Published Date: 2012-12-17
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident happened in February and March [55168]. Therefore, the software failure incident occurred in February and March. |
| System | 1. Niagara Framework [55168] |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Hackers who were political activists exploited gaps in the popular software used by the New Jersey company, causing the software failure incident [55168]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. An air conditioning firm in New Jersey that used the Niagara Framework software in its operations and for its customers, including banks [55168]. |
| Software Causes | 1. The software cause of the failure incident was a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts in the Niagara Framework software, which allowed hackers to enter the system [Article 55168]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. The failure incident was caused by hackers who exploited gaps in popular software used to remotely operate elevators, medical equipment, access checkpoints, and operations [Article 55168]. 2. The hackers were political activists who wanted to draw attention to the weakness of industrial control systems [Article 55168]. 3. The targeted air conditioning firm had a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts in the Niagara system, which provided a backdoor entry for the hackers [Article 55168]. 4. The intrusions highlighted the growing threat to Internet-connected computer systems that run critical infrastructure worldwide [Article 55168]. 5. The vulnerabilities in the Niagara system made it susceptible to attacks, as identified by a security researcher [Article 55168]. |
| Impacts | 1. The hackers were able to take over computers running equipment at a New Jersey company by exploiting gaps in popular software used worldwide, specifically the Niagara Framework, which controls devices and systems remotely [55168]. 2. The hackers, who were political activists, did not damage or steal anything during the attack [55168]. 3. The incident highlighted the vulnerability of Internet-connected computer systems that control critical infrastructure such as power grids, water systems, manufacturing, and transportation [55168]. 4. The Department of Homeland Security issued a cyber-alert advising Niagara users to take immediate steps to enhance security, such as prohibiting guest users, strengthening passwords, and cutting off direct access to the Internet [55168]. |
| Preventions | 1. Properly configuring user accounts with strong security measures, such as avoiding the use of "guest user" accounts with little security [55168]. 2. Implementing regular software updates and patches to address vulnerabilities in the system [55168]. 3. Restricting direct access to the Internet for critical systems to prevent external intrusions [55168]. |
| Fixes | 1. Prohibit guest user accounts immediately. 2. Bolster passwords for the system. 3. Cut off direct access to the Internet for the system. 4. Take other steps to prevent hackers from exploiting configuration and software flaws. [Cited Articles: #55168] | References | 1. FBI document [55168] 2. Security researcher mentioned in a Washington Post investigation [55168] 3. Department of Homeland Security [55168] 4. Tridium officials [55168] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident happened again at the air conditioning firm that was targeted in the FBI alert. The firm used the Niagara software in its operations and also installed it for customers, including banks. The hackers exploited a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts in the Niagara Framework to gain unauthorized access to the system [55168]. (b) The software failure incident involving the vulnerabilities in the Niagara system has raised concerns about the security of Internet-connected computer systems that control critical infrastructure worldwide. The incident highlighted the growing threat to systems like power grids, water systems, manufacturing, transportation, and other operations [55168]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design | (a) The software failure incident in the article was related to the design phase. The incident occurred due to a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts in the Niagara Framework software, which allowed hackers to enter the system as a "back door" [55168]. (b) The software failure incident was not related to the operation phase but rather to a design flaw in the system that allowed hackers to exploit vulnerabilities in the software [55168]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system | (a) within_system: The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to contributing factors that originated from within the system. Specifically, the hackers exploited a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts within the Niagara Framework software, which allowed them to enter the system as a "back door" [55168]. Additionally, the vulnerabilities in the Niagara system itself made it susceptible to attacks, highlighting internal weaknesses within the software [55168]. Tridium, the company behind the Niagara software, issued alerts and software fixes to address these internal system vulnerabilities [55168]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to non-human actions. Hackers exploited gaps in popular software used to remotely operate elevators, medical equipment, access checkpoints, and operations by taking advantage of a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts in the Niagara Framework system [55168]. (b) Human actions also played a role in the software failure incident. The air conditioning firm targeted in the attack had configured its Niagara system with a "guest user" account with little security, providing a backdoor for the hackers to enter the system. The Department of Homeland Security issued alerts advising users to prohibit guest users, bolster passwords, and take other steps to prevent hackers from exploiting configuration and software flaws, highlighting the importance of proper configuration by humans to prevent such incidents [55168]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | software | (a) The software failure incident in the article was not attributed to hardware issues. The incident was caused by hackers exploiting a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts in the Niagara Framework software, which is used to remotely control devices and systems [55168]. (b) The software failure incident was directly related to software vulnerabilities in the Niagara Framework software. The hackers exploited gaps in the software to gain unauthorized access to computers running equipment at a New Jersey company. The vulnerabilities allowed the hackers to enter the system and control devices remotely, highlighting the weaknesses in the industrial control systems [55168]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious | (a) The software failure incident in Article 55168 was malicious in nature. Hackers, identified as political activists, took over computers running equipment at a New Jersey company by exploiting gaps in popular software used to remotely operate elevators, medical equipment, access checkpoints, and operations. They targeted the Niagara Framework system by misconfiguring "guest user" accounts to enter the system multiple times. The hackers' objective was to draw attention to the weakness of industrial control systems, highlighting the vulnerability