| Recurring |
unknown |
The articles do not provide information about a similar software failure incident happening again at the same organization or at multiple organizations. Therefore, the specific incidents mentioned in the articles are unique and not explicitly linked to any recurring patterns within the same organization or across multiple organizations. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. The New York Times' antivirus software, provided by Symantec, missed 44 out of 45 pieces of malware installed by Chinese hackers during a cyberattack. The reason for this failure was that the hackers built custom malware that was not on Symantec's list of forbidden software, allowing most of it to pass through undetected [16412].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also highlighted in the article. The New York Times suspected an attack due to its investigation into Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's family finances and asked AT&T to monitor its network. AT&T quickly picked up suspicious signs, indicating that the operation and monitoring of the network played a crucial role in detecting the cyberattack [16412]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
The software failure incident reported in the articles can be categorized as both within_system and outside_system:
(a) within_system: The failure within the system can be attributed to the limitations of the antivirus software deployed by the New York Times. The antivirus software from Symantec missed 44 out of 45 pieces of malware installed by Chinese hackers on the network, indicating a failure within the system's defense mechanisms [16412].
(b) outside_system: The failure outside the system can be attributed to the sophisticated and custom malware developed by the Chinese hackers to bypass the antivirus software. The attackers built custom malware that was not on Symantec's list of forbidden software, allowing most of it to pass through undetected. This external factor contributed to the software failure incident [16412]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the New York Times cyberattack was primarily due to non-human actions. The antivirus software from Symantec missed detecting 44 out of 45 pieces of malware installed by Chinese hackers on the network [16412]. This failure was attributed to the custom-built malware that was not on Symantec's list of forbidden software, allowing it to pass through undetected. The incident highlighted the limitations of relying solely on antivirus software for protection against sophisticated cyber threats.
(b) Human actions also played a role in the software failure incident. The attackers targeted individuals within the New York Times by sending malicious code through email accounts, exploiting human behavior to gain access to the network [16412]. Additionally, the response to the incident involved human actions such as requesting AT&T to monitor the network, hiring security consultancy Mandiant to track the attackers, and making decisions based on suspicions and observations made by security personnel within the company. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The incident mentioned in the article is primarily focused on a cyberattack by Chinese hackers on the New York Times' network. The failure of the antivirus software to detect the custom malware installed by the attackers was a significant issue. This failure was not directly attributed to hardware issues but rather to the limitations of the antivirus software in detecting sophisticated attacks [16412].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The software failure incident in this case is attributed to the limitations of the antivirus software deployed by the New York Times. The software failed to detect the custom malware created by the Chinese hackers, highlighting a software-related failure in terms of effectiveness and capability [16412]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is malicious in nature. Chinese hackers conducted a cyberattack on the New York Times, installing custom malware to retrieve usernames and passwords of Times' reporters [16412]. The attackers bypassed the antivirus software deployed by the New York Times, indicating a deliberate attempt to harm the system and steal sensitive information. Additionally, the incident involved sophisticated attacks that were specifically targeted at the Times due to its investigative reporting on Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's family finances, further highlighting the malicious intent behind the software failure incident. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
The software failure incident reported in the articles can be attributed to both poor decisions and accidental decisions:
(a) poor_decisions: The incident highlights poor decisions related to relying solely on antivirus software for protection against sophisticated cyberattacks. The New York Times' use of Symantec's antivirus software failed to detect custom malware created by Chinese hackers, leading to a significant security breach [16412].
(b) accidental_decisions: The incident also points to accidental decisions or unintended consequences, such as the oversight of not having a comprehensive security strategy beyond antivirus software. The attackers exploited vulnerabilities in the system by sending malicious code through emails, highlighting the need for a more holistic approach to cybersecurity [16412]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article. The incident at the New York Times, where Chinese hackers successfully infiltrated the network despite the antivirus software in place, highlights a failure due to contributing factors introduced due to the lack of professional competence by the development organization. The antivirus software from Symantec missed 44 out of 45 pieces of malware installed by the attackers, primarily because the hackers built custom malware that was not on Symantec's list of forbidden software, allowing it to pass through undetected [16412].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also apparent in the article. The incident at the New York Times showcases how the attackers were able to exploit vulnerabilities and infiltrate the network by sending malicious code through email, which individuals unknowingly opened, allowing the attackers access. This accidental action of opening the malicious email contributed to the success of the cyberattack [16412]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident reported in the articles can be categorized as a temporary failure. The incident was a result of specific circumstances, such as the cyberattack by Chinese hackers on the New York Times' network, where the antivirus software missed the majority of the malware installed by the attackers [16412]. This failure was not a permanent issue but rather a temporary one caused by the specific attack and the limitations of the antivirus software in detecting the custom-built malware used by the hackers. |
| Behaviour |
omission, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident reported in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The failure was related to the antivirus software missing malware installed by attackers on the New York Times network [Article 16412].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can be categorized as an omission where the antivirus software omitted to detect 44 out of 45 pieces of malware installed by Chinese hackers on the New York Times network. The custom malware created by the hackers was not on the list of forbidden software in the Symantec antivirus system, leading to the omission of detection [Article 16412].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The focus of the incident was on the antivirus software's inability to detect the malware promptly [Article 16412].
(d) value: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The issue was primarily about the antivirus software's effectiveness in detecting custom malware created by attackers [Article 16412].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The failure was more about the limitations of traditional antivirus software in detecting sophisticated cyber threats [Article 16412].
(f) other: The software failure incident can be categorized as a failure due to the system's inability to keep up with evolving cyber threats and the attackers' ability to create custom malware that bypassed traditional antivirus software defenses [Article 16412]. |