Incident: Security Vulnerabilities in WiFi-connected Sex Toys Lead to Privacy Risks

Published Date: 2017-04-03

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving the Svakom Siime Eye vibrator was reported in an article published on March 6, 2018 [Article 69255, Article 69258]. 2. Estimation for the incident timeline: - Step 1: The article mentions that security experts uncovered the vulnerability last year. - Step 2: The article was published on March 6, 2018. - Step 3: Based on the information, the incident likely occurred in 2017.
System 1. Lovense internet-connected sex toys [33238] 2. Svakom Siime Eye WiFi-connected sex toy [69255, 50559, 69258]
Responsible Organization 1. Manufacturers of internet-connected sex toys such as Lovense and Svakom were responsible for causing the software failure incidents reported in the articles [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258].
Impacted Organization 1. Users of internet-connected sex toys, such as the Lovense toys and the Svakom Siime Eye vibrator, were impacted by the software failure incidents reported in the articles [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258].
Software Causes 1. Lack of encryption and security measures in the communication protocols of internet-connected sex toys, leading to vulnerabilities that allowed hackers to intercept communications and take control of the devices [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of proper encryption and security measures in the design and implementation of the internet-connected sex toys [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258] 2. Default or easily guessable passwords being used for the devices, making them vulnerable to unauthorized access [69255, 50559, 69258] 3. Hard-coded credentials in the applications, leaving them unchanged and easily exploitable by hackers [69255, 50559, 69258] 4. Lack of response or action from manufacturers even after being informed of vulnerabilities by security experts [50559, 69258] 5. Inadequate consideration for privacy and security risks in the development of IoT devices like sex toys [69258]
Impacts 1. The software failure incidents involving internet-connected sex toys being vulnerable to hacking had serious privacy implications. Hackers could intercept communications, take control of the devices, access intimate data, and even potentially live stream footage without the users' knowledge [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258]. 2. The vulnerabilities in these sex toys raised concerns about potential sexual assault, as unwanted activation of a vibrator could be considered a violation of privacy and security [46799]. 3. The incidents highlighted the lack of security measures in place for IoT devices, emphasizing the need for manufacturers to prioritize security in all connected devices, including sex toys [69258]. 4. Users were advised to throw away the vulnerable devices and cease using them to prevent further privacy breaches and potential exploitation of the video streams [50559].
Preventions 1. Implementing strong encryption protocols for communication between the sex toys and their associated apps could have prevented the software failure incident [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258]. 2. Enforcing secure password practices, such as not using default passwords or having blank passwords for admin accounts, could have enhanced the security of the devices [69255, 50559, 69258]. 3. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments by the manufacturers could have helped identify and address potential security flaws before they were exploited by hackers [33238, 46799, 50559, 69258]. 4. Providing timely responses to security researchers who report vulnerabilities and promptly addressing identified issues could have mitigated the risks associated with the software failure incident [50559, 69258]. 5. Enhancing user education on responsible usage of the devices, including guidance on data storage and privacy protection, could have minimized the impact of the security vulnerabilities [33238, 46799].
Fixes 1. Implement strong encryption protocols for communication between the sex toys and associated apps to prevent interception and unauthorized access [33238, 69255]. 2. Ensure that default passwords are not easily guessable and require users to set up strong, unique passwords to access the devices [69255, 50559]. 3. Regularly update the software and firmware of the sex toys to patch any vulnerabilities and improve security measures [69258]. 4. Provide clear and transparent information to users about data collection practices and ensure that user data is handled securely and responsibly [46799, 69258]. 5. Establish industry-wide standards for privacy and security in sex toys, encouraging manufacturers to adhere to these standards to protect user privacy and security [46799].
