Incident: Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) Protocol Vulnerability in Routers

Published Date: 2011-12-28

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident happened in December 2011. - Clues from the articles: The articles were published on December 28, 2011, and December 30, 2011, reporting on the incident. - Therefore, the incident occurred in December 2011. - [Article 54584, Article 54878]
System 1. Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol [54584, 54878]
Responsible Organization 1. Security researcher Stefan Viehbock [54584, 54878] 2. Craig Heffner of Tactical Network Solutions [54878]
Impacted Organization 1. Consumers using Wi-Fi routers with the WPS protocol enabled [54584, 54878]
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was a security flaw in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol, which allowed for an efficient brute force attack on secure Wi-Fi networks [54584, 54878]. 2. The vulnerability in the WPS protocol made it easier for hackers to break into secure Wi-Fi networks by exploiting the design flaws in the 8-digit PIN authentication process [54584, 54878]. 3. The flaw in the WPS protocol allowed attackers to determine if the first half of the PIN was correct, significantly reducing the number of attempts needed to brute force the PIN and gain access to the network [54584, 54878].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of proper lockout policy for brute force attempts on some wireless routers [54584, 54878] 2. Denial-of-service condition caused by brute force attempts on some wireless routers [54584]
Impacts 1. The security flaw in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol allowed hackers to break into secure Wi-Fi networks by exploiting a vulnerability in the PIN authentication process, affecting millions of consumers with Wi-Fi routers [54584, 54878]. 2. The vulnerability enabled hackers to crack an 8-digit PIN in about two hours, significantly reducing the time required for a brute force attack [54584]. 3. Some wireless routers did not implement any lockout policy for brute force attempts, making it easier for hackers to exploit the security flaw [54584]. 4. The flaw led to a denial-of-service condition in some wireless routers due to brute force attempts, requiring a reboot to resolve the issue [54584]. 5. The impacted wireless router vendors, including Buffalo, D-Link, Cisco Linksys, Netgear, Technicolor, TP-Link, and ZyXEL, were notified of the security problem but had not provided a fix or response to the issue [54584, 54878]. 6. Researchers released tools that could exploit the vulnerability, allowing hackers to gain access to secure Wi-Fi networks in a matter of hours [54878]. 7. The fix recommended to users was to disable the WPS function on their routers to mitigate the security risk posed by the flaw [54584, 54878].
Preventions 1. Implementing a lockout policy for brute force attempts on wireless routers could have prevented the software failure incident by reducing the effectiveness of brute force attacks [54584, 54878]. 2. Enhancing the security design of the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol to prevent the router from revealing whether the first or last digits of the PIN are correct could have mitigated the vulnerability exploited by hackers [54584, 54878]. 3. Providing timely responses and fixes by the wireless router vendors after being notified of the security issue by US-CERT could have prevented the widespread impact of the security flaw [54584, 54878].
Fixes 1. Disabling the WPS function on routers could fix the software failure incident [54584, 54878]. 2. Implementing a lockout policy for brute force attempts on wireless routers could help mitigate the vulnerability [54584, 54878]. 3. Developing and deploying firmware updates by router vendors to address the security flaw in the WPS protocol [54584, 54878].
