| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the NissanConnect EV app being vulnerable to unauthorized commands has happened again within the same organization. This incident was not the first time such a vulnerability was discovered in Nissan's software. The article mentions that the security flaw was discovered by a security researcher who was able to send random commands to Nissan Leafs with just a web browser and a VIN [40778]. This indicates a recurring issue within Nissan's software systems.
(b) There is no specific mention in the provided article about a similar incident happening at other organizations or with their products and services. Therefore, there is no information available to suggest that this particular software failure incident has occurred elsewhere. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 40778 occurred due to a design flaw in the NissanConnect EV smartphone app. The security researcher was able to exploit a vulnerability in the system's design that allowed him to send random commands to Nissan Leaf electric vehicles using just a web browser and a vehicle identification number (VIN). This flaw was attributed to the lack of authentication between the remote user and the Leaf's systems, indicating a design oversight by Nissan in ensuring secure communication channels [40778].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 40778 did not specifically mention any failure due to operation or misuse of the system. The primary cause of the incident was identified as a design flaw in the app's system that allowed unauthorized access and control over Nissan Leaf electric vehicles. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident with the NissanConnect EV smartphone app was due to contributing factors originating from within the system. The security flaw that allowed unauthorized access to control Nissan Leaf electric vehicles was a result of the connection between the remote user and the Leaf's systems not being authenticated. This lack of authentication on Nissan's side enabled anyone with knowledge of how to send commands to do so, as the system did not verify the commands' sources [40778]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 40778 occurred due to non-human actions. The security flaw that allowed unauthorized access to Nissan's NissanConnect EV smartphone app and control over Leaf electric vehicles was a result of the connection between the remote user and the Leaf's systems not being authenticated. This lack of authentication enabled anyone with knowledge of how to send commands to do so, without the need for human participation in introducing the vulnerability [40778].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 40778 did involve human actions. The security researcher, Troy Hunt, discovered the vulnerability and responsibly disclosed it to Nissan before making it public. Nissan then took action to disable the app after being made aware of the flaw. Additionally, the statement from Nissan mentioned an internal investigation that found the issue with the dedicated server for the app, indicating human involvement in identifying and addressing the problem [40778]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 40778 occurred due to contributing factors originating in hardware. The incident involved a security flaw in Nissan's NissanConnect EV smartphone app, which allowed unauthorized users to send random commands to Nissan Leaf electric vehicles using just a web browser and a vehicle identification number (VIN). This flaw was possible because the connection between the remote user and the Leaf's systems was not authenticated, indicating a hardware-related vulnerability in the system [40778].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 40778 also had contributing factors originating in software. The flaw in the NissanConnect EV app, which enabled unauthorized access to vehicle controls, was a result of an issue with the dedicated server for the app. This issue allowed temperature control and other telematics functions to be accessible via a non-secure route, indicating a software-related vulnerability in the app's design and implementation [40778]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was non-malicious. The incident occurred due to a security flaw in Nissan's NissanConnect EV smartphone app that allowed unauthorized users to send random commands to Nissan Leaf electric vehicles without proper authentication. The security researcher who discovered the flaw, Troy Hunt, responsibly disclosed the issue to Nissan before making it public. Nissan then disabled the app to address the vulnerability [40778].
(b) The software failure incident was not malicious and did not involve any intentional harm to the system. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident involving NissanConnect EV smartphone app disabling was primarily due to poor decisions made by Nissan. The security flaw that allowed unauthorized access to control the Leaf electric vehicles was a result of the connection between the remote user and the Leaf's systems not being authenticated. This lack of authentication meant that anyone with knowledge of how to send commands could do so, as Nissan did not verify the commands' sources [40778].
Additionally, the incident highlights poor decision-making on Nissan's part as they did not address the issue promptly even after being informed by the security researcher, Troy Hunt. It took four weeks for any action to be taken, indicating a lack of urgency in addressing the security vulnerability [40778]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 40778 occurred due to development incompetence. The security flaw in the NissanConnect EV smartphone app that allowed unauthorized access to Nissan Leaf electric vehicles was a result of the connection between the remote user and the Leaf's systems not being authenticated. This lack of authentication allowed anyone with knowledge of how to send commands to do so, as Nissan's side did not verify the commands' sources [40778].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 40778 was not accidental but rather a result of a security flaw that was exploited by a security researcher who discovered the vulnerability and reported it to Nissan before making it public. The incident was not accidental but rather a consequence of a lack of proper authentication in the software system [40778]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in Article 40778 can be categorized as a temporary failure. The NissanConnect EV smartphone app was disabled by Nissan after a security researcher discovered a flaw that allowed unauthorized access to control certain functions of Nissan Leaf electric vehicles. The app was taken offline temporarily to address the issue, with Nissan stating that the dedicated server for the app had an issue that enabled non-secure access to certain functions. There is no specific mention of the failure being permanent, indicating that it was a temporary measure to address the security vulnerability [40778]. |
| Behaviour |
crash |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a crash. The NissanConnect EV smartphone app was disabled after a security researcher discovered a flaw that allowed random commands to be sent to Nissan Leaf electric vehicles without proper authentication. This led to the app being shut down by Nissan, indicating a failure in the system's state and its inability to perform its intended functions [40778]. |