References 1. Security experts from Pen Test Partners [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258] 2. Researchers who go by 'Beau du Jour' [69255, 50559] 3. Joe Bursell of Pen Test Partners [33238] 4. Ken Munro, founder of Pen Test Partners [50559, 69258] 5. Standard Innovation [46799] 6. Chi Onwurah, Labour MP for Newcastle Central [69258]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to security vulnerabilities in WiFi-connected sex toys has happened again at the same organization, Svakom. In the article [Article 69258], it is mentioned that security experts uncovered a troubling vulnerability in the Svakom Siime Eye vibrator, which allows hackers to live stream footage from the vibrator's point of view. The vulnerability includes a default password '88888888' for the WiFi access point and an 'admin' account with a blank password in the web interface. The same security flaws were identified in a previous incident involving the Svakom Siime Eye vibrator, indicating a recurring issue within the organization. (b) The software failure incident related to security vulnerabilities in WiFi-connected sex toys has also happened at other organizations or with their products. In the article [Article 46799], it is highlighted that another WiFi-connected sex toy, the We-Vibe 4 Plus, was found to have security issues allowing hackers to remotely seize control of the vibrator. This incident involved independent hackers from New Zealand revealing the lack of security in the communication between the vibrator and its controlling app. Additionally, the article [Article 50559] discusses the vulnerability in the Svakom Siime Eye vibrator, indicating a broader issue within the industry of IoT devices like sex toys being produced without adequate security measures.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) In the articles, there are instances of software failure incidents related to the design phase. For example, in Article 69255, a troubling vulnerability was uncovered in a WiFi-connected sex toy due to poor design choices. The Svakom Siime Eye vibrator had default passwords and a web interface with an 'admin' account having a blank password, making it easy for hackers to access the live video stream without the user's knowledge [69255]. Similarly, in Article 50559, security experts highlighted the vulnerability in the Svakom Siime Eye vibrator, where anyone in range could connect to the access point and access the live video stream due to poor design choices like default passwords and hard-coded credentials in the app [50559]. (b) Regarding software failure incidents related to the operation phase, there are examples in the articles as well. In Article 46799, it was revealed that the app associated with the We-Vibe 4 Plus vibrator was sending intimate data back to the manufacturer for market research purposes without users' explicit consent. This operation-related failure raised concerns about privacy and data security [46799]. Additionally, in Article 69258, it was mentioned that the Svakom Siime Eye vibrator was vulnerable to hacking during operation, allowing hackers to live stream footage from the vibrator's point of view due to poor operational security practices like default passwords and lack of encryption [69258].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) The software failure incidents reported in the articles are primarily within_system failures. These incidents involve vulnerabilities and security flaws within the software and devices themselves that allow hackers to exploit them. For example, in Article 69255, a vulnerability in a WiFi-connected sex toy allowed hackers to live stream footage from the vibrator's point of view due to default passwords and a lack of encryption [69255]. Similarly, in Article 50559, the Svakom Siime Eye vibrator had security issues such as a default password and an 'admin' account with a blank password, making it easy for hackers to access the device and its web interface [50559]. (b) Additionally, there are elements of outside_system factors contributing to the software failures. For instance, in Article 69258, an MP highlighted concerns about the security of sex toys being hacked from countries like Russia and North Korea, indicating external threats to the devices [69258]. This external factor adds to the overall risk and vulnerability of the software and devices, making them susceptible to attacks from outside sources.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incidents in the articles are primarily related to non-human actions, specifically vulnerabilities in the design and implementation of the software in the WiFi-connected sex toys. These vulnerabilities allowed hackers to easily access the devices, intercept communications, and even live stream footage without the users' knowledge. The vulnerabilities were due to factors such as default passwords, lack of encryption, and insecure web interfaces [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258]. (b) However, human actions also played a role in these software failures. For example, the decision by manufacturers to create IoT devices like vibrators with cameras and WiFi access points without proper security measures contributed to the vulnerabilities. Additionally, the lack of response from manufacturers to security researchers' warnings and the use of hard-coded credentials in the apps were human actions that exacerbated the security risks [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The articles report on security vulnerabilities in WiFi-connected sex toys, such as the Svakom Siime Eye vibrator, where hackers could live stream footage from the vibrator's point of view due to weaknesses in the hardware design [69255, 50559]. - The vulnerabilities included default passwords, lack of encryption, and hard-coded admin account credentials in the hardware, allowing unauthorized access to the live video stream and web interface of the devices [69255, 50559]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The software failure incidents were primarily due to software vulnerabilities in the apps and web interfaces associated with the sex toys, allowing hackers to exploit the software to access intimate user data and control the devices remotely [69255, 50559]. - Issues such as lack of encryption, hard-coded credentials, and insecure communication protocols were highlighted as software-related vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers [69255, 50559].