References 1. Security researcher Stefan Viehbock [Article 54584, Article 54878] 2. U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) [Article 54584, Article 54878] 3. Craig Heffner of Tactical Network Solutions [Article 54878] 4. CNET [Article 54584, Article 54878]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to the security flaw in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol has happened again at multiple organizations. The vulnerability in the WPS protocol affects various wireless router vendors, including Buffalo, D-Link, Cisco Linksys, Netgear, Technicolor, TP-Link, and ZyXEL [54584, 54878]. These vendors' devices are impacted by the security hole, indicating a widespread issue across different organizations in the industry. The incident highlights a recurring problem with the implementation of the WPS protocol in routers from different manufacturers. (b) The software failure incident involving the security flaw in the WPS protocol has also occurred at multiple organizations. The vulnerability in the WPS protocol affects various wireless router vendors, including Buffalo, D-Link, Cisco Linksys, Netgear, Technicolor, TP-Link, and ZyXEL [54584, 54878]. These vendors' devices are impacted by the security hole, indicating a widespread issue across different organizations in the industry. The incident highlights a recurring problem with the implementation of the WPS protocol in routers from different manufacturers.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident in the articles is related to the design phase. The vulnerability in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol, which allows for an efficient brute force attack, was identified as a result of flaws in the design of the protocol itself. The design decisions made in implementing the WPS protocol led to a security hole that could be exploited by hackers to break into secure Wi-Fi networks [54584, 54878]. (b) The software failure incident is also related to the operation phase. The vulnerability in the WPS protocol can be exploited by hackers through the operation of trying different combinations of PINs until access is gained. The flaw in the operation of how routers handle PIN authentication allows attackers to determine if the first half of the PIN is correct, significantly reducing the number of attempts needed to brute force the PIN [54584, 54878].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: - The software failure incident related to the security flaw in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol was due to contributing factors that originated from within the system itself. The flaw in the protocol allowed for an efficient brute force attack, making it easier for hackers to break into secure Wi-Fi networks [54584, 54878]. - The vulnerability in the WPS protocol, which is integrated into most new wireless routers sold today, allowed for the exploitation of the security hole affecting millions of consumers [54584, 54878]. (b) outside_system: - There is no specific mention in the articles of the software failure incident being caused by contributing factors originating from outside the system.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in the articles is primarily due to non-human actions, specifically a security flaw in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol. This flaw allows for a brute force attack on the 8-digit PIN used for setting up secure Wi-Fi networks, making it easier for hackers to break into these networks [54584, 54878]. (b) However, human actions also play a role in exacerbating the situation. The vulnerability in the WPS protocol was discovered by security researchers, Stefan Viehbock and Craig Heffner, who developed tools to exploit this vulnerability and bring attention to the issue. Additionally, the lack of response or fixes from the router vendors mentioned in the articles also highlights the impact of human actions or inactions in addressing the security flaw [54584, 54878].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The software failure incident reported in the articles is not directly attributed to hardware issues. The vulnerability in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol, which led to the security flaw, is a software-related issue [54584, 54878]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The software failure incident is primarily due to contributing factors that originate in software. The vulnerability in the WPS protocol, which allows for a brute-force attack on Wi-Fi networks, is a software flaw [54584, 54878].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. Security researchers discovered a vulnerability in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol that allows hackers to exploit the security flaw and gain unauthorized access to secure Wi-Fi networks. The vulnerability enables an efficient brute force attack on the WPS protocol, making it much easier for hackers to break into secure networks [54584, 54878]. The flaw in the protocol allows attackers to determine if the first half of the PIN is correct, significantly reducing the number of attempts needed to brute force the PIN and gain access to the network [54584, 54878]. The incident involves intentional exploitation of the security vulnerability by malicious actors to compromise Wi-Fi networks. (b) The software failure incident is non-malicious in the sense that the vulnerability in the WPS protocol was not introduced with the intent to harm the system. The protocol was designed to make it easier for unskilled users to set up secure Wi-Fi networks using WPA encryption without much hassle [54584, 54878]. However, the flaw in the design of the protocol, which allows for the brute force attack, was not intentionally created to harm the system but rather resulted from poor design decisions and implementation of the WPS technology [54584, 54878].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions (a) The software failure incident related to the security flaw in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol was primarily due to poor decisions made in the design of the protocol. The vulnerability in the WPS protocol allowed for an efficient brute force attack, making it much easier for hackers to break into secure Wi-Fi networks [54584, 54878]. The flaw in the protocol was attributed to "really bad design decisions" that enabled the security breach, affecting millions of devices worldwide [54584]. The design flaw allowed attackers to determine if the first half of the PIN was correct, significantly reducing the number of attempts needed to brute force the PIN [54584]. Additionally, the routers did not implement any lockout policy for brute force attempts, further exacerbating the security issue [54584]. (b) The software failure incident could also be attributed to accidental decisions or unintended consequences. The vulnerability in the WPS protocol, which allowed for the exploitation of the security flaw, was not intentional but rather a result of the flawed design decisions made in the protocol [54584, 54878]. The fact that the routers revealed whether certain digits of the PIN were correct unintentionally facilitated the brute force attack, leading to the compromise of secure Wi-Fi networks [54878]. The developers and vendors did not anticipate this vulnerability, indicating that it was an unintended consequence of the protocol's design [54584, 54878].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the articles. The vulnerability in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol, which allowed for easy exploitation by hackers, was due to poor design decisions that enabled an efficient brute force attack [54584, 54878]. The flaw in the protocol, which made it easier for hackers to break into secure Wi-Fi networks, was a result of the design choices made in implementing the WPS technology, indicating a lack of professional competence in ensuring robust security measures. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also present in the articles. The vulnerability in the WPS protocol, which revealed the first or last numbers of the 8-digit PIN when entered, was an unintentional design flaw that made it easier for hackers to crack the security code [54584, 54878]. This accidental disclosure of information by the router during PIN entry contributed to the security vulnerability, allowing for unauthorized access to Wi-Fi networks.
