Published Date: 2011-03-04
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident related to the NASA Glory atmospheric research mission satellite crashing into the southern Pacific Ocean due to a protective nose cone fairing failure during launch aboard an Orbital Sciences Corp. Taurus XL rocket happened on March 4, 2011, as reported in [Article 4557]. |
| System | unknown |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Sapa Profiles (now Hydro Extrusion Portland) - The failure of the aluminum extrusions in the component known as the payload fairing rail frangible joint, due to falsified critical tests by Sapa Profiles, was identified as the root cause of the software failure incident [84614]. 2. Orbital Sciences Corp - The failure of the protective nose cone fairing to separate during launch aboard an Orbital Sciences Corp. Taurus XL rocket led to the crash of NASA's Glory atmospheric research mission satellite [4557]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. NASA [4557, 84614] 2. Orbital Sciences Corp. [4557] 3. Hydro Extrusion Portland (formerly Sapa Profiles) [84614] |
| Software Causes | 1. The failure incident was caused by a software issue related to the protective nose cone fairing not separating during launch due to a failure of the aluminum extrusions in a component known as the payload fairing rail frangible joint, which is an explosive separation device [Article 84614]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Failure of the protective nose cone fairing to separate during launch due to a design flaw in the fairing separation initiation system [4557]. 2. Falsification of critical tests on aluminum extrusions in a component known as the payload fairing rail frangible joint by extrusion maker Sapa Profiles (now Hydro Extrusion Portland) [84614]. |
| Impacts | 1. The software failure incident involving the NASA Glory atmospheric research mission satellite crashing into the southern Pacific Ocean led to a loss of $424 million, marking the second consecutive failure for the Orbital Sciences booster following a similar nose cone malfunction in 2009 [4557]. 2. The failure of the Taurus XL rockets in the 2009 Orbiting Carbon Observatory and 2011 Glory missions, caused by falsified critical tests on aluminum extrusions by Sapa Profiles, resulted in NASA losing nearly $700 million [84614]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing rigorous quality control measures during the manufacturing process of critical components like the payload fairing rail frangible joint could have prevented the software failure incident [84614]. 2. Conducting thorough and independent testing of materials and components by the space agency and industry partners to ensure compliance with required standards and specifications could have helped prevent the failure [84614]. 3. Enhancing oversight and auditing processes for suppliers to detect any falsification of critical tests or data manipulation that could compromise the integrity of components used in space missions could have averted the software failure incident [84614]. |
| Fixes | 1. Redesigning the system and testing the components of the fairing separation initiation system, as done by Orbital Sciences after the previous failure [4557]. 2. Implementing additional sensors to provide more telemetry data for engineers to analyze and pinpoint the issue, as mentioned by Rich Straka from Orbital's Launch Systems Group [4557]. 3. Conducting a joint investigation involving NASA and the Justice Department to identify the root cause of the failure, as revealed in the case of the aluminum scam related to the extrusions in the fairing rail frangible joint [84614]. 4. Ensuring that materials are produced, tested, and certified in accordance with required standards to rebuild trust in the industry, as emphasized by Jim Norman, NASA's director for launch services [84614]. | References | 1. NASA officials and spokespersons [4557] 2. Ronald Grabe, former space shuttle commander and manager of Orbital's Launch Systems Group [4557] 3. Richard Haenke, ascent commentator [4557] 4. Omar Baez, NASA Launch Director [4557] 5. Hal Getzelman, NASA official [4557] 6. Scott Kelly, International Space Station commander [4557] 7. Rich Straka, deputy general manager of operations for Orbital's Launch Systems Group [4557] 8. Mike Luther, deputy associate administrator for science operations at NASA headquarters [4557] 9. University of Colorado's Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics [4557] 10. Raytheon, builder of the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor [4557] 11. Joint investigation involving NASA and the Justice Department [84614] 12. G. Zachary Terwilliger, US attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia [84614] 13. Jim Norman, NASA's director for launch services [84614] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: The incident of the protective nose cone fairing failing to separate during launch of the NASA's Glory satellite happened again with the Taurus XL rocket, which was the second failure in a row for the Orbital Sciences booster. The previous failure occurred in 2009 with the loss of another environmental satellite due to a similar nose cone malfunction [4557]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: The article mentions that this was the second failure in a row for a Taurus XL rocket, with the previous failure being the loss of NASA's Orbiting Carbon Observatory in 2009 due to a similar nose cone fairing failure [4557]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design | (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the failure of the