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incidents described in the articles are primarily malicious in nature. These incidents involve vulnerabilities in internet-connected sex toys that could be exploited by hackers to intercept communications, take control of the devices, and even live stream footage without the user's knowledge [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258]. The vulnerabilities discovered in these devices, such as the Svakom Siime Eye vibrator, allowed unauthorized access to live video streams, web interfaces with default or blank passwords, and potential geo-location of users. The security flaws in these devices were highlighted by security experts, and the incidents involved intentional actions by hackers to exploit these weaknesses for malicious purposes. Additionally, the incidents involved concerns about privacy violations, potential sexual assault through unwanted activation of the devices, and the collection of intimate user data without consent. These aspects point towards a malicious intent behind the exploitation of the software vulnerabilities in the internet-connected sex toys.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident in the articles can be categorized under poor_decisions. The incidents involving smart internet-connected sex toys being at risk from hackers [Article 33238], the vulnerability in a WiFi-connected sex toy allowing hackers to live stream footage [Article 69255], and the security risks associated with web-connected sex toys [Article 69258] all point towards poor decisions made in the design and implementation of these devices. These poor decisions include using default passwords, lack of encryption, hard-coded credentials, and inadequate security measures, leading to significant vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incidents related to development incompetence can be seen in the articles discussing vulnerabilities in WiFi-connected sex toys. For example, in Article #69255, a troubling vulnerability was uncovered in a WiFi-connected sex toy where the default password was easily guessable, and the web interface had an 'admin' account with a blank password, indicating a lack of secure development practices. Similarly, in Article #50559, security experts criticized the decision to create a vibrator-endoscope that also acted as a WiFi access point, highlighting the lack of care or attention in IoT device production. (b) Accidental software failure incidents are evident in the articles where security vulnerabilities were discovered unintentionally. For instance, in Article #46799, two independent hackers revealed security flaws in a vibrator's controlling app, emphasizing the need for serious consideration of security in sex toys. Additionally, in Article #69258, security experts warned about the wide-open vulnerabilities in sex toys, indicating that not enough is being done to make them secure, suggesting accidental oversight in ensuring proper security measures.
Duration permanent, temporary (a) The articles report on software failure incidents that can be considered permanent due to contributing factors introduced by all circumstances. For example, in Article 69255, a vulnerability in a WiFi-connected sex toy allowed hackers to live stream footage from the vibrator's point of view. The default password for the device was easily guessable, and the web interface had an 'admin' account with a blank password, making it vulnerable to unauthorized access [69255]. (b) The articles also mention temporary software failure incidents caused by contributing factors introduced by certain circumstances but not all. For instance, in Article 46799, security experts uncovered a vulnerability in a WiFi-connected sex toy that could allow hackers to live stream footage from the vibrator's point of view. The vulnerability was discovered by UK security firm Pen Test Partners, and they reached out to the company to inform them of the issues, indicating a potential for resolution or mitigation of the problem [46799].
Behaviour crash, omission, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident related to the smart internet-connected sex toys being at risk from hackers [33238] can be categorized as a crash. The incident involved security experts warning that the toys can be easily hacked, allowing people to intercept communications and take control of them. This indicates a failure of the system losing its state and not performing its intended functions. (b) omission: The incident involving the vulnerability in a WiFi-connected sex toy, the Svakom Siime Eye, where hackers could live stream footage from the vibrator's point of view [69255, 50559], can be categorized as an omission. The system omitted to perform its intended functions of securing the device properly, allowing hackers to easily guess the default password and access the live video stream without the user's knowledge. (c) timing: There is no specific incident in the provided articles that can be categorized as a timing failure. (d) value: The incident related to the We-Vibe 4 Plus vibrator being vulnerable to remote control activation by hackers [46799] can be categorized as a value failure. The system performed its intended functions incorrectly by allowing hackers to remotely seize control of the vibrator and activate it at will, compromising user privacy and security. (e) byzantine: There is no specific incident in the provided articles that can be categorized as a byzantine failure. (f) other: The incident involving security experts uncovering vulnerabilities in web-connected sex toys, such as the Svakom Siime Eye vibrator [69258], can be categorized as an "other" behavior. The system behaved in a way not described in the options (a to e) by allowing easy access to the live video stream, having hard-coded credentials, and lacking proper security measures, leading to potential privacy breaches and data collection without user consent.