Duration permanent (a) The software failure incident described in the articles is more of a permanent nature. The security flaw in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol, which allows for easy access to secure Wi-Fi networks, is a fundamental design flaw that cannot be easily fixed. The vulnerability is inherent in the protocol itself, making it a long-term issue affecting millions of devices worldwide [54584, 54878]. The US-CERT warning mentioned that there is no known fix to the security problem, and the recommended solution is to disable the WPS function on routers [54584, 54878]. Additionally, the fact that the router vendors have not responded with a fix or statement further indicates the long-term nature of this software failure incident [54584, 54878].
Behaviour value, other (a) crash: - The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [54584, 54878]. (b) omission: - The software failure incident does not involve omission where the system omits to perform its intended functions at an instance(s) [54584, 54878]. (c) timing: - The software failure incident does not involve timing issues where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early [54584, 54878]. (d) value: - The software failure incident involves a failure related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, specifically in the context of the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up protocol allowing for vulnerabilities that can be exploited by hackers [54584, 54878]. (e) byzantine: - The software failure incident does not involve a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [54584, 54878]. (f) other: - The other behavior observed in this software failure incident is related to a security flaw in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up protocol, specifically in the design decisions that enable an efficient brute force attack, leading to the compromise of secure Wi-Fi networks [54584, 54878].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence, other (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident in the provided articles [54584, 54878]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - There is no mention of any physical harm to individuals due to the software failure incident in the provided articles [54584, 54878]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted by the software failure incident in the provided articles [54584, 54878]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident impacted the security of Wi-Fi networks, potentially allowing hackers to gain unauthorized access to users' networks and data [54584, 54878]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - There is no mention of people having to postpone activities due to the software failure incident in the provided articles [54584, 54878]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident affected Wi-Fi routers and their functionality, potentially leading to denial-of-service conditions and requiring reboots [54584, 54878]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident had significant consequences related to the security of Wi-Fi networks and the potential for unauthorized access [54584, 54878]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The potential consequences discussed in the articles include the vulnerability of millions of Wi-Fi routers to hacking due to the security flaw in the WPS protocol, as well as the ease with which hackers could exploit the vulnerability [54584, 54878]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The software failure incident led to the recommendation for users to disable the WPS function on their routers as a temporary fix to mitigate the security risk posed by the vulnerability [54584, 54878].
Domain information, utilities (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to the information industry. The incident involves a security flaw in the Wi-Fi Protected Set-up (WPS) protocol, which is intended to make it easier for users to set up secure Wi-Fi networks [54584, 54878]. (g) The incident also has implications for the utilities industry as it involves the security vulnerability in Wi-Fi routers, which are essential for providing wireless internet connectivity, a service that falls under the utilities sector [54584, 54878]. (m) Additionally, the software failure incident can be categorized under the "technology" industry, as it pertains to the security vulnerability in the technology infrastructure of Wi-Fi routers and networks [54584, 54878].

Sources

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