Incident: Hotel Wi-Fi Routers Vulnerable to Malware Attack Impacting Guests

Published Date: 2015-03-26

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving vulnerable InnGate routers made by ANTlabs happened in 2015. [34478]
System 1. InnGate routers made by ANTlabs [34478]
Responsible Organization 1. ANTlabs - The vulnerability in the systems was discovered in the firmware of several models of InnGate routers made by ANTlabs, which allowed attackers to gain access to the root file system and potentially infect computers of Wi-Fi users [34478].
Impacted Organization 1. Guests at hundreds of hotels around the world were impacted by the software failure incident involving vulnerable InnGate routers made by ANTlabs [34478].
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was an authentication vulnerability in the firmware of several models of InnGate routers made by ANTlabs, which allowed attackers to gain access to the root file system of the devices and potentially infect computers of Wi-Fi users [34478].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of authentication in the rsync daemon used by the ANTlabs devices, allowing unauthorized access to the file system [34478].
Impacts 1. Guests at hundreds of hotels around the world were susceptible to serious hacks due to the vulnerability in the InnGate routers, allowing attackers to distribute malware, monitor data, and potentially gain access to reservation and keycard systems [34478]. 2. The vulnerability involved an authentication flaw in the firmware of several models of InnGate routers made by ANTlabs, affecting 277 devices in 29 countries, including the US, Singapore, the UK, and the United Arab Emirates [34478]. 3. The vulnerable systems were found at hotels belonging to eight of the world's top 10 hotel chains, potentially exposing guest data and compromising property management systems [34478]. 4. The vulnerability allowed attackers to gain full access to the property management systems (PMS) used in the vulnerable hotels, which could lead to unauthorized access to guest information, room numbers, and potentially other systems like phone and keycard systems [34478]. 5. The incident highlighted the risk of potential attacks similar to the DarkHotel campaign, where attackers subverted guest Wi-Fi systems in luxury hotels to distribute malware to specific guests, emphasizing the importance of securing hotel networks against such threats [34478].
Preventions 1. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments of the routers used in hotels could have helped identify and patch the authentication vulnerability in the firmware of the InnGate routers [34478]. 2. Implementing proper authentication mechanisms for the rsync daemon used by the ANTlabs devices could have prevented unauthorized access to the file system of the devices [34478]. 3. Ensuring that sensitive systems like property management systems (PMS) are not directly connected to potentially vulnerable devices like the InnGate routers could have reduced the attack surface and mitigated the risk of a full system compromise [34478]. 4. Hotels could have employed network segmentation and firewall configurations to protect critical systems like PMS from unauthorized access, even if the vulnerable devices were present on the network [34478]. 5. Timely software updates and patches from the device manufacturers, like the patch released by ANTlabs in response to the vulnerability, should be promptly applied to mitigate known security risks [34478].
Fixes 1. Patching the vulnerability in the firmware of the ANTlabs InnGate routers by applying the fix provided by ANTlabs [34478]. 2. Implementing secure authentication mechanisms for the rsync daemon used by the ANTlabs devices to prevent unauthorized access to the file system [34478]. 3. Conducting regular security audits and scans to identify and address any vulnerabilities in the network infrastructure, especially in critical systems like property management systems [34478]. 4. Enhancing network security measures such as firewall configurations to protect vulnerable devices from being accessible over the internet [34478]. 5. Educating hotel staff and guests about cybersecurity best practices to prevent falling victim to potential attacks exploiting the software vulnerability [34478].
