Published Date: 2015-04-15
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident happened in 2015 (Article 35246). 2. The software failure incident happened in 2017 (Article 61338). 3. The software failure incident happened in 2018 (Article 74673). 4. The software failure incident happened in 2019 (Article 89225). |
| System | 1. ES&S AutoMARK 2. Premier/Diebold AccuVote-OS 3. AVS WinVote machines 4. ExpressPoll-5000 5. Election Systems & Software Model 650 [Article 89632, Article 35246, Article 61338, Article 75347] |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Hackers at Defcon Voting Village [74673, 89632, 35246, 61338, 89225] |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Voting machines used in elections [74673, 89632, 35246, 61338, 89225] |
| Software Causes | 1. Weak password protections and hardcoded system credentials in voting machines led to vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers [#35246, #61338, #75347]. 2. Poor physical security protections in voting machines allowed for undetected tampering and potential for operating system manipulations [#89632]. 3. Remote attacks on voting machines could compromise memory or integrity checks, causing denial of service [#89632]. 4. Voting machines running outdated software from the early 2000s or even the 1990s were found to have known vulnerabilities that had not been resolved [#75347]. 5. Lack of security updates on voting machines, such as the failure to update the Windows operating system since at least 2004, left the machines susceptible to attacks [#35246]. 6. The use of easily guessable passwords like "abcde" and "admin" in voting machines posed a significant security risk [#35246, #61338]. 7. Vulnerabilities in voting machines, such as the ES&S Model 650, were disclosed years ago but still persisted, highlighting the lack of security improvements by vendors [#75347]. 8. The presence of network vulnerabilities in voting machines, like the ES&S Model 650, raised concerns about the overall security of election infrastructure [#75347]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Poor physical security protections that could allow undetected tampering [Article 89632] 2. Easily guessable hardcoded system credentials [Article 89632] 3. Potential for operating system manipulations [Article 89632] 4. Remote attacks that could compromise memory or integrity checks or cause denial of service [Article 89632] 5. Weak password protections such as "abcde" and "admin" [Article 35246] 6. Vulnerabilities in voting machines that were known for over a decade and still not fixed [Article 75347] |
| Impacts | 1. The software failure incident involving vulnerabilities in voting machines highlighted the ease with which hackers could compromise the machines, potentially leading to doubts about the integrity of election results [#35246, #61338]. 2. The incident revealed that voting machines had weak password protections, easily guessable credentials, and vulnerabilities that had been known for over a decade but remained unfixed, raising concerns about the security of election infrastructure [#35246, #75347]. 3. The vulnerabilities found in voting machines underscored the need for stronger security measures, funding for replacing outdated equipment, and specialized IT staff to maintain and update devices to prevent potential attacks [#75347]. 4. The incident emphasized the importance of having failsafes for voting machines to prevent glitches or technical failures from disrupting elections and the necessity for election officials to ensure the accuracy and security of election results [#75347]. 5. The software failure incident highlighted the slow progress in addressing vulnerabilities in voting machines, the challenges in holding vendors accountable for improving device security, and the ongoing need for significant funding to enhance election infrastructure defenses [#75347]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing strong physical security measures to prevent unauthorized access to voting machines [35246, 61338]. 2. Regularly updating software and operating systems on voting machines to patch known vulnerabilities [35246, 75347]. 3. Conducting thorough security audits and penetration testing on voting machines to identify and address weaknesses [35246, 61338, 75347]. 4. Investing in modern, secure voting machine technology that includes paper ballot backups [35246, 61338, 75347]. 5. Providing adequate funding for state and local election officials to replace outdated and vulnerable voting machines [75347]. 6. Establishing bug bounty programs to incentivize security researchers to identify and report vulnerabilities in voting machines [61338]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implementing paper ballots and conducting risk-limiting audits after every election to double-check election results [89225]. 2. Upgrading voting machines to newer models that use paper ballots and have stronger security measures [89225]. 3. Providing funding from Congress to help states purchase new equipment and improve election security [35246, 61338, 89225]. 4. Encouraging election officials to replace outdated equipment and employ specialized IT staff for maintenance and updates [75347]. 