| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) In the article, it is mentioned that Tesla had to address six vulnerabilities in their Model S car that were discovered by researchers. The vulnerabilities included issues with the car's infotainment system, outdated browser, and potential remote hacks. Tesla worked with the researchers to develop fixes and distributed a patch to all Model S vehicles to address the vulnerabilities. This incident highlights the importance of software security in Tesla vehicles [38895].
(b) The article compares the Tesla Model S hacks to a previous incident involving a Chrysler Jeep, where researchers were able to compromise the Jeep's infotainment system and control critical functions like brakes and steering. The article points out that Tesla had a gateway system in place to prevent hackers from reaching critical functions, unlike the Jeep. This comparison suggests that similar incidents have occurred in the automotive industry, emphasizing the need for robust cybersecurity measures in digitally connected cars [38895]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the vulnerabilities discovered by researchers in the Tesla Model S. The vulnerabilities included outdated software components like an out-of-date browser with a four-year-old Apple WebKit vulnerability that could potentially allow remote hacking to start the car or cut the motor [38895]. The researchers found six vulnerabilities in the Tesla car, which required working with the company to develop fixes for some of them. Tesla distributed a patch to every Model S on the road to address these vulnerabilities [38895].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be observed in the ability of the researchers to remotely cut the Model S engine by installing a remote-access Trojan on the car's network and using a mobile phone to telnet into the car and cut the power [38895]. Additionally, the researchers were able to gain access to the car's LAN by connecting to the Ethernet cable for diagnostic purposes, allowing them to uncover information about the firmware update process and gain access to the Tesla firmware update server [38895]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incident discussed in the articles is primarily within_system. The vulnerabilities and hacks discovered by the researchers were related to the Tesla Model S' infotainment system, outdated browser, and network security within the car itself. The vulnerabilities allowed for remote access, control of the car's functions, and potential malicious activities like cutting the engine remotely. The researchers found and exploited weaknesses within the car's software and network architecture, highlighting the importance of internal security measures [38895].
(b) However, the incident also touches on outside_system factors to some extent. For example, the researchers compared the security measures of Tesla with those of other car manufacturers like Fiat Chrysler, indicating an external benchmark for evaluating security practices in the industry. Additionally, the researchers' goal was to assess Tesla's approach to car security to provide insights for the wider car industry, suggesting an external perspective on security practices [38895]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The vulnerability in the Tesla Model S' infotainment system was due to an out-of-date browser using a four-year-old Apple WebKit vulnerability, which could potentially allow an attacker to conduct a fully remote hack to start the car or cut the motor [38895].
The researchers found six vulnerabilities in the Tesla car, some of which required physical access to the vehicle initially, and worked with the company to develop fixes for them. Tesla distributed a patch to every Model S on the road to address these vulnerabilities [38895].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The researchers discovered vulnerabilities in the Tesla Model S that could be exploited by physically accessing the car and planting a remote-access Trojan on the network, allowing them to cut the engine remotely while someone else was driving. They also found basic vulnerabilities such as using telnet or simple network protocols to connect to services inside the network and gain intelligence about the car [38895].
The researchers highlighted that once an attacker gained access to the car's infotainment system, they could gradually leverage additional vulnerabilities to increase their access, ultimately gaining full control of the entertainment system. This included being able to remotely cut the engine, alter speed readouts, and perform various actions through the infotainment system [38895]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The article mentions that the researchers found vulnerabilities in the Tesla Model S that required physical access to the car initially, such as plugging a laptop into a network cable behind the driver's-side dashboard to start the car with a software command [38895].
- The vulnerabilities discovered by the researchers involved aspects like the car's infotainment system, which had the ability to start the car or cut power to it [38895].
- The researchers also uncovered information about the firmware update process by connecting to the car's LAN through an Ethernet cable for diagnostic purposes [38895].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The article highlights that the vulnerabilities found in the Tesla Model S were related to software aspects like an out-of-date browser using a four-year-old Apple WebKit vulnerability that could potentially allow a remote hack to start the car or cut the motor [38895].
- The researchers were able to gain access to the car's LAN and uncover information about the firmware update process, including VPN credentials and unsecured passwords in an update file, which allowed them to access the Tesla firmware update server [38895].
