| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder impacting cars from various manufacturers, including Volkswagen, has happened again within the same organization. Researchers discovered the flaw in the transponder used in cars from Volkswagen's Porsche, Audi, Bentley, and Lamborghini brands, which allowed hackers to potentially start the engine without the correct key fob [38614].
(b) The software failure incident related to the flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder has also impacted cars from multiple organizations. The affected cars included models from Audi, Fiat, Honda, Kia, Volkswagen, Volvo, and others, all relying on chips made by EM Microelectronic in Switzerland [38614]. Additionally, a similar flaw was exploited by the RollJam device, which could open cars from various manufacturers such as Chrysler, Daewoo, Fiat, GM, Honda, Toyota, Volvo, and the Volkswagen Group, among others [38614]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the flaw discovered in the Megamos Crypto transponder used in various car models. Researchers found that the transponder's internal security was weaker than expected, allowing hackers to exploit the encryption between the car and remote control [38614].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is demonstrated by the RollJam device, which intercepts the rolling codes exchanged between car keys and vehicles. This interception prevents the codes from reaching the car, enabling unauthorized access and potential theft of vehicles [38614]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder used in cars falls under the category of within_system failure. The flaw was discovered by researchers who found weaknesses in the encryption mechanism of the transponder, allowing hackers to exploit the system and potentially start the engine without the correct key fob [38614].
(b) On the other hand, the incident also involves contributing factors that originate from outside the system. For example, the researchers had to go to court to fight against automakers who wanted to keep the discovery of the flaw a secret. Volkswagen, in particular, used its lawyers to keep the research under wraps, indicating external legal actions were taken to suppress the information about the vulnerability [38614]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- The software failure incident in the articles is primarily due to a flaw in the widely-used Megamos Crypto transponder, which is responsible for the encryption between the car and remote [38614].
- The flaw allowed hackers to exploit the communication between the car and the transponder wirelessly, reducing the number of possible combinations to just 200,000 after listening in twice [38614].
- The flaw was discovered by researchers who broke the transponder's cryptographic system by intercepting the radio communication between the key and the transponder, enabling them to find the correct combination to start the car in less than half an hour [38614].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- Human actions contributed to the software failure incident as researchers discovered and exploited the flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder, highlighting the weakness in the cryptographic mechanisms used in the transponder [38614].
- Volkswagen and other manufacturers initially went to court to keep the researchers' discovery of the flaw a secret, indicating a deliberate attempt to suppress the information about the vulnerability [38614].
- Volkswagen sued the universities and researchers personally to block them from publishing their discovery, emphasizing the conflict between academic free speech and the security of millions of cars [38614]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The software failure incident related to the flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder used in cars was due to a hardware issue. The flaw was in the transponder itself, which is a hardware component responsible for the encryption between the car and remote [38614].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The software failure incident related to the flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder was also due to software issues. The flaw was in the cryptographic mechanisms of the transponder, specifically in the proprietary cipher and PIN code, which were not strong enough to prevent the hack [38614]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. Researchers discovered a massive flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder used in cars, allowing hackers to potentially steal vehicles by exploiting the vulnerability in the encryption system [38614].
The flaw was exploited by hackers who intercepted the wireless communication between the car and the transponder, significantly reducing the number of possible combinations for the secret key and enabling them to create fake keys that could start the engine [38614].
Additionally, the incident involved the creation of a device called RollJam, which could open cars at the click of a button, making auto hacking simple for anyone to carry out [38614].
Volkswagen went to court to keep the researchers' discovery a secret, highlighting the seriousness of the vulnerability and the potential impact on the security of millions of vehicles [38614].
(b) The software failure incident was not non-malicious as it involved intentional actions by hackers to exploit the vulnerability in the encryption system of the Megamos Crypto transponder, demonstrating a clear intent to harm the system and potentially steal vehicles [38614]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
- The software failure incident related to the flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder used in cars was not accidental but rather a result of poor decisions made by automakers and chip manufacturers. Researchers had known about the flaws since 2012 and had warned automakers, but the issue was not adequately addressed [38614].
- Volkswagen and other manufacturers went to court to keep the discovery of the flaw a secret, indicating a deliberate attempt to suppress information about the vulnerability [38614].
- The flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder was a result of weak proprietary ciphers and insufficient cryptographic mechanisms, highlighting poor decisions in the design and implementation of the security system in the cars [38614]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article where researchers discovered a massive flaw in the remote controls used by hundreds of cars, including luxury vehicles from Volkswagen's Porsche, Audi, Bentley, and Lamborghini brands. Despite knowing about the flaws since 2012, the researchers warned automakers, but Volkswagen and other manufacturers went to court two years ago to keep the discovery a secret [38614].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is demonstrated by the flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder, which is responsible for the encryption between the car and remote. The flaw allowed hackers to narrow down the number of possible combinations to just 200,000 by listening in to the wireless communication between the car and the transponder, making it vulnerable to automated 'cracking' programs [38614]. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is more of a permanent nature. The flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder used in various car models allowed hackers to exploit the system by intercepting wireless communication between the car and the transponder, significantly reducing the number of possible combinations for the secret key. This flaw was not a one-time occurrence but a fundamental weakness in the cryptographic system that could be exploited repeatedly, making it a permanent issue [38614].
(b) The software failure incident can also be considered temporary in the sense that the flaw was discovered by researchers who then presented their findings at a conference and gave the chip maker nine months to fix the problem before going public with their discovery. Additionally, the researchers agreed to omit a pivotal detail from their report to prevent non-technical individuals from easily replicating the hack, indicating a temporary mitigation measure [38614]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident related to the flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder can be categorized as a crash. The flaw allowed hackers to exploit the transponder, leading to the immobilization of the engine if the correct key fob was not detected. This resulted in the system losing its intended state of preventing unauthorized access to the vehicle, ultimately leading to a security breach [38614].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. The flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder caused the system to omit performing its intended function of securely verifying the identity of the key fob before allowing the engine to start. This omission led to the vulnerability that allowed hackers to bypass the security measures [38614].
(c) timing: The software failure incident does not align with the timing category as there is no indication that the system performed its intended functions at incorrect times [38614].
(d) value: The software failure incident can be categorized under the value type of failure. The flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder caused the system to incorrectly perform its intended function of encryption and authentication, leading to unauthorized access to the vehicle [38614].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with the byzantine category as there is no mention of inconsistent responses or interactions within the system [38614].
(f) other: The software failure incident can be further described as a security vulnerability. The flaw in the Megamos Crypto transponder allowed for unauthorized access to vehicles by exploiting the encryption and authentication mechanisms, highlighting a critical security weakness in the system [38614]. |