protective nose cone fairing to separate during the launch of the NASA Glory atmospheric research mission satellite aboard an Orbital Sciences Corp. Taurus XL rocket. This failure was attributed to a flaw in the design of the fairing separation system, specifically the initiation system, which was redesigned and tested extensively after a similar failure in a previous mission [4557]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is linked to the failure of the fairings on the rockets to separate due to a failure of the aluminum extrusions in a component known as the payload fairing rail frangible joint. This failure was caused by falsified critical tests conducted by the extrusion maker, Sapa Profiles, over 19 years, leading to the malfunction during the operation of the Taurus XL rockets in the 2009 and 2011 missions [84614]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system | (a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the Taurus XL rocket's protective nose cone fairing not separating during launch was primarily caused by internal factors within the system. The failure was attributed to a failure of the aluminum extrusions in a component known as the payload fairing rail frangible joint, which is an explosive separation device that helps the fairing open and fall away from the rocket in flight [84614]. Additionally, Orbital Sciences had conducted an extensive investigation after a previous similar failure and redesigned the system, including changing the initiation system to a more robust nitrogen system borrowed from their Minotaur rockets [4557]. (b) outside_system: There is no information in the articles suggesting that the software failure incident was caused by contributing factors originating from outside the system. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The failure of the protective nose cones on the Taurus XL rockets to separate during the 2009 Orbiting Carbon Observatory and 2011 Glory missions was initially attributed to a malfunction in the fairings [4557]. - A joint investigation later revealed that the problem was caused by the failure of the aluminum extrusions in a component known as the payload fairing rail frangible joint, which is an explosive separation device that helps the fairing open and fall away from the rocket in flight [84614]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - Employees at the company's Portland, Oregon, facilities manipulated critical tests over 19 years, falsifying results to show materials passed when they actually failed. This led to the failure of the aluminum extrusions in the payload fairing rail frangible joint, contributing to the rocket's fairings not separating as intended [84614]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The failure of the protective nose cone fairing to separate during launch of the NASA's Glory satellite was attributed to a failure of the aluminum extrusions in a component known as the payload fairing rail frangible joint, which is a hardware component that helps the fairing open and fall away from the rocket in flight [Article 84614]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The articles do not mention any software-related contributing factors to the software failure incident. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | non-malicious | (a) The software failure incident related to the Taurus XL rocket failures, specifically the 2009 Orbiting Carbon Observatory and 2011 Glory missions, was non-malicious. The failure was attributed to a 19-year aluminum scam involving falsified critical tests on aluminum extrusions by Sapa Profiles (now Hydro Extrusion Portland). These extrusions played a critical role in the failure of the fairings on the rockets to separate, leading to the mission malfunctions [Article 84614]. (b) There is no indication in the articles that the software failure incident was malicious. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | accidental_decisions | <Article 4557> does not mention any software failure incident related to poor or accidental decisions. <Article 84614> does not directly mention software failure incidents related to poor or accidental decisions. Instead, it focuses on the failure of the missions due to the aluminum scam involving falsified critical tests on aluminum extrusions that led to the nose cones on the Taurus XL rockets failing to separate as intended. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence: - The failure of the Glory atmospheric research mission satellite was attributed to a nose cone fairing failure during launch aboard an Orbital Sciences Corp. Taurus XL rocket [4557]. - The incident was the second in a row for the Orbital Sciences booster following a similar nose cone malfunction in 2009 [4557]. - Orbital Sciences redesigned the system after the 2009 failure, but the issue recurred in the 2011 Glory mission, indicating a failure to address the root cause effectively [4557]. (b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally: - The failure of the Glory and Orbiting Carbon Observatory missions was ultimately traced back to falsified critical tests on aluminum extrusions by Sapa Profiles (now Hydro Extrusion Portland) over 19 years [84614]. - The extrusions in a component known as the payload fairing rail frangible joint failed, leading to the fairings on the rockets not separating as intended [84614]. - Employees at Sapa Profiles manipulated test results to appear as passing from 1996 to 2015, impacting the reliability of the materials used in the rockets [84614]. |
