Incident: Hackers Ground Airplanes by Sending Bogus Flight Plans.

Published Date: 2015-06-22

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving the grounding of airplanes due to hackers accessing computer systems responsible for issuing flight plans to pilots of Poland's state-owned LOT airline happened on Sunday [37119]. 2. The article was published on 2015-06-22. 3. Estimation: The incident occurred on Sunday before the article was published on 2015-06-22. Therefore, the software failure incident happened in June 2015.
System 1. Flight plan-delivery protocol used by every airline [37119] 2. ACARS datalink system (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System) [37119]
Responsible Organization 1. Hackers were responsible for causing the software failure incident at Poland's state-owned LOT airline and United Airlines, as they breached the network and sent bogus flight plans to pilots [37119].
Impacted Organization 1. Poland's state-owned LOT airline [37119] 2. Passengers on flights headed to Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Copenhagen, and cities in Poland [37119] 3. United Airlines [37119]
Software Causes 1. Lack of authentication in the flight plan-delivery protocol used by airlines, allowing hackers to send bogus flight plans to pilots [37119].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of authentication in the flight plan-delivery protocol used by airlines, allowing hackers to send bogus flight plans to pilots [37119].
Impacts 1. More than 10 airplanes were grounded, affecting approximately 1,400 passengers on flights to various destinations, including Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Copenhagen, and cities in Poland [37119]. 2. Flights were canceled and delayed, causing inconvenience to passengers and disrupting travel plans [37119]. 3. The software failure incident led to a delay of about five hours before the problem was reportedly fixed [37119].
Preventions 1. Implementing authentication measures for the flight plan delivery protocol to ensure that only legitimate sources can send flight plans to pilots could have prevented the incident [37119]. 2. Enhancing the protocol for delivering flight plans to include checks and verification mechanisms to detect and reject bogus flight plans before they reach the pilots could have also prevented the software failure incident [37119].
Fixes 1. Implementing authentication measures for flight plan delivery protocols to ensure that only legitimate sources can send flight plans to pilots [37119]. 2. Developing a standard for end-to-end secure networking using broadband radios installed on airplanes to enhance the security of data transmission [37119]. 3. Enhancing the system to reject bogus flight plans before they reach the pilot, ensuring that only valid and accurate flight plans are accepted [37119].
References 1. LOT spokesman Adrian Kubicki [37119] 2. Passenger Edward Benson, founder and CTO of Cloudstitch [37119] 3. Passenger Christ Habets [37119] 4. Peter Lemme, an independent consultant and chair of the SAE-sponsored Ku/Ka band satcom subcommittee [37119]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to bogus flight plans being sent to pilots has happened again at United Airlines. In a previous incident, all United flights in the US were grounded for nearly an hour due to problems with flight plans dispatched to its pilots, resulting in delays and cancellations [37119]. (b) The software failure incident related to bogus flight plans being sent to pilots has also happened at LOT airline in Poland. Hackers apparently got into the computer systems responsible for issuing flight plans to pilots, causing some flights to be cancelled and others to be delayed [37119].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where it is mentioned that the flight plan-delivery protocol used by every airline, including LOT airline, was a weak link that allowed hackers to potentially send bogus flight plans to pilots [37119]. This indicates a design flaw in the protocol that did not require authentication, making it vulnerable to unauthorized access and manipulation. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the article where it describes how hackers breached the network at Warsaw's Chopin airport, causing flight cancellations and delays for approximately 1,400 passengers on flights to various destinations [37119]. This disruption in the operation of the system led to significant inconvenience for both the airline and the affected passengers.
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the bogus flight plans affecting LOT airline and United Airlines was primarily due to contributing factors originating from within the system. The vulnerability in the flight plan-delivery protocol used by airlines allowed hackers to send bogus flight plans to pilots, causing disruptions and grounding of flights [37119]. The issue with the protocol not requiring authentication and accepting properly formatted plans regardless of the source was highlighted as a systemic problem within the system itself [37119]. The incident did not pose a safety concern as pilots have checks in place to verify and confirm the accuracy of the flight plans before taking any action [37119]. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident was also influenced by contributing factors originating from outside the system, specifically from hackers who breached the network at Warsaw's Chopin airport and gained unauthorized access to the flight plan systems of LOT airline, causing disruptions and grounding of flights [37119]. The external threat posed by hackers exploiting the vulnerability in the flight plan-delivery protocol highlighted the importance of cybersecurity measures to protect against such attacks [37119].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in the articles was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically hackers gaining unauthorized access to the computer systems responsible for issuing flight plans to pilots of Poland's state-owned LOT airline and United Airlines. This unauthorized access led to the grounding of airplanes and the disruption of flight plans [37119]. (b) Human actions also played a role in the incident as the protocol for delivering flight plans did not require authentication, making it vulnerable to exploitation by hackers. Additionally, human actions were involved in the response to the incident, such as pilots and airline personnel identifying and addressing the issue with the flight plans [37119].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The incident involved hackers apparently getting into computer systems responsible for issuing flight plans to pilots of Poland's state-owned LOT airline, indicating a breach in the hardware systems [37119]. - The ACARS datalink system, which is used to distribute flight plans and other data to pilots, is a hardware component that was potentially compromised in the incident [37119]. