| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident of being able to hack into iPhones using the NAND mirroring technique has happened again within the same organization, Apple. Sergei Skorobogatov demonstrated the technique to break into various iPhone models, including the iPhone 5C and up to the iPhone 6. This incident is reminiscent of the FBI's previous struggle to unlock the iPhone of the San Bernardino shooter, which led to the FBI paying over $1.3m to a third party for software to hack into the device [47722].
(b) The software failure incident of being able to hack into iPhones using the NAND mirroring technique has implications beyond just Apple products. The technique could potentially be used on newer models like the iPhone 6S and iPhone 7, although it would require more sophisticated hardware. This indicates that the vulnerability exploited by Skorobogatov's technique could extend to other organizations producing similar devices with NAND chips for memory storage [47722]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where the FBI had initially paid over $1.3m to unlock the San Bernardino shooter's iPhone 5C. The FBI had considered various techniques, including the NAND mirroring approach, to unlock the phone. However, initially, the FBI director, James Comey, dismissed the technique as unworkable. It was only after Sergei Skorobogatov from Cambridge University demonstrated the technique through a paper and a YouTube video that it was proven to be effective. This highlights a failure in the initial design or consideration of potential methods to unlock the iPhone [47722].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be observed in the same article where the FBI had to resort to paying a third party for software to hack into the iPhone of the San Bernardino gunman. This was due to the operation or misuse of the system, as Apple had declined to help the FBI break into the phone, leading to the FBI seeking alternative methods to access the phone's contents. The operation phase failure is evident in the need to pay a third party for software to gain access to the iPhone [47722]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident in this case can be attributed to factors originating from within the system. The failure occurred due to a vulnerability in the iPhone's security system that allowed for the bypassing of the password retry limit through a technique known as NAND mirroring. This technique involved manipulating the phone's NAND chip to create cloned versions with the password attempt counter set to zero, enabling multiple password attempts until the phone was unlocked [47722].
(b) outside_system: The incident also involved external factors such as the FBI's initial inability to unlock the iPhone, leading them to pay a third party over $1.3 million for software to hack into the device. Additionally, there was a legal and PR battle between Apple and the US government regarding providing backdoor access to the phone, highlighting external pressures and conflicts surrounding the software failure incident [47722]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident related to non-human actions:
The software failure incident in this case was not directly caused by non-human actions. Instead, it was a result of a technique known as NAND mirroring, which involved manipulating the iPhone's memory system to bypass the password retry limit [Article 47722].
(b) The software failure incident related to human actions:
The software failure incident in this case was influenced by human actions. The FBI paid a significant amount of money to unlock the San Bernardino shooter's iPhone, and there was a dispute between Apple and the US government regarding providing backdoor access to the phone [Article 47722]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles is related to hardware. The failure occurred due to a hardware-based technique known as NAND mirroring, where the researcher, Sergei Skorobogatov, manipulated the phone's NAND chip to bypass the limit on password retry attempts. This hardware-based approach allowed for breaking into the iPhone by creating a cloned version of the chip with the password attempt counter set to zero, enabling multiple attempts to unlock the phone [47722].
(b) The software failure incident is not directly related to software issues but rather to a hardware-based technique used to bypass the software security measures on the iPhone. The failure was not caused by software bugs or faults but by exploiting the hardware design of the device to gain unauthorized access to the phone's contents. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The objective of the software failure incident was malicious. The incident involved a computer scientist demonstrating a technique known as NAND mirroring to hack into iPhones, including the iPhone 5C used by the San Bernardino shooter. This technique allowed for bypassing the limit on password retry attempts and creating cloned versions of the NAND chip with the password attempt counter set to zero, enabling multiple attempts to unlock the phone [47722]. The FBI had previously paid a significant amount to a third party for software to hack into the iPhone, and the technique demonstrated by the computer scientist proved that the FBI's claim that such methods were impossible was incorrect [47722]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions:
- The FBI paid over $1.3m to unlock the San Bernardino shooter's iPhone 5C [Article 47722].
- The FBI initially dismissed the technique known as NAND mirroring as unworkable [Article 47722].
- The FBI had considered many different techniques before gaining access to the phone, including the NAND mirroring approach [Article 47722].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions:
- Sergei Skorobogatov demonstrated a technique known as NAND mirroring to break into iPhones, which was initially dismissed by the FBI [Article 47722].
- The FBI had paid a third party for software to hack into the iPhone of the San Bernardino gunman [Article 47722].
- The FBI considered various techniques, including NAND mirroring, before gaining access to the phone [Article 47722]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence can be seen in the article where the FBI paid over $1.3 million to unlock the San Bernardino shooter's iPhone 5C, while a computer scientist from Cambridge University demonstrated a technique known as NAND mirroring to break into iPhones up to the iPhone 6. The FBI director initially dismissed this technique as unworkable, but the researcher was able to successfully demonstrate it, showing a gap in the FBI's understanding and potentially highlighting a lack of professional competence in assessing such security vulnerabilities [47722].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors can be observed in the same article where the FBI had initially considered various techniques, including the NAND mirroring approach, but had concluded that it didn't work. However, the researcher from Cambridge University was able to successfully use this technique, indicating that the FBI's assessment may have been accidental or mistaken, leading to a failure in accurately evaluating the security of the iPhone [47722]. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles can be considered as a permanent failure. This is evident from the fact that the FBI initially claimed that the technique demonstrated by Sergei Skorobogatov, known as NAND mirroring, was unworkable and did not work for breaking into the iPhone of the San Bernardino shooter. However, Skorobogatov was able to successfully demonstrate the technique and unlock the iPhone, proving the FBI's initial assessment wrong. This indicates a permanent failure in the FBI's understanding and assessment of the security measures related to the iPhone unlocking process [47722]. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The incident is more related to security vulnerabilities and bypassing security measures to gain unauthorized access to the iPhone [47722].
(b) omission: The incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, it focuses on bypassing security measures to unlock the iPhone by exploiting a vulnerability in the password retry attempts mechanism [47722].
(c) timing: The incident is not related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. It is more about circumventing security measures to gain access to the iPhone by manipulating the password retry attempts mechanism [47722].
(d) value: The failure incident is not about the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. It is about finding a way to bypass security measures to unlock the iPhone by resetting the password attempt counter through a hardware-based attack [47722].
(e) byzantine: The incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. It is more about exploiting a vulnerability in the security mechanism of the iPhone to gain unauthorized access [47722].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security vulnerability exploit. It involves using a hardware-based attack to manipulate the password retry attempts mechanism and gain unauthorized access to the iPhone, demonstrating a flaw in the security design of the device [47722]. |