5. Holding voting machine vendors accountable for improving device security and resolving known vulnerabilities [75347]. | References | 1. Defcon Voting Village event [Article 89632, Article 35246, Article 61338, Article 89225] 2. Reports and findings from the Voting Village participants [Article 89632, Article 35246, Article 61338, Article 89225] 3. Statements from cybersecurity experts and researchers [Article 35246, Article 75347] 4. Statements from election security advocates and lawmakers [Article 89225, Article 75347] 5. Statements from voting machine manufacturers [Article 61338, Article 75347] 6. Statements from election officials and organizations [Article 35246, Article 75347] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: - The incident of vulnerabilities in voting machines has happened again with the same machines being used in elections despite known flaws [35246]. - The WinVote machines, known for their vulnerabilities, were used in important elections even after the security issues were highlighted [61338]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: - The vulnerabilities in voting machines have been found in multiple models used across the US, indicating a widespread issue with voting machine security [75347]. - The report from the Def Con Voting Village highlighted vulnerabilities in seven models of voting machines that are actively used around the country, showing a recurring problem across different organizations [75347]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) In the articles, there are instances of software failure incidents related to the design phase. For example, vulnerabilities in voting machines were found during the DefCon Voting Village events, highlighting flaws in the design and security of the machines [89632, 75347]. These vulnerabilities included weak password protections, easily guessable hardcoded system credentials, poor physical security protections, and potential for remote attacks compromising memory or integrity checks. The flaws were not new and had been known for over a decade, indicating a lack of improvement in the design and security of voting machines over time. (b) Regarding software failure incidents related to the operation phase, there are mentions of vulnerabilities that could be exploited through operation or misuse of the system. For instance, hackers at the DefCon Voting Village were able to exploit voting machines within a short period, demonstrating how easy it was to compromise the machines through operations like exploiting unpatched software vulnerabilities or using default passwords [61338, 35246]. These incidents highlight the importance of secure operation practices and the potential risks associated with inadequate operational procedures in maintaining the security of voting machines. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system, outside_system | (a) The software failure incident related to voting machines at Defcon can be categorized as both within_system and outside_system. Within_system: - The voting machines had vulnerabilities such as weak passwords, poor physical security protections, easily guessable credentials, and potential for remote attacks [#89632, #35246, #61338, #89225]. - These vulnerabilities were found during events like the Defcon Voting Village, where hackers were able to exploit flaws within the voting machines themselves [#89632, #35246, #61338, #89225]. Outside_system: - The vulnerabilities in the voting machines were also attributed to factors outside the system, such as the lack of adequate funding for election security upgrades, slow progress in replacing vulnerable machines, and the need for federal legislation to ensure sufficient funding for states to purchase new equipment [#89632, #35246, #61338, #89225]. - The involvement of nation-state actors like Russia in targeting election infrastructure highlighted external threats to the voting systems [#75347]. These incidents demonstrate a combination of internal vulnerabilities within the voting machines themselves and external factors affecting the overall security and reliability of the election infrastructure. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The articles highlight vulnerabilities in voting machines that were found during events like the DefCon Voting Village, where elite hackers identified flaws in the machines without human participation [Article 75347]. - Vulnerabilities such as weak password protections, easily guessable hardcoded system credentials, and remote attacks were discovered, indicating failures introduced without human participation [Article 89632]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The articles mention instances where human actions, such as using simple and easily guessable passwords like "abcde" and "admin," contributed to the vulnerability of voting machines [Article 35246]. - Additionally, the lack of proper security measures, outdated software, and failure to address known vulnerabilities over the years point to human actions as contributing factors to the software failure incidents [Article 35246, Article 75347]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - Article 35246 reports on a software failure incident related to voting machines that used easily guessable passwords like "abcde" and "admin," had poor physical security protections, and had outdated operating systems, which made them vulnerable to hacking from a distance [35246]. - Article 61338 discusses how hackers at the Defcon Voting Village were able to exploit vulnerabilities in voting machines, such as the Advanced Voting Solutions WinVote machine, by using simple methods like exploiting an unpatched Windows XP vulnerability and gaining remote access [61338]. - Article 75347 highlights vulnerabilities in voting machines, including weak password protections and network vulnerabilities, that were found during the DefCon security conference's Voting Village event, indicating issues with the security of the hardware components of the voting machines [75347]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - Article 74673 mentions the hacking of voting