| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the ByLock messaging app can be considered as having happened again within the same organization or with its products and services. The article mentions that ByLock was a messaging app used by members of a religious movement in Turkey, which was later compromised by Turkish intelligence. The app was reportedly created by the Gülenists themselves for communication purposes. However, the app's security features were weak, and important user information was left unencrypted, leading to the exposure of tens of thousands of users and their involvement in the failed coup attempt [46757].
(b) The software failure incident related to the ByLock messaging app does not indicate a similar incident happening at other organizations or with their products and services. The focus of the article is primarily on the specific use of ByLock by a particular group in Turkey and how its security vulnerabilities were exploited by Turkish authorities to trace and identify individuals linked to the failed coup attempt. There is no mention of similar incidents occurring at other organizations or with their products and services in the articles provided [46757]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the case of the ByLock messaging app mentioned in Article 46757. Security experts noted that ByLock appeared to be the work of amateur software developers and had left important information about its users unencrypted. The app's design flaws, such as sending private security keys and user passwords in plain, unencrypted text to a central server, made it vulnerable to being cracked by Turkish intelligence, leading to the identification of thousands of individuals accused of participating in the failed military coup [46757].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the misuse of the ByLock messaging app by the individuals involved in the failed coup attempt. While the app was compromised and no longer secure, the coup plotters switched to using the more secure WhatsApp for communication. However, even WhatsApp messages were accessed by the authorities by getting their hands on the phones of detained plotters, highlighting the operational failure in securely using communication platforms during the coup planning and execution [46757]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the ByLock messaging app can be categorized as within_system. The app's weak security features, including unencrypted important user information and the flawed method of sending private security keys and passwords in plain, unencrypted text to a central server, were internal factors contributing to the failure [46757]. Additionally, the amateurish development of the app by potentially the Gülenists themselves, as suggested by a Turkish official, further points to internal system weaknesses [46757]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to the weak security features and vulnerabilities present in the ByLock messaging app. Security experts noted that the app appeared to be the work of amateur software developers and had important information about its users left unencrypted [46757]. The app's design flaws, such as sending private security keys and user passwords in plain, unencrypted text to a central server, made it vulnerable to exploitation by non-human actors like hackers or intelligence agencies. These weaknesses allowed Turkish authorities to trace and identify thousands of individuals linked to a religious movement and the failed military coup [46757].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The failure of the ByLock messaging app can also be attributed to human actions, particularly the actions of the developers who created the app. The app's insecure design, including the transmission of sensitive information in plain, unencrypted text, was a result of decisions made by the developers. Additionally, the decision to launch the app on less secure platforms after its removal from mainstream app stores contributed to its vulnerability [46757]. The potential involvement of the Gülenists in creating the app for their communication purposes, as suggested by a Turkish official, also points to human actions playing a role in the software failure incident [46757]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The article does not mention any hardware-related failures contributing to the incident. Therefore, there is no information available regarding hardware contributing factors in this software failure incident.
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The software failure incident in this case is primarily related to software factors. The ByLock messaging app had weak security features due to amateur software development, leaving important user information unencrypted [46757].
- The software flaw in ByLock allowed Turkish authorities to trace thousands of individuals involved in an underground network linked to a failed military coup [46757].
- The software failure was due to the insecure design of ByLock, where private security keys and user passwords were sent to a central server in plain, unencrypted text, making it vulnerable to decryption by unauthorized parties [46757].
- The software failure was also evident in the fact that the app was compromised, leading to the swift identification and purge of tens of thousands of individuals by the Turkish government [46757]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. Turkish authorities were able to trace thousands of people involved in an underground network linked to a failed military coup by cracking the weak security features of a smartphone messaging app called ByLock. The app was compromised by Turkish intelligence, allowing them to trace tens of thousands of members of a religious movement blamed for the coup attempt. The app's security flaws, including unencrypted important information about users, were exploited to identify individuals involved in the coup [46757]. The coup plotters switched to using the more secure WhatsApp after realizing ByLock had been compromised, but authorities were still able to access WhatsApp messages sent during the coup by obtaining the phones of detained plotters [46757]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions can be seen in the case of the ByLock messaging app mentioned in Article 46757. The app was found to have weak security features and important user information left unencrypted, indicating poor decisions made by the amateur software developers who created the app. Additionally, the use of plain, unencrypted text to send private security keys and user passwords to a central server was highlighted as a critical flaw in the app's design, showing poor decision-making in terms of security measures [46757].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental decisions can be inferred from the fact that the developers of ByLock may not have anticipated the level of scrutiny and potential compromise of their app. The app was initially used by a religious movement but was later compromised by Turkish intelligence, leading to unintended consequences for the users who were traced and identified. The developers may not have foreseen the app being used against its initial user base or the potential implications of its security vulnerabilities [46757]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the case of the ByLock messaging app. Security experts who analyzed the app mentioned that it appeared to be the work of amateur software developers and had left important information about its users unencrypted [46757]. Additionally, the app's security flaws, such as sending private security keys and user passwords in plain, unencrypted text to a central server, indicate a lack of professional competence in ensuring secure communication [46757].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is seen in the case of ByLock being compromised by Turkish intelligence. The app was cracked by Turkish authorities, leading to the tracing of thousands of individuals linked to a religious movement and the subsequent purge of teachers, police, soldiers, and justice officials [46757]. The compromise of ByLock was accidental from the perspective of the users who were unaware of the app's vulnerabilities until it was too late, forcing them to stop using it after realizing it had been compromised [46757]. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
(a) The software failure incident in this case can be considered permanent as the ByLock messaging app was compromised by Turkish intelligence, leading to the tracing and identification of thousands of individuals involved in the failed military coup [46757].
(b) On the other hand, the software failure incident can also be seen as temporary in the sense that once the users of the ByLock app realized it had been compromised, they stopped using it and switched to a more secure platform like WhatsApp for communication [46757]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident related to the ByLock messaging app can be categorized as a crash. The app was compromised by Turkish authorities, leading to the loss of its intended function of secure messaging. Users stopped using the app after realizing it had been cracked, indicating a failure in the system's ability to maintain its state and perform its intended function [46757].
(b) omission: The failure of the ByLock messaging app can also be attributed to omission. The app omitted to perform its intended function of securely encrypting user data, as important information about its users was left unencrypted, making it vulnerable to being cracked by Turkish intelligence [46757].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident is not explicitly mentioned in the article. However, it can be inferred that the system failed in terms of timing as well. The app was compromised earlier in the year by Turkish intelligence, but the information obtained was used later to trace and purge individuals in the aftermath of the failed coup [46757].
(d) value: The failure of the ByLock messaging app can also be categorized as a value failure. The system performed its intended function of generating private security keys for anonymity, but the value of this function was compromised by sending these keys along with user passwords in plain, unencrypted text to a central server, making the encryption ineffective [46757].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident related to the ByLock messaging app does not align with a byzantine failure. The system did not exhibit inconsistent responses or interactions; rather, it failed due to security vulnerabilities and compromised encryption methods [46757].
(f) other: The other behavior exhibited by the software failure incident is a security breach. The ByLock messaging app failed to maintain the security and privacy of its users, leading to a breach by Turkish authorities who were able to crack the app and trace thousands of individuals involved in the coup attempt [46757]. |