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception sensor, processing_unit, network_communication, embedded_software (a) sensor: Failure due to contributing factors introduced by sensor error - The Svakom Siime Eye vibrator had a camera on the end that allowed users to capture photos or videos during a session, including views from inside the body. The vulnerability in this WiFi-connected sex toy allowed hackers to live stream footage from the vibrator's point of view, indicating a sensor-related failure [Article 69255]. - The We-Vibe 4 Plus vibrator, which could connect with a smartphone app for remote control, had a Bluetooth connection inside it. The security flaw in this vibrator allowed hackers to remotely seize control of the device and activate it at will, indicating a sensor-related failure [Article 46799]. (b) actuator: Failure due to contributing factors introduced by actuator error - The articles did not specifically mention any failures related to actuator errors. (c) processing_unit: Failure due to contributing factors introduced by processing error - The Svakom Siime Eye vibrator had a vulnerability where someone within WiFi range could easily guess the password to instantly access the live video stream, indicating a processing error in the device's system [Article 50559]. - The We-Vibe 4 Plus vibrator had a security issue where the way it communicated with its controlling app was not secure, allowing hackers to remotely seize control of the vibrator. This indicates a processing error in the device's software [Article 46799]. (d) network_communication: Failure due to contributing factors introduced by network communication error - The Svakom Siime Eye vibrator had a vulnerability where someone within WiFi range could easily guess the password to instantly access the live video stream, indicating a network communication error in the device's system [Article 50559]. - The We-Vibe 4 Plus vibrator had a security issue where the way it communicated with its controlling app was not secure, allowing hackers to remotely seize control of the vibrator. This indicates a network communication error in the device's software [Article 46799]. (e) embedded_software: Failure due to contributing factors introduced by embedded software error - The Svakom Siime Eye vibrator had a vulnerability where a hacker could easily access the live video stream without the user's knowledge, indicating an embedded software error in the device [Article 50559]. - The We-Vibe 4 Plus vibrator had a security issue where the way it communicated with its controlling app was not secure, allowing hackers to remotely seize control of the vibrator. This indicates an embedded software error in the device's system [Article 46799].
Communication link_level (a) The failure related to the communication layer of the cyber physical system that failed is at the link_level. In the incident involving the Svakom Siime Eye vibrator, security experts uncovered a vulnerability where anyone in range could connect to the vibrator's WiFi access point if they could guess the default password, allowing them to access the live video stream without the user's knowledge [69255, 50559]. This vulnerability was due to factors introduced at the physical layer of the communication system, making it a link_level failure.
Application TRUE The software failure incidents reported in the articles were related to the application layer of the cyber physical systems. These incidents involved vulnerabilities in internet-connected sex toys that allowed hackers to intercept communications, take control of the devices, and access sensitive information. The failures were attributed to security flaws, default passwords, lack of encryption, and unsecure web interfaces within the applications of the sex toys. 1. Article 33238 highlights security concerns with internet-connected sex toys that could be easily hacked, allowing attackers to intercept communications and access login information due to lack of encryption during the registration process. 2. Article 69255 discusses a vulnerability in a WiFi-connected sex toy where hackers could access the live video stream and web interface by guessing default passwords and exploiting hard-coded credentials in the application. 3. Article 46799 reports on security researchers uncovering vulnerabilities in a Bluetooth-connected vibrator that allowed remote control by hackers, potentially leading to unwanted activation and data collection through the associated app. 4. Article 50559 also mentions a troubling vulnerability in a WiFi-connected sex toy that enabled hackers to live stream footage from the device's camera due to default passwords and unsecure web interfaces. These incidents clearly demonstrate failures at the application layer of the cyber physical systems, resulting from bugs, security oversights, and incorrect usage of the software applications in the sex toys.

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence harm, property, non-human, theoretical_consequence (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - No information about people losing their lives due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - The articles discussed the potential harm caused by the software failure incidents, such as the risk of unwanted activation of a vibrator being considered potentially as sexual assault [46799]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - No information about people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The articles highlighted how the software failure incidents exposed users to privacy risks, such as unauthorized access to intimate data and video streams [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - No information about people having to postpone activities due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incidents primarily impacted the security and privacy of users interacting with internet-connected sex toys [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incidents had observable consequences related to privacy and security risks for users of the affected devices [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles discussed potential consequences such as unauthorized access to intimate data, video streams, and the risk of unwanted activation of vibrators [46799, 50559]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - No other consequences of the software failure were mentioned in the articles [33238, 69255, 46799, 50559, 69258].
Domain information, health (a) The failed system was related to the industry of information, specifically in the context of smart internet-connected sex toys that were at risk from hackers. Security experts warned about the vulnerabilities in these devices that could allow hackers to intercept communications and take control of them [Article 33238]. (j) The incident also pertains to the health industry as the articles discuss vulnerabilities in WiFi-connected sex toys that could lead to hackers live streaming footage from the vibrator's point of view. These security concerns highlight potential risks to user privacy and security in the context of intimate devices [Article 69255, Article 46799, Article 50559, Article 69258].

Sources

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