do not mention any malicious intent or actions contributing to the software failure incident. The failure seems to be related to the challenges in obtaining regulatory approval for Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' system and the complexity of autonomous driving technology [133980]. (b) The software failure incident appears to be non-malicious, stemming from the difficulties in proving the safety and effectiveness of Tesla's self-driving technology to regulators. The failure is attributed to the complexity of autonomous driving technology and the challenges in meeting regulatory requirements [133980]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | unknown | The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident related to poor_decisions or accidental_decisions. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence, unknown | (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the case of Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' (FSD) system. Despite Elon Musk's announcements and promises, Tesla has not received regulatory approval for its FSD system, indicating a failure in demonstrating the system's safety and readiness for autonomous driving without human intervention [133980]. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. |
| Duration | temporary | The software failure incident related to Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' (FSD) system can be considered as a temporary failure. This is evident from the fact that Tesla has not yet received regulatory approval for its FSD system, indicating that the failure is due to contributing factors introduced by certain circumstances but not all. Elon Musk mentioned that the technology is not yet ready to have no one behind the wheel, and drivers still need to actively supervise the partially automated functions of the FSD system. Musk also expressed hopes of releasing an upgraded FSD software by the end of the year to address regulatory concerns and minimize the amount of control drivers need to exert [133980]. |
| Behaviour | value, other | (a) crash: The articles do not mention any specific instance of the software crashing and losing state [133980]. (b) omission: The articles do not mention any specific instance of the software omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s) [133980]. (c) timing: The articles do not mention any specific instance of the software performing its intended functions correctly, but too late or too early [133980]. (d) value: The software failure incident in this case is related to the system not being able to prove its self-driving system is safer than a human driver, indicating a failure in performing its intended functions correctly [133980]. (e) byzantine: The articles do not mention any specific instance of the software behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [133980]. (f) other: The software failure incident in this case involves the system not receiving regulatory approval for its 'Full Self-Driving' system, which can be considered a failure in meeting regulatory requirements and expectations [133980]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | sensor, embedded_software | (a) sensor: The article mentions that Tesla's Full Self-Driving (FSD) system requires active supervision from a driver, who must 'check in' with the steering wheel every few minutes to show they are paying attention. This indicates that the failure could be related to the sensor layer, where the system relies on the driver's interaction with the steering wheel as a form of sensor input [133980]. (b) actuator: The article discusses how Tesla's FSD system allows the vehicle to autonomously change lanes and park, with drivers rarely having to touch the controls. This suggests that the failure could be related to the actuator layer, where the system's ability to control the vehicle's movements may be impacted [133980]. (c) processing_unit: Elon Musk mentioned that an upgraded FSD software is expected to be released to minimize how much drivers touch controls, indicating that the failure could be related to the processing unit layer, where software updates are being implemented to address the issue [133980]. (d) network_communication: The article mentions that the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) is evaluating whether Tesla's self-driving tests require regulatory approval, following concerns about the technology's safety and federal investigations into Tesla vehicle crashes. This scrutiny could involve assessing the network communication aspects of Tesla's autonomous driving system [133980]. (e) embedded_software: The article highlights that Tesla has repeatedly missed self-imposed targets for achieving full self-driving capability, indicating challenges with the embedded software that powers the autonomous features of Tesla vehicles. The complexity of autonomous driving technology is also mentioned as a primary problem for Tesla, suggesting issues with the embedded software layer [133980]. |
| Communication | unknown | Unknown |
| Application | FALSE | The software failure incident reported in the provided news articles regarding Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' (FSD) system does not seem to be related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. The failure is more related to the regulatory approval and technological capabilities of the self-driving system rather than issues stemming from bugs, operating system errors, unhandled exceptions, or incorrect usage at the application layer. Therefore, based on the information available, it is unknown whether the failure was related to the application layer of the cyber physical system [133980]. |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | theoretical_consequence | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - No information about people losing their lives due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles [133980]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - No information about people being physically harmed due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles [133980]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - No information about people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles [133980]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident discussed in the articles primarily revolves around Tesla's Full Self-Driving system not receiving regulatory approval and the implications for Tesla's autonomous driving technology. There is no mention of people's material goods, money, or data being directly impacted by the software failure [133980]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - The software failure incident did not mention any specific activities being postponed due to the lack of regulatory approval for Tesla's Full Self-Driving system [133980]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The articles focus on the regulatory challenges faced by Tesla's Full Self-Driving system and the implications for autonomous driving technology. There is no mention of non-human entities being directly impacted by the software failure [133980]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The primary consequence discussed in the articles is the lack of regulatory approval for Tesla's Full Self-Driving system, which hinders the advancement of autonomous driving technology. However, there is no mention of any real observed consequences resulting from the software failure [133980]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles mention potential consequences such as Tesla not being able to prove the safety of its self-driving system compared to human drivers, the ongoing regulatory review by the California DMV, and the challenges faced in obtaining regulatory approval for the technology. These are theoretical consequences discussed in the context of the software failure incident [133980]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - There were no other specific consequences of the software failure mentioned in the articles [133980]. |
| Domain | transportation | (a) The failed system in question is related to the transportation industry, specifically autonomous driving technology developed by Tesla. The 'Full Self-Driving' (FSD) system is designed to enable Tesla vehicles to operate autonomously without the need for human intervention [Article 133980]. The system includes features such as lane-changing, parking assistance, highway assistance, and automatic traffic light and stop sign control. However, it is important to note that the system currently requires active supervision from a driver, as it falls under Level 2 autonomy where humans must still have their hands on the wheel and supervise partially automated functions. The ultimate goal of the system is to achieve Level 5 autonomy, where vehicles can operate fully autonomously under all traffic and weather conditions. (b) The failed system is intended to support the transportation industry by revolutionizing the way vehicles operate on the roads. Tesla's 'Full Self-Driving' system aims to enhance the driving experience by providing autonomous capabilities to its vehicles, reducing the need for human intervention and potentially improving road safety [Article 133980]. (c) The failed system is not directly related to the extraction of natural resources. (d) The failed system is not directly related to sales transactions. (e) The failed system is not directly related to the construction industry. (f) The failed system is not directly related to the manufacturing industry. (g) The failed system is not directly related to utilities services. (h) The failed system is not directly related to the finance industry. (i) The failed system is not directly related to knowledge-related industries such as education, research, or space exploration. (j) The failed system is not directly related to the health industry. (k) The failed system is not directly related to the entertainment industry. (l) The failed system is not directly related to the government sector. (m) The failed system is not directly related to any other industry mentioned in the options provided. |
Article ID: 133980