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The issue with both the LOT planes and United Airlines was identified as potentially being the protocol for delivering flight plans, which doesn't require authentication, indicating a software vulnerability [37119]. - The protocol for delivering flight plans was highlighted as a potential weak link that could allow hackers to send bogus flight plans to pilots, irrespective of the branded flight-plan system used by an airline, pointing to a software-related flaw [37119].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is malicious in nature. It involved hackers breaching the network at Warsaw's Chopin airport and getting into computer systems responsible for issuing flight plans to pilots of Poland's state-owned LOT airline [37119]. The hackers sent bogus flight plans to pilots, causing flights to be cancelled and delayed, affecting approximately 1,400 passengers. The incident was similar to a previous mysterious grounding of United Airlines planes, where hackers also sent bogus flight plans to pilots, resulting in all United flights in the US being grounded for nearly an hour [37119]. The issue was related to the flight plan-delivery protocol used by airlines, which did not require authentication, allowing hackers to exploit the system and send false information to pilots [37119].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions can be inferred from the articles. The incident involving the grounding of airplanes at LOT airline and United Airlines was due to hackers breaching the network and sending bogus flight plans to pilots. The protocol for delivering flight plans did not require authentication, which allowed hackers to exploit this vulnerability and disrupt flight operations [37119]. This lack of authentication in the flight plan delivery protocol can be seen as a poor decision in the design and implementation of the software system, leading to the software failure incident.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as it discusses the vulnerability in the flight plan-delivery protocol used by airlines. The protocol did not require authentication, allowing hackers to send bogus flight plans to pilots, leading to the grounding of airplanes. This lack of proper authentication in the protocol can be attributed to a lack of professional competence in designing a secure system [37119]. (b) The accidental aspect of the software failure incident is also highlighted in the article. For example, United Airlines experienced problems with flight plans dispatched to its pilots, resulting in delays and grounding of flights. Passengers reported that bogus flight plans were popping up in the system, indicating an accidental introduction of incorrect data that led to the disruption in flight operations [37119].
Duration temporary (a) The software failure incident described in the articles was temporary. In the case of the LOT airline incident, the problem with the flight plans was reportedly fixed after about five hours [37119]. Similarly, in the United Airlines incident, all flights in the US were grounded for nearly an hour before the problem was resolved [37119]. These incidents were not permanent failures but rather temporary disruptions that were eventually rectified.
Behaviour omission, timing, value, other (a) crash: The articles do not mention any instances of the system losing state and not performing any of its intended functions. (b) omission: The incident involved the issuance of bogus flight plans to pilots, which could lead to the system omitting to perform its intended functions of providing accurate flight plans to pilots [37119]. (c) timing: The system was reported to have experienced problems with flight plans being dispatched to pilots, causing delays in flights. This could be considered a timing failure where the system performed its intended functions but at the wrong time [37119]. (d) value: The incident involved the issuance of incorrect flight plans to pilots, indicating a failure in the system performing its intended functions incorrectly [37119]. (e) byzantine: The articles do not mention any inconsistent responses or interactions that would classify the failure as a byzantine behavior. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in this case could be described as a security vulnerability leading to unauthorized access and manipulation of flight plans, potentially compromising the safety and efficiency of airline operations [37119].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception processing_unit, network_communication, embedded_software (a) sensor: The software failure incident reported in the articles is not related to sensor errors. (b) actuator: The software failure incident reported in the articles is not related to actuator errors. (c) processing_unit: The failure was related to the processing unit of the cyber-physical system. The incident involved hackers breaching the network at Warsaw's Chopin airport, causing flight cancellations and delays due to issues with flight plans being sent to pilots [37119]. (d) network_communication: The failure was related to network communication errors. The incident involved hackers breaching the network at Warsaw's Chopin airport, causing flight cancellations and delays due to issues with flight plans being sent to pilots [37119]. (e) embedded_software: The failure was related to embedded software errors. The incident involved hackers breaching the network at Warsaw's Chopin airport, causing flight cancellations and delays due to issues with flight plans being sent to pilots [37119].
Communication connectivity_level The failure related to the software incident in the articles was more closely associated with the connectivity level rather than the link level of the cyber-physical system. The incident involved hackers breaching the network at Warsaw's Chopin airport, causing flight cancellations and delays by sending bogus flight plans to pilots through the ACARS datalink system [37119]. This indicates that the failure was primarily at the network or transport layer, affecting the communication and distribution of flight plans rather than being a physical layer issue.
Application FALSE The software failure incident described in the articles was not related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. The failure was due to hackers breaching the network and sending bogus flight plans to pilots, exploiting a vulnerability in the flight plan-delivery protocol used by airlines. This indicates a security breach rather than a failure at the application layer caused by bugs, operating system errors, unhandled exceptions, or incorrect usage [37119].