of critical infrastructure systems to cyber threats [55168]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions | (a) The intent of the software failure incident was due to poor decisions. The hackers exploited a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts in the Niagara Framework software, which allowed them to enter the system as a "back door" [55168]. The air conditioning firm targeted had configured its Niagara system with a "guest user" account with little security, providing an opportunity for the hackers to gain unauthorized access [55168]. The vulnerabilities in the system made it susceptible to attacks, highlighting the poor decisions in the configuration and security measures implemented [55168]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | accidental | (a) The software failure incident in the article was not attributed to development incompetence. The hackers exploited a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts in the Niagara Framework software, which was not a result of development incompetence but rather a security vulnerability that was taken advantage of [55168]. (b) The software failure incident in the article was accidental in nature. The hackers were political activists who wanted to draw attention to the weakness of industrial control systems. They found and exploited a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts in the Niagara Framework software, indicating that the incident was not intentional but rather accidental in terms of how the vulnerability was discovered and exploited [55168]. |
| Duration | temporary | The software failure incident described in the article was temporary. The incident occurred in February and March when hackers exploited a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts to enter the system known as the Niagara Framework on multiple occasions. The hackers did not damage or steal anything during the attack, and steps were taken to address the vulnerabilities and make the system more secure [55168]. |
| Behaviour | other | (a) crash: The software failure incident in the article did not involve a crash where the system lost state and did not perform any of its intended functions [55168]. (b) omission: The failure was not due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s) [55168]. (c) timing: The incident did not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions correctly, but too late or too early [55168]. (d) value: The software failure incident was not due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly [55168]. (e) byzantine: The behavior of the software failure incident did not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [55168]. (f) other: The software failure incident involved hackers exploiting a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts to enter the system known as the Niagara Framework, using it as a "back door" into the system. The hackers did not damage or steal anything during the attack, indicating a different type of behavior in the software failure incident [55168]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | sensor, network_communication, embedded_software | (a) sensor: The software failure incident reported in the article is related to the perception layer of the cyber physical system that failed due to contributing factors introduced by sensor error. The hackers exploited a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts to enter the system known as the Niagara Framework, which is used to remotely control devices and systems. This misconfiguration of the sensor (guest user account) allowed the hackers to gain unauthorized access to the system [55168]. (b) actuator: The article does not mention any contributing factors related to actuator error in the software failure incident. (c) processing_unit: The software failure incident does not directly point to any contributing factors introduced by processing error. (d) network_communication: The failure in the software incident is related to network communication error as the hackers exploited vulnerabilities in the software used for remote operation of devices and systems. They used the Internet to gain unauthorized access to the system, highlighting the importance of securing network communication to prevent such attacks [55168]. (e) embedded_software: The failure in the software incident can also be attributed to contributing factors introduced by embedded software error. The vulnerabilities in the Niagara Framework software allowed the hackers to exploit configuration and software flaws, emphasizing the need for secure embedded software to prevent unauthorized access and attacks [55168]. |
| Communication | connectivity_level | The software failure incident reported in Article 55168 was related to the connectivity level of the cyber physical system. Hackers exploited a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts in the Niagara Framework, a software system used to control devices remotely. They used this misconfiguration as a "back door" into the system, indicating a failure at the network or transport layer of the system [55168]. |
| Application | TRUE | The software failure incident described in the article [55168] was related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. The hackers exploited a misconfiguration of "guest user" accounts in the Niagara Framework software, which allowed them to enter the system as a "back door." This misconfiguration was a contributing factor introduced by incorrect usage or configuration of the application layer, leading to the security breach. |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | property, non-human, theoretical_consequence | (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure The software failure incident described in the article did not result in any physical harm or loss of life. However, the hackers were able to exploit a misconfiguration in the "guest user" accounts of the Niagara Framework software, which allowed them to access and potentially control devices and systems remotely. While the hackers did not damage or steal anything during the attack, the potential impact on property, such as data or control over critical infrastructure systems like elevators, medical equipment, and access checkpoints, was a significant concern [55168]. |
| Domain | information, health | (a) The failed system was intended to support the information industry as it was used to remotely operate elevators, medical equipment, access checkpoints, and operations [55168]. (b) The failed system was not directly related to the transportation industry. (c) The failed system was not directly related to the natural resources industry. (d) The failed system was not directly related to the sales industry. (e) The failed system was not directly related to the construction industry. (f) The failed system was not directly related to the manufacturing industry. (g) The failed system was not directly related to the utilities industry. (h) The failed system was not directly related to the finance industry. (i) The failed system was used in the health industry as it was involved in controlling medical equipment [55168]. (j) The failed system was not directly related to the entertainment industry. (k) The failed system was not directly related to the government industry. (l) The failed system was not directly related to the government industry. (m) The failed system was not directly related to any other industry mentioned in the options. |
Article ID: 55168