| Duration | temporary | The software failure incident related to the Taurus XL rocket's nose cone fairing not separating during launch can be considered a temporary failure. The incident was caused by a failure of the aluminum extrusions in a component known as the payload fairing rail frangible joint, which is an explosive separation device that helps the fairing open and fall away from the rocket in flight [Article 84614]. This specific issue with the aluminum extrusions was a contributing factor introduced by certain circumstances (the falsified critical tests by Sapa Profiles) rather than all circumstances. |
| Behaviour | crash, omission, other | (a) crash: The software failure incident in Article 4557 resulted in a crash. The NASA's Glory atmospheric research mission satellite crashed into the southern Pacific Ocean after a protective nose cone fairing failed to separate during launch [4557]. (b) omission: The software failure incident in Article 4557 can be considered an omission as the protective nose cone fairing failed to separate, leading to the failure of the mission to achieve orbit [4557]. (c) timing: The software failure incident in Article 4557 did not involve a timing issue. The failure was primarily due to the fairing not separating as expected, leading to the mission failure [4557]. (d) value: The software failure incident in Article 4557 did not involve a value issue. The failure was related to the fairing not separating, which led to the satellite not achieving orbit [4557]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident in Article 4557 did not exhibit a byzantine behavior. The failure was primarily due to the fairing not separating as intended during the launch [4557]. (f) other: The software failure incident in Article 4557 can be categorized as a failure due to a hardware malfunction, specifically the failure of the protective nose cone fairing to separate during launch, resulting in the loss of the satellite [4557]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | None | None |
| Communication | None | None |
| Application | None | None |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | property, delay, non-human | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident reported in the articles [4557, 84614]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - There is no mention of any physical harm to individuals resulting from the software failure incident reported in the articles [4557, 84614]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure incident reported in the articles [4557, 84614]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident led to the loss of two NASA missions, the Orbiting Carbon Observatory in 2009 and the Glory mission in 2011, resulting in significant financial losses for NASA [4557, 84614]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - The Glory mission was delayed multiple times before the software failure incident occurred, with the launch being initially delayed since February 23 due to trouble with ground support equipment [4557]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident impacted the Glory environmental research satellite, which was designed to measure solar energy entering and leaving Earth's atmosphere and the effects of aerosols on the global environment [4557]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident resulted in the loss of two NASA missions, financial losses, and the failure to achieve the intended scientific objectives of the Glory satellite [4557, 84614]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles do not mention any potential consequences discussed that did not occur as a result of the software failure incident [4557, 84614]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - There are no other consequences of the software failure incident mentioned in the articles [4557, 84614]. |
| Domain | knowledge | The failed system in the incident was related to the industry of space exploration and environmental research. The software failure incident involved the loss of NASA's Glory atmospheric research mission satellite due to a protective nose cone fairing failure during launch aboard an Orbital Sciences Corp. Taurus XL rocket [Article 4557]. The incident resulted in the loss of a $424 million satellite designed to measure solar energy entering and leaving Earth's atmosphere and the impact of aerosols on the global environment. The satellite was intended to contribute to the understanding of Earth as a system and the impacts of climate change through its scientific measurements [Article 4557]. Additionally, the incident was part of NASA's missions to study Earth's environment and climate change, emphasizing the importance of space-based research in understanding and monitoring our planet [Article 4557]. The failure of the Taurus XL rockets in this incident led to significant financial losses for NASA, impacting its scientific missions and contributions to Earth science research [Article 4557]. Furthermore, the investigation into the failure revealed that the problem was caused by falsified critical tests related to aluminum extrusions in a component known as the payload fairing rail frangible joint, which is an explosive separation device that helps the fairing open and fall away from the rocket in flight [Article 84614]. This highlights the critical role of materials and components in the aerospace industry, particularly in space exploration missions. In summary, the software failure incident was directly related to the industry of space exploration, environmental research, and aerospace technology, impacting NASA's scientific missions and efforts to study Earth's environment and climate change. |
Article ID: 4557
Article ID: 84614