| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to altering firmware in cloud servers has happened again at IBM. Researchers at the security firm Eclypsium demonstrated how they could rent a server from a cloud computing provider, specifically focusing on IBM, and alter its firmware, allowing for hidden changes to persist even after the server is released and rented by another customer [81120].
(b) The software failure incident related to firmware alterations in cloud servers has not been explicitly mentioned to have happened at multiple organizations in the provided article. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The article discusses a software failure incident related to the design phase, specifically focusing on the firmware of cloud servers. Researchers at the security firm Eclypsium demonstrated how they could alter the firmware of IBM cloud servers, hiding changes to the code that persisted even after the server was released and rented by another customer [81120].
(b) The article also touches upon a software failure incident related to the operation phase. It mentions that IBM responded to the vulnerability by wiping its servers' BMC firmware between different customers' uses to address the issue. However, there were doubts about the effectiveness of this fix, with researchers still being able to perform their catch-and-release trick despite IBM's claimed actions [81120]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is within_system. The failure occurred due to the ability of attackers to alter the firmware of cloud servers, specifically in the case of IBM's bare metal cloud computing service. The incident involved researchers demonstrating how they could make changes to the firmware of servers, which persisted even after the servers were released back into the pool of available machines for other customers to rent [81120]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles is related to non-human actions, specifically the ability to alter firmware in cloud servers without human intervention. Researchers at Eclypsium demonstrated how they could rent a server from a cloud computing provider, such as IBM, and alter its firmware, hiding changes to its code that persist even after the server is released and rented by another customer [81120]. This incident highlights a vulnerability in the cloud servers' firmware that can be exploited without direct human involvement, potentially leading to malicious activities like spying, data alteration, or destruction of the server.
(b) The software failure incident is also related to human actions. While the vulnerability itself may have been introduced without direct human participation, the researchers at Eclypsium actively demonstrated the exploit by making benign alterations to the firmware of IBM servers in their testing [81120]. Additionally, IBM responded to the research findings by implementing a fix that involved wiping and reflashing the servers' BMC firmware between different customers' uses, indicating a human-initiated response to address the issue. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
The incident described in the article [81120] involves a software failure incident that is related to hardware. Specifically, the failure is due to vulnerabilities in the firmware of a hardware component called the baseboard management controller (BMC) in Super Micro servers offered by IBM in their bare metal cloud computing service. The compromised firmware in the BMC allows for malicious code to persist even after the server is released back into the pool of available machines for other customers. This hardware-related vulnerability poses a significant risk as it can lead to spying on the server, data alteration, or even destruction of the server by hackers.
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
The software failure incident described in the article [81120] is also related to software. While the root cause of the issue lies in the compromised firmware of the hardware component (BMC), the persistence of malicious code in the firmware highlights a software-related failure. The compromised firmware can be considered as a software failure since it allows for unauthorized access, manipulation of the operating system, and potential ransomware attacks, all of which are software-related consequences of the hardware vulnerability. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious, non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The incident involved researchers demonstrating how they could rent a server from a cloud computing provider, alter its firmware, and hide changes to its code that persist even after they stop renting it. This technique could be used to plant malware in servers' hidden code, allowing hackers to spy on the server, alter its data, or destroy it at will [81120]. The researchers made benign changes to the IBM servers' firmware in their demonstration, but they warned that the same technique could be used for malicious purposes [81120].
(b) The incident is non-malicious in the sense that the researchers initially made harmless alterations to the BMC's firmware of the IBM bare metal cloud servers as part of their experiment [81120]. However, the concern raised was that it would be easy to hide truly malicious firmware using the same method, indicating the potential for non-malicious changes to be escalated to malicious ones [81120]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized under both poor_decisions and accidental_decisions:
(a) poor_decisions: The incident involved a vulnerability where researchers demonstrated the ability to alter firmware in cloud servers, potentially allowing for the planting of malware that persists undetected even after the server is used by another customer [81120].
(b) accidental_decisions: The vulnerability in the firmware of the cloud servers was not intentional but rather a result of the inherent security flaw in the design and management of the servers, which allowed for the persistence of firmware alterations [81120]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The article discusses a software failure incident related to development incompetence. The incident involved a vulnerability in the firmware of IBM's bare metal cloud servers, where researchers at Eclypsium demonstrated how they could alter the firmware of rented servers, allowing for the persistence of hidden malicious code even after the server is released back into the pool of available machines for other customers [81120]. This incident highlights a security flaw that was not addressed initially, showcasing a failure due to contributing factors introduced by a lack of professional competence in ensuring the security and integrity of the cloud servers' firmware.
(b) The software failure incident can also be categorized as accidental. The vulnerability in the firmware of the cloud servers was not intentionally created by the cloud service provider or the customers renting the servers. It was a result of a flaw in the design or implementation of the servers' firmware that allowed for unauthorized alterations to persist even after the servers were released and rented by other customers [81120]. This accidental introduction of a security vulnerability showcases a failure due to contributing factors introduced accidentally, rather than through deliberate actions. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article is more aligned with a temporary failure rather than a permanent one. The incident involved researchers at the security firm Eclypsium demonstrating how they could alter the firmware of cloud computing servers, specifically focusing on IBM servers, in a way that allowed changes to persist even after the server was released and rented by another customer [81120]. This indicates that the failure was temporary in nature, as it was caused by specific actions taken by the researchers rather than being an inherent, permanent flaw in the system. |
| Behaviour |
crash, other |
(a) crash: The article discusses a scenario where researchers demonstrated the ability to alter the firmware of cloud servers, which could potentially lead to malware being planted in the servers' hidden code. This alteration persists even after the server is released back into the pool of available machines for other customers, indicating a form of system crash where the system loses its state and may not perform its intended functions properly [81120].
(b) omission: The incident described in the article does not directly mention a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s).
(c) timing: The article does not specifically mention a failure due to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early.
(d) value: The article does not provide information about a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly.
(e) byzantine: The incident described in the article does not directly mention a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident described in the article can be categorized as a persistent firmware alteration that occurs even after the server is released back into the pool of available machines for other customers. This behavior could be considered a form of system persistence or system state retention beyond the expected or intended duration, which is not explicitly covered by the options (a) to (e) [81120]. |