- The vulnerabilities discovered by the researchers were related to software weaknesses in the car's systems, such as the ability to telnet or use simple network protocols to connect to services inside the network and gain intelligence about the car [38895]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident discussed in the articles is primarily malicious in nature. The incident involved researchers discovering vulnerabilities in the Tesla Model S that could be exploited by hackers to remotely access and control various functions of the car, such as starting the car, cutting power to the engine, opening and closing windows, locking and unlocking doors, and manipulating the suspension system. The vulnerabilities allowed for potential malicious activities, including planting a remote-access Trojan on the car's network, gaining superuser access to the infotainment system, and potentially injecting malicious CAN messages into the car's systems [38895]. The researchers highlighted the risks associated with digitally connected cars and emphasized the importance of addressing security vulnerabilities to prevent malicious attacks on vehicles.
(b) While the incident involved non-malicious aspects such as researchers conducting a thorough analysis of the Tesla Model S to identify vulnerabilities and working with the company to develop fixes, the overall focus of the incident was on exposing potential security weaknesses that could be exploited by malicious actors. The vulnerabilities discovered in the car's systems were not intentionally introduced to harm the system but could be leveraged by individuals with malicious intent to compromise the vehicle's security and control [38895]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
- The software failure incident related to the Tesla Model S involved poor decisions that contributed to vulnerabilities in the car's infotainment system. Researchers found that the car's infotainment system was using an out-of-date browser with a four-year-old Apple WebKit vulnerability that could potentially allow an attacker to conduct a fully remote hack to start the car or cut the motor [38895].
- The vulnerabilities in the Tesla car were discovered after researchers examined the architecture of the Model S over a period of about two years. They found six vulnerabilities in the car, including the use of an outdated browser and other weaknesses that could be exploited by attackers with physical access to the vehicle [38895]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence can be seen in the vulnerabilities discovered in the Tesla Model S by researchers Kevin Mahaffey and Marc Rogers. They found six vulnerabilities in the car's infotainment system, including an out-of-date browser with a four-year-old Apple WebKit vulnerability that could potentially allow a remote hack to start the car or cut the motor [38895].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is evident in the unintentional vulnerabilities found in the Tesla Model S, such as the outdated browser with known vulnerabilities and the unsecured passwords in an update file that allowed access to the Tesla firmware update server. These accidental factors contributed to the potential risks of remote hacking and control of the vehicle [38895]. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
The software failure incident discussed in the articles related to the Tesla Model S vulnerabilities can be categorized as both temporary and permanent.
Temporary: The vulnerabilities discovered by the researchers required physical access to the car and control of the car's infotainment system to execute certain hacks initially. For example, the ability to start the car with a software command or cut its engine remotely required specific conditions to be met, such as having access to the car's network cable behind the dashboard [38895].
Permanent: On the other hand, the presence of outdated software components like the out-of-date browser with a known WebKit vulnerability posed a long-term risk of potential remote hacks that could start the car or cut the motor without requiring physical access. This vulnerability could potentially allow an attacker to gain access to the infotainment system remotely through a malicious web page [38895].
Therefore, the software failure incident can be considered temporary due to the specific conditions required for some hacks and permanent due to the long-term risk posed by the outdated software components. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The articles do not mention any instances of the software system crashing and losing its state.
(b) omission: The software system in the Tesla Model S was found to have vulnerabilities that could allow attackers to remotely cut the engine, plant a remote-access Trojan, and gain control of the infotainment system, among other actions. These vulnerabilities could be considered instances of the system omitting to perform its intended functions securely [38895].
(c) timing: There is no mention of the software system performing its intended functions too late or too early in the articles.
(d) value: The vulnerabilities found in the Tesla Model S, such as the ability to remotely cut the engine or gain unauthorized access to the infotainment system, could be considered instances of the system performing its intended functions incorrectly [38895].
(e) byzantine: The behavior of the software system in the Tesla Model S did not exhibit inconsistent responses or interactions as described in a byzantine failure.
(f) other: The other behavior observed in the software failure incident is the system being susceptible to remote attacks due to vulnerabilities in the infotainment system, potentially leading to unauthorized control of various car functions [38895]. |