| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
The article mentions a flaw in the upgrade to chip-based credit cards in the United States, specifically related to the chip and magnetic stripe interaction. Computer security researchers at the payment technology company NCR demonstrated how credit card thieves can rewrite the magnetic stripe code to make it appear like a chipless card again, allowing them to keep counterfeiting. This flaw in the chip-based system was highlighted at the Black Hat computer security conference [46991].
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
The article discusses how many retailers are upgrading their payment machines without encrypting the transaction, leaving a vulnerability that can be exploited by credit card thieves. The article also mentions that payment terminal makers keep producing machines without encryption by default, and retailers have to pay extra for basic security. This issue is not limited to a single organization but seems to be a common practice across multiple retailers and payment terminal makers [46991]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the flaw found in the upgrade to chip-based credit cards in the United States. Computer security researchers at NCR demonstrated how credit card thieves can rewrite the magnetic stripe code to make it appear like a chipless card again, allowing them to keep counterfeiting just like they did before the nationwide switch to chip cards [46991].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted by the lack of encryption in the transaction process when retailers upgrade their payment machines to the EMV system. The failure in operation occurs because many retailers are not encrypting the transaction, leaving the data on the magnetic stripe vulnerable to alteration, which could fool the terminal but would be rejected on the back end [46991]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the article is primarily within the system. The flaw in the upgrade to the chip-based credit cards in the United States was due to a relatively easy way for credit card thieves to rewrite the magnetic stripe code to make it appear like a chipless card again, allowing them to keep counterfeiting. This flaw was demonstrated by computer security researchers at the payment technology company NCR [46991]. Additionally, the article mentions that the way many retailers are upgrading their payment machines by not encrypting the transaction contributes to this vulnerability within the system. The failure is attributed to the lack of encryption and the design of the chip-based system itself, rather than external factors.
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident is not primarily due to contributing factors originating from outside the system. The article does not highlight any external factors such as external attacks or environmental issues that directly caused the software failure incident. The focus is on the flaw within the chip-based credit card system and the lack of encryption in the transaction process as internal factors contributing to the vulnerability exploited by credit card thieves [46991]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The article discusses a flaw in the upgrade to chip-based credit cards in the United States, where computer security researchers at NCR demonstrated how credit card thieves can rewrite the magnetic stripe code to make it appear like a chipless card again. This flaw allows for counterfeiting just like before the switch to chip cards, highlighting a vulnerability in the system that was not introduced by human actions but rather by the design of the system itself [46991].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The article mentions that many retailers are not encrypting the transaction data on their payment machines when upgrading to the chip-based system. This lack of encryption is a human action that contributes to the vulnerability exploited by credit card thieves to rewrite the magnetic stripe code, allowing for counterfeiting. Additionally, the article points out that retailers have to pay extra for basic security features like encryption, indicating a human decision to prioritize cost over security [46991]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The article mentions a flaw in the upgrade to chip-based credit cards in the United States, specifically related to the chip and magnetic strip technology [46991].
- Computer security researchers at NCR demonstrated how credit card thieves can rewrite the magnetic stripe code to make it appear like a chipless card again, exploiting a hardware vulnerability [46991].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The article highlights a flaw in the EMV chip-based system, indicating a software vulnerability [46991].
- The researchers advised encrypting everything in a transaction to mitigate the software-related security risks [46991]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is related to a malicious objective. Computer security researchers at NCR demonstrated how credit card thieves can rewrite the magnetic stripe code on chip-based credit cards to make it appear like a chipless card again, allowing them to continue counterfeiting. This flaw in the EMV chip-based system was highlighted at the Black Hat computer security conference, indicating a deliberate attempt to exploit a vulnerability in the system for fraudulent purposes [46991]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the chip-based credit cards in the United States can be attributed to poor decisions made during the upgrade process. The article highlights that there was a glaring hole in the EMV chip-based system due to the way many retailers were upgrading their payment machines without encrypting the transaction [46991]. This lack of encryption allowed credit card thieves to rewrite the magnetic stripe code, making it appear like a chipless card and enabling them to continue counterfeiting. Additionally, the article mentions that retailers could spend millions of dollars upgrading to EMV and still not protect their customers from credit card theft, indicating a poor decision in the implementation of the upgrade. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article. Computer security researchers at the payment technology company NCR discovered a flaw in the chip-based credit cards' system, which allowed credit card thieves to rewrite the magnetic stripe code to make it appear like a chipless card [46991]. This flaw was possible due to the way many retailers were upgrading their payment machines without encrypting the transaction, highlighting a lack of professional competence in implementing proper security measures.
(b) The accidental software failure incident is also apparent in the article. The flaw in the chip-based credit cards' system, allowing credit card thieves to exploit the magnetic stripe code, was not intentional but rather a result of oversight in the upgrade process. The discovery of this flaw was unexpected and not deliberately introduced, indicating an accidental introduction of vulnerabilities in the system [46991]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as a temporary failure. The flaw in the upgrade to the chip-based credit cards in the United States, as highlighted by computer security researchers at NCR, demonstrated how credit card thieves could rewrite the magnetic stripe code to make it appear like a chipless card again, allowing them to continue counterfeiting [46991]. This flaw was identified as a specific vulnerability introduced by certain circumstances, such as the lack of encryption in the transaction process, rather than a permanent failure affecting all circumstances. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The articles do not mention a specific instance of a system crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions.
(b) omission: The software failure incident described in the articles does not directly involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s).
(c) timing: The articles do not discuss a failure related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early.
(d) value: The software failure incident discussed in the articles is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Specifically, the flaw in the upgrade to chip-based credit cards allows credit card thieves to rewrite the magnetic stripe code to make it appear like a chipless card, enabling them to continue counterfeiting [46991].
(e) byzantine: The articles do not mention the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions, which would fall under the byzantine behavior category.
(f) other: The software failure incident described in the articles involves a flaw in the system that allows credit card thieves to manipulate the magnetic stripe code, bypassing the chip-based security measures. This behavior could be categorized as a security vulnerability or exploitation of a loophole in the system's design [46991]. |