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, delay, non-human, theoretical_consequence (a) death: There were no reports of people losing their lives due to the software failure incident mentioned in the articles [37119]. (b) harm: There were no reports of people being physically harmed due to the software failure incident mentioned in the articles [37119]. (c) basic: There were no reports of people's access to food or shelter being impacted because of the software failure incident mentioned in the articles [37119]. (d) property: The software failure incident did impact people's travel plans as flights were grounded, causing inconvenience to passengers [37119]. (e) delay: The software failure incident resulted in flight delays and cancellations affecting approximately 1,400 passengers [37119]. (f) non-human: The software failure incident impacted airplanes as more than 10 airplanes were grounded due to the hack into the computer systems responsible for issuing flight plans [37119]. (g) no_consequence: There were observed consequences of the software failure incident, such as flight delays and cancellations [37119]. (h) theoretical_consequence: The potential consequences discussed included the possibility of hackers sending bogus flight plans to pilots, which could lead to confusion and inefficiencies in flight routing but not safety concerns [37119]. (i) other: The software failure incident did not result in any other specific consequences beyond the flight disruptions and potential inefficiencies in flight routing discussed in the articles [37119].
Domain transportation (a) The failed system in the incident was related to the transportation industry. The software failure incident involved the computer systems responsible for issuing flight plans to pilots of Poland's state-owned LOT airline and United Airlines, resulting in the grounding of airplanes and flight delays [37119]. The incident highlighted vulnerabilities in the flight plan-delivery protocol used by airlines, which could potentially impact the transportation of passengers and goods by air.

Sources

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