References 1. Security firm Cylance [34478] 2. Researchers at Kaspersky Lab [34478] 3. US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) [34478] 4. ANTlabs [34478] 5. Oracle [34478]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to vulnerable InnGate routers made by ANTlabs has happened at multiple organizations. Researchers discovered the vulnerability in the systems used by hotels around the world, including hotels belonging to eight of the world's top 10 hotel chains [34478]. This indicates that the vulnerability affected multiple organizations using the same product. (b) The vulnerability in the InnGate routers made by ANTlabs has been found in hotels in various countries, including the US, Singapore, the UK, and the United Arab Emirates. The affected hotels include not only hotel chains but also convention centers with internet-accessible vulnerable routers [34478]. This shows that the software failure incident has occurred at multiple organizations beyond just hotel chains.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the vulnerability discovered in the InnGate routers made by ANTlabs. The vulnerability was due to an authentication vulnerability in the firmware of several models of InnGate routers, allowing attackers to gain access to the root file system of the devices and potentially infect the computers of Wi-Fi users [34478]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted by the fact that the vulnerable systems were accessible over the internet, making them susceptible to malicious activity by anyone who could get on the hotel's network. This operational vulnerability allowed attackers to potentially exploit the systems, compromise guest data, and even gain access to the hotel's reservation and keycard systems [34478].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the article is primarily within the system. The vulnerability in the InnGate routers made by ANTlabs was due to an authentication vulnerability in the firmware of the routers themselves, allowing attackers to gain direct access to the root file system of the devices [34478]. The vulnerability in the unauthenticated rsync daemon used by the ANTlabs devices enabled attackers to read and write to the file system of the Linux-based operating system without any authentication, providing them with full access to the system [34478]. These vulnerabilities were inherent to the design and implementation of the routers, making them internal to the system. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident does not involve contributing factors that originate from outside the system. The vulnerabilities exploited by attackers were present within the system itself, such as the unauthenticated rsync daemon and authentication vulnerability in the firmware of the routers [34478]. There is no indication in the article that external factors played a significant role in the software failure incident.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in this case is primarily due to non-human actions. The vulnerability in the InnGate routers made by ANTlabs was discovered by security researchers, and it allowed attackers to gain direct access to the root file system of the devices without any authentication. This vulnerability was exploited by attackers to distribute malware, monitor network data, and potentially gain access to hotel reservation and keycard systems [34478]. (b) However, human actions also played a role in this software failure incident. The researchers, particularly Justin Clarke from Cylance, discovered the vulnerability accidentally while conducting an internet-wide scan using a new script to look for rsync routers. Clarke ran a command to view the file directory of an ANTlabs device and found that he could access the entire file system and write to it. Subsequent scans uncovered more vulnerable systems at hotels belonging to major hotel chains [34478].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware can be attributed to the vulnerability in the firmware of several models of InnGate routers made by ANTlabs, a Singapore firm, which are installed in hotels around the world [34478]. The vulnerability in the routers allowed attackers to gain direct access to the root file system of the devices, potentially leading to the distribution of malware, monitoring and recording of data sent over the network, and even gaining access to the hotel's reservation and keycard systems. This hardware vulnerability in the routers exposed guests at these hotels to serious security risks. (b) The software failure incident related to software can be attributed to the unauthenticated rsync daemon used by the ANTlabs devices, which did not require any authentication for access [34478]. This software vulnerability allowed attackers to read and write to the file system of the Linux-based operating system without any restrictions, potentially leading to the exploitation of the devices and compromising the security of the hotel networks and guest information.
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident in this case is malicious in nature. Researchers discovered a vulnerability in the firmware of InnGate routers made by ANTlabs, which could allow attackers to distribute malware to guests, monitor and record data sent over the network, and potentially gain access to the hotel's reservation and keycard systems [34478]. The vulnerability was due to an unauthenticated rsync daemon used by the ANTlabs devices, which allowed attackers to gain full file system access without restriction, enabling them to carry out various malicious activities [34478]. (b) The software failure incident is non-malicious in the sense that it was not caused by accidental or unintentional factors. Instead, it was a result of a deliberate vulnerability in the system that could be exploited by attackers for malicious purposes [34478].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The software failure incident described in the article was primarily due to poor decisions made in the design and implementation of the InnGate routers by ANTlabs. The vulnerability in the systems was a result of an authentication vulnerability in the firmware of several models of InnGate routers, which allowed attackers to gain access to the root file system of the devices without any authentication. This poor decision to not require authentication for accessing the rsync daemon on the devices led to a significant security flaw that could be exploited by attackers [34478].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident in this case can be attributed to development incompetence. The vulnerability in the systems was discovered by security researchers at Cylance, indicating that the flaw was due to a lack of professional competence in ensuring the security of the firmware in the InnGate routers made by ANTlabs [34478]. The authentication vulnerability in the firmware of several models of InnGate routers allowed attackers to gain access to the root file system of the devices without any authentication, enabling them to copy configuration files, write files to the system, and potentially infect the computers of Wi-Fi users [34478]. (b) Additionally, the incident can also be categorized as accidental. The discovery of the vulnerability was accidental, as Justin Clarke from Cylance stumbled upon the vulnerable systems while taking a break from another project and conducting an internet-wide scan using a new script to look for rsync routers. This accidental discovery led to the identification of over 100 vulnerable ANTlabs systems, highlighting how the vulnerability was not intentionally introduced but was found inadvertently [34478].