machines at Defcon, where hackers were able to demonstrate how easy it was to hack into the machines, indicating software vulnerabilities that were exploited [74673]. - Article 89632 discusses urgent vulnerabilities found in voting machines, including easily guessable hardcoded system credentials and potential for operating system manipulations, highlighting software-related flaws in the voting machines [89632]. - Article 89225 details vulnerabilities in voting machines and vote counters, such as weak password protections and remote access avenues, indicating software-related vulnerabilities that were identified during the DefCon security conference's Voting Village event [89225]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious, non-malicious | (a) The articles highlight software failure incidents related to malicious intent by hackers targeting voting machines. These incidents involve hacking attempts at Defcon events, where vulnerabilities in voting machines were exploited by hackers to demonstrate the ease of compromising the machines [74673, 89632, 35246, 61338, 89225]. (b) Additionally, the articles discuss non-malicious software failures related to vulnerabilities and flaws in voting machines that were not intentionally introduced to harm the system. These vulnerabilities include weak password protections, outdated software, and basic security flaws that could be exploited by individuals with physical access to the machines [35246, 75347]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions | (a) The intent of the software failure incident: - The software failure incidents related to voting machines being vulnerable to hacking were not due to accidental decisions but rather poor decisions made in the design and implementation of the machines [35246, 61338, 75347]. - The vulnerabilities in the voting machines were a result of poor decisions such as using weak passwords like "abcde" and "admin," lack of security protections, outdated software, and easily exploitable flaws [35246, 61338, 75347]. - The failure to address known vulnerabilities over the years despite being aware of them indicates poor decisions in maintaining the security of the voting machines [75347]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence: - The articles highlight vulnerabilities in voting machines that have persisted for years despite being known and not fixed, indicating a lack of professional competence in addressing security flaws [35246, 75347]. - The report from the Def Con Voting Village event revealed numerous flaws in voting machines that have not been fixed over the course of more than a decade, showing a lack of progress in addressing known vulnerabilities [75347]. (b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally: - The articles do not provide specific information about the software failure incident occurring accidentally. |
| Duration | permanent, temporary | (a) The software failure incident in the articles seems to be more of a permanent nature. The vulnerabilities and flaws in the voting machines have been persistent over the years, with some of the issues dating back a decade or more. For example, vulnerabilities from a decade ago still plague voting machines currently in use [Article 89632]. Additionally, some machines had flaws in their system credentials, potential for operating system manipulations, and remote attacks that could compromise memory or integrity checks [Article 89632]. The flaws found in the voting machines have not been adequately addressed or fixed despite being known for a long time, indicating a more permanent nature of the software failure incident. (b) The software failure incident can also be considered temporary in a sense that it was exposed and highlighted during specific events like the Defcon Voting Village where elite hackers demonstrated vulnerabilities in voting equipment. The vulnerabilities were discovered during these events, showcasing the weaknesses in the machines [Article 89225]. However, the underlying issues with the voting machines have persisted over time, indicating a more permanent nature of the software failure incident. |
| Behaviour | crash, omission, value, other | (a) crash: The articles mention vulnerabilities in voting machines that could lead to a crash or failure of the system to perform its intended functions. For example, the Defcon Voting Village found vulnerabilities in voting equipment that could be exploited to compromise the machines [#89632]. Additionally, the articles discuss how hackers were able to break into voting machines and change votes remotely, indicating a potential crash of the voting system [#61338]. (b) omission: The software failure incident related to omission is evident in the vulnerabilities found in voting machines that allowed attackers to manipulate votes or compromise the integrity of the election process. For instance, hackers were able to change votes remotely on the Advanced Voting Solutions WinVote machine, highlighting the omission of the system to prevent unauthorized access and tampering [#61338]. (c) timing: The timing aspect of the software failure incident is not explicitly mentioned in the articles provided. (d) value: The software failure incident related to the value is demonstrated by the vulnerabilities found in voting machines that could lead to incorrect functioning of the systems. For example, the articles discuss how hackers were able to change votes on the WinVote machine, indicating a failure in the system to maintain the integrity of the voting process [#61338]. (e) byzantine: The articles do not explicitly mention the software failure incident related to a byzantine behavior. (f) other: The