| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the German debit and credit card issue in 2010 was specific to Gemalto, the French card manufacturer. Gemalto admitted blame for the failure, which affected about 30 million chip and pin cards in Germany. The incident cost an estimated €300m to rectify, and Gemalto was working on a software update or potentially replacing the affected cards. Gemalto-manufactured cards in other countries were not affected by the software bug [28].
(b) The software failure incident in Germany in 2010, where millions of debit and credit card holders were unable to withdraw money or make payments due to a programming failure, did not mention similar incidents happening at other organizations or with their products and services. The focus of the article was on Gemalto and the specific issue with their cards in Germany [28]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 28 was primarily due to a design issue. The failure was caused by a software bug related to the programming of the microchips in the cards not recognizing the year change to 2010. This bug was a result of a programming failure introduced during the development phase by the French card manufacturer, Gemalto. The article mentions that Gemalto admitted blame for the failure and was attempting a software update to rectify the issue, which might also require replacing the affected cards [28].
(b) Additionally, the operation phase also played a role in the software failure incident. The article mentions that some cash machines were quickly reconfigured to override the 2010 problem, indicating that the operation and maintenance procedures of these machines were adjusted to address the issue caused by the software bug. Furthermore, customers were urged to call telephone hotlines to find out what to do if their cards were affected, highlighting the operational aspect of managing the fallout from the software failure [28]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident described in Article 28 was within the system. The issue was caused by a software bug in the microchips of the debit and credit cards, specifically related to the programming failure that prevented the cards from recognizing the year change to 2010. This internal system failure led to millions of German cardholders being unable to withdraw money or make payments, causing significant disruptions and financial inconveniences [28]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The software failure incident in Germany was caused by a 2010 software bug that left millions of German debit and credit card holders unable to withdraw money or make payments in shops. The bug was related to the microchips in the cards not recognizing the year change to 2010, which was a non-human factor introduced due to a programming failure [28].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The article does not mention any specific human actions that directly contributed to the software failure incident. Therefore, it is unknown if human actions played a role in this particular incident. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 28 occurred due to a hardware-related issue. The incident was caused by a 2010 software bug that affected about 30 million chip and pin cards in Germany. The programming failure meant that the microchips in the cards could not recognize the year change to 2010, leading to customers being unable to withdraw money or make payments in shops [28].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 28 was primarily attributed to a software-related issue. The fault was acknowledged by a French card manufacturer, Gemalto, which admitted to being responsible for the failure. Gemalto mentioned attempting a software update to rectify the issue, indicating that the root cause of the incident was related to software programming [28]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in Article 28 was non-malicious. The incident was attributed to a software bug in the chip and pin cards that prevented them from recognizing the year change to 2010. This bug was not introduced with malicious intent but rather as a result of a programming failure by the French card manufacturer, Gemalto. The company admitted blame for the failure, estimating a cost of €300m to rectify the issue. The incident led to inconvenience for millions of German debit and credit card holders, with many stranded without access to cash or the ability to make payments [28]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
accidental_decisions |
From the provided article [28], the software failure incident related to the German debit and credit card issue was primarily due to an accidental decision rather than poor decisions. The incident was caused by a software bug in the programming that led to the microchips in the cards not recognizing the year change to 2010. This was not a deliberate poor decision but rather an unintended consequence of the programming error. Gemalto, the French card manufacturer, admitted blame for the failure and was working on a software update to rectify the issue, indicating that the failure was accidental rather than a result of deliberate poor decisions. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 28 was primarily due to development incompetence. The article mentions that a software bug in 2010 left millions of German debit and credit card holders unable to withdraw money or make payments in shops. This bug was caused by a programming failure where the microchips in cards could not recognize the year change to 2010. The French card manufacturer, Gemalto, admitted to being to blame for the failure, estimating a cost of €300m to rectify the issue. This indicates a lack of professional competence in the development process that led to the software bug affecting a significant number of cards [28].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 28 was not accidental but rather a result of a specific programming failure related to the year change to 2010. Gemalto, the card manufacturer, acknowledged the issue and was attempting a software update to address the problem. The fault was not a random or accidental occurrence but a direct result of the software bug introduced during the development process [28]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in Article 28 can be categorized as a temporary failure. The incident was caused by a specific software bug related to the recognition of the year change to 2010 in the microchips of the cards, leading to the inability of cardholders to withdraw money or make payments. The article mentions that efforts were being made to rectify the issue through a software update and potentially card replacements. Additionally, some cash machines were reconfigured to override the problem, indicating a temporary workaround to address the immediate impact of the failure. Customers were also urged to call hotlines to find out what to do if their cards were affected, suggesting ongoing efforts to manage the situation [28]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in Article 28 resulted in a crash scenario where millions of German debit and credit card holders were unable to withdraw money or make payments in shops due to the programming failure [28].
(b) omission: The software failure incident also involved omission as the microchips in the affected cards could not recognize the year change to 2010, leading to the omission of performing their intended functions [28].
(c) timing: While the software failure incident did not directly involve timing issues, it did cause delays and inconvenience for bank customers who were forced to queue to withdraw cash over the counter due to the malfunctioning cards [28].
(d) value: The software failure incident did not specifically involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly in terms of providing incorrect values or data [28].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [28].
(f) other: The software failure incident could be categorized under the "other" behavior as it led to a situation where the affected cards were unable to perform their primary functions of facilitating transactions, resulting in significant disruptions for cardholders and businesses [28]. |