| Recurring |
unknown |
The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident happening again at either one_organization or multiple_organization. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
The software failure incident described in the articles is related to the design phase. The incident involved a vulnerability in the chip-and-PIN system used in credit cards, which was exploited by criminals through a "man-in-the-middle" attack that took advantage of how cards and card readers communicate [52548]. This vulnerability allowed fraudsters to implant a second chip inside stolen credit cards, enabling them to spoof the PIN verification required by point-of-sale terminals. The incident highlights a flaw in the design of the chip-and-PIN system that criminals were able to exploit, leading to significant financial losses. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the articles is related to a chip-and-PIN system used in credit cards. The failure occurred within the system due to vulnerabilities in the chip-and-PIN technology itself. Criminals were able to exploit a known vulnerability in the system by implanting a second chip inside stolen credit cards, allowing them to spoof the PIN verification required by point-of-sale terminals [52548].
(b) outside_system: The failure was also influenced by factors outside the system, such as the criminal activities of the fraudsters who exploited the vulnerability in the chip-and-PIN system. The criminals used sophisticated techniques to alter credit cards and execute a "man-in-the-middle" attack, demonstrating how external threats can impact the security and functionality of a system [52548]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically the vulnerabilities in the chip-and-PIN system that were exploited by criminals. The fraudsters altered stolen credit cards by implanting a second chip inside them, capable of spoofing the PIN verification required by point-of-sale terminals. This manipulation allowed them to execute a "man-in-the-middle" attack, intercepting the PIN query and replying with a spoofed "verified" signal regardless of the actual PIN entered by the fraudster [52548].
(b) However, human actions were also involved in this software failure incident. The criminals behind the fraud scheme actively exploited the vulnerabilities in the chip-and-PIN system by altering the credit cards with a second chip to bypass the PIN verification process. They used their technical skills to create stealthy forgeries that could be used for fraudulent transactions, demonstrating a high level of sophistication in their criminal activities [52548]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to hardware. The incident involved criminals altering stolen credit cards by implanting a second chip inside them to spoof the PIN verification required by point-of-sale terminals. This hardware manipulation allowed the fraudsters to execute a "man-in-the-middle" attack by intercepting the PIN query and replying with a spoofed "verified" signal regardless of the entered PIN. The fraudsters miniaturized the attack setup into a tiny FUNcard chip, which was then soldered to the stolen credit card's chip and glued back-to-back onto the plastic body of another stolen card, creating a stealthy device capable of bypassing chip-and-PIN security [52548].
(b) The software failure incident in the article is not directly related to software issues but rather to the manipulation of hardware components (chips) to exploit vulnerabilities in the chip-and-PIN system. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The incident involved criminals who outsmarted the chip-and-PIN system by altering stolen credit cards to implant a second chip inside them, capable of spoofing the PIN verification required by point-of-sale terminals. This attack was described as a "man-in-the-middle" attack that took advantage of vulnerabilities in the communication between cards and card readers [52548]. The fraudsters were able to execute this attack to spend nearly 600,000 euros from stolen credit cards, demonstrating a deliberate intent to bypass security measures for financial gain. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
accidental_decisions |
The software failure incident described in the articles is related to a security vulnerability in the chip-and-PIN system used in credit cards. This incident can be categorized as an accidental_decisions failure. The vulnerability exploited by the French fraudsters was a result of a flaw in the communication between the card's chip and the card reader, allowing for a "man-in-the-middle" attack to spoof PIN verification ([52548]). The incident was not due to poor decisions but rather a clever exploitation of a known theoretical vulnerability in the system. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to development incompetence. The French fraudsters were able to outsmart the chip-and-PIN system by implanting a second chip inside stolen credit cards, capable of spoofing the PIN verification required by point-of-sale terminals. This attack took advantage of a long-known vulnerability in chip-and-PIN systems, demonstrating a high level of technical sophistication and expertise on the part of the criminals [52548].
(b) The software failure incident was not accidental but rather a deliberate and calculated attack carried out by the French fraudsters. They meticulously altered stolen credit cards to implant a second chip inside them, demonstrating a premeditated effort to bypass the security measures of the chip-and-PIN system [52548]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles is more of a temporary nature rather than permanent. The incident involved a specific vulnerability in the chip-and-PIN system that allowed criminals to exploit a flaw in the communication between the card's chip and the card reader to spoof PIN verification [52548]. This temporary failure was due to the specific circumstances and vulnerabilities present in the system that were exploited by the fraudsters. The vulnerabilities were later addressed and fixed in Europe, indicating that the failure was not permanent but rather a result of certain factors that were mitigated through new security measures. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the fraudsters manipulated the credit card system to bypass security measures and conduct fraudulent transactions [52548].
(b) omission: The incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The fraudsters actively altered the credit cards to implant a second chip inside them, allowing them to spoof the PIN verification required by point-of-sale terminals [52548].
(c) timing: The incident does not involve the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The fraudsters' manipulation of the credit cards was aimed at bypassing the PIN verification process in real-time during transactions [52548].
(d) value: The incident does involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The fraudsters altered the credit cards to implant a second chip capable of spoofing the PIN verification, leading to incorrect verification signals being sent to the card readers [52548].
(e) byzantine: The incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The fraudsters' manipulation of the credit cards was consistent in providing false verification signals to the card readers to authorize fraudulent transactions [52548].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in this case could be categorized as a sophisticated attack on the security system rather than a traditional software failure. The fraudsters exploited vulnerabilities in the chip-and-PIN system by altering credit cards to deceive the verification process, showcasing a high level of ingenuity and criminal sophistication [52548]. |