software failure incident related to other behaviors includes the discovery of vulnerabilities in voting machines that could compromise the security and accuracy of elections. These vulnerabilities, such as weak passwords, lack of security protections, and remote access possibilities, highlight a broader issue of system weaknesses that could lead to unauthorized access and manipulation of votes [#35246, #61338, #75347, #89225, #89632]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | processing_unit, network_communication, embedded_software | (a) sensor: The articles do not specifically mention any software failure incidents related to sensor errors. (b) actuator: The articles do not specifically mention any software failure incidents related to actuator errors. (c) processing_unit: Article 75347 discusses vulnerabilities in voting machines related to processing errors. It mentions flaws in the update architecture of a ballot counter made by Election Systems & Software, the Model 650, which has persisted since 2007. This indicates a failure related to the processing unit of the voting machine. (d) network_communication: Article 75347 also mentions a network vulnerability found in a ballot counter made by Election Systems & Software, the Model 650, which is used by 26 states and the District of Columbia. This indicates a failure related to network communication errors. (e) embedded_software: Article 75347 discusses vulnerabilities in voting machines related to embedded software errors. It mentions that many of the machines analyzed during the Voting Village run software written in the early 2000s or even the 1990s. Some vulnerabilities detailed in the report were disclosed years ago and still haven't been resolved, indicating issues with the embedded software of the voting machines. |
| Communication | link_level, connectivity_level | [a35246] The AVS WinVote machines used in elections had vulnerabilities that allowed for remote attacks and easy access to the system, indicating a failure at the connectivity level. The machines had weak password protections, hidden ethernet cables for internet connection, and flaws in the update architecture that persisted for years. Additionally, the machines were found to have network vulnerabilities that could compromise their security. |
| Application | TRUE | The software failure incidents reported in the articles were related to vulnerabilities and flaws in the voting machines used in elections. These vulnerabilities included weak password protections, easily guessable hardcoded system credentials, potential for operating system manipulations, remote attacks compromising memory or integrity checks, and poor physical security protections [89632, 35246, 61338, 89225]. These issues point towards failures at the application layer of the cyber physical system, as they involve bugs, unhandled exceptions, and incorrect usage that could be exploited by hackers to compromise the voting machines. |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | property, non-human | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - No information about people losing their lives due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - No information about people being physically harmed due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - No information about people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The articles discuss vulnerabilities in voting machines that could potentially impact the integrity of election results, which could have significant consequences on the democratic process and public trust in elections [35246, 61338, 75347]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - No information about people having to postpone an activity due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incidents discussed in the articles primarily focus on vulnerabilities in voting machines used in elections, which could impact the accuracy and security of election results [35246, 61338, 75347]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The articles clearly highlight the vulnerabilities in voting machines and the potential risks associated with compromised election systems, indicating real consequences of the software failures [35246, 61338, 75347]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles discuss the potential consequences of compromised election systems, such as loss of public trust in election results and the need for improved election security, which are not theoretical but practical concerns [35246, 61338, 75347]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The articles primarily focus on the potential consequences related to election security and the integrity of election results due to vulnerabilities in voting machines. |
| Domain | information, government | (a) The failed system was related to the industry of information, specifically in the context of election systems and voting machines. The articles discuss vulnerabilities and flaws in voting machines used in elections, highlighting issues such as weak passwords, remote access vulnerabilities, and outdated software that could compromise the integrity of election results [35246, 61338, 75347, 89632, 89225]. (l) The failed system also pertains to the government industry, as it directly impacts the election infrastructure and the democratic process. The articles emphasize the importance of securing election systems to ensure the accuracy and reliability of election results, which are crucial for the functioning of government and democracy [35246, 61338, 75347, 89632, 89225]. |
Article ID: 74673
Article ID: 89632
Article ID: 35246
Article ID: 61338
Article ID: 89225
Article ID: 75347