Duration permanent (a) The software failure incident described in the article is more of a permanent nature. The vulnerability in the routers made by ANTlabs was a fundamental flaw in the authentication mechanism of the firmware, allowing attackers to gain direct access to the root file system of the devices. This flaw could potentially lead to serious consequences such as distributing malware to guests, monitoring and recording data, and even gaining access to the hotel's reservation and keycard systems [34478]. The vulnerability was not a temporary issue that could be easily fixed or resolved, but rather a fundamental flaw in the design and implementation of the software. (b) The software failure incident cannot be categorized as temporary as the vulnerability in the routers was not due to specific circumstances but rather a fundamental flaw in the authentication mechanism of the firmware [34478].
Behaviour crash, omission, value, byzantine (a) crash: The vulnerability in the InnGate routers made by ANTlabs allowed attackers to gain direct access to the root file system of the devices, potentially leading to a crash or failure of the system. Attackers could write files to the devices, infecting the computers of Wi-Fi users and disrupting the normal functioning of the routers [34478]. (b) omission: The vulnerability in the InnGate routers could lead to omission failures where the system omits to perform its intended functions. For example, attackers could potentially gain access to the hotel's reservation and keycard systems, monitor and record data sent over the network, and distribute malware to guests, causing the system to omit its intended security and privacy functions [34478]. (c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident is not explicitly mentioned in the article. However, the vulnerability in the InnGate routers could potentially lead to timing failures if attackers were able to manipulate the timing of data transmissions or access to the systems, causing disruptions in the network's timing behavior [34478]. (d) value: The vulnerability in the InnGate routers could result in value failures where the system performs its intended functions incorrectly. For instance, attackers could potentially gain full access to the property management system (PMS) of hotels, compromising guest information, room numbers, and potentially gaining access to other systems like the phone system and point-of-sale system [34478]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident involving the vulnerability in the InnGate routers could exhibit byzantine behavior due to the inconsistent responses and interactions caused by attackers gaining unauthorized access to the root file system of the devices. This could lead to unpredictable and malicious actions within the network, affecting the overall system behavior [34478]. (f) other: The other behavior exhibited in this software failure incident could be related to security breaches and unauthorized access. Attackers exploiting the vulnerability in the InnGate routers could perform a range of malicious activities, including distributing malware, monitoring data, and potentially gaining access to critical systems within hotels, leading to a breach of security protocols and unauthorized access to sensitive information [34478].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence, other (a) death: The article does not mention any deaths resulting from the software failure incident. [34478] (b) harm: The article does not mention any physical harm to individuals resulting from the software failure incident. [34478] (c) basic: The article does not mention any impact on people's access to food or shelter due to the software failure incident. [34478] (d) property: The software failure incident could potentially impact people's material goods, money, or data as attackers could gain access to the hotel's reservation and keycard systems, potentially compromising guest information and security. [34478] (e) delay: The article does not mention any delays caused by the software failure incident. [34478] (f) non-human: The vulnerability in the routers used by hotels could impact non-human entities such as the hotel's reservation and keycard systems, as well as potentially affecting the hotel's property management system, phone system, point-of-sale system, and electronic keycard system. [34478] (g) no_consequence: The software failure incident had real observed consequences as it exposed hotels and guests to potential hacks and data breaches. [34478] (h) theoretical_consequence: The article discusses potential consequences of the software failure incident, such as attackers gaining access to guest information, reservation systems, keycard systems, and potentially compromising the security of various hotel systems. [34478] (i) other: The software failure incident could lead to significant privacy breaches, financial losses, and reputational damage for the affected hotels and guests.
Domain entertainment (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to the hospitality industry, specifically affecting hotels around the world due to a vulnerability in the routers used for their Wi-Fi networks [34478]. The vulnerable systems were found primarily at hotel chains and convention centers, with some hotels using the affected devices to manage guest Wi-Fi and connect to property management systems [34478]. (j) The incident also highlights potential risks to the security and privacy of guests staying at these hotels, as attackers could potentially gain access to reservation systems, keycard systems, and other interconnected systems through the compromised routers [34478]. (m) The software failure incident is not related to any other industry mentioned in the options provided.

Sources

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