| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to hijacking internet traffic using BGP vulnerabilities has happened again at the organization Síminn. In the incident, traffic was diverted to Iceland, and Síminn initially attributed the issue to a software malfunction in its internet gateway in Montreal. The company stated that the malfunction caused traffic not intended for Síminn or its customers to pass through its network en route to its destination. The issue was said to have been resolved with the assistance of the equipment vendor on August 22nd. However, Renesys was skeptical of this explanation and requested further details about the bug and the vendor, which Síminn did not provide [55761].
(b) The software failure incident related to BGP hijacking has also occurred at multiple organizations. The incident involved intercepting internet traffic and redirecting it to Belarus and Iceland. The hijacks were initiated by various ISPs in these countries, such as GlobalOneBel in Belarus and Nyherji hf and Opin Kerfi in Iceland. The intercepts affected traffic from countries like the U.S., Germany, South Korea, and Iran. Renesys observed a total of 17 intercepts between July 31 and August 19, with nine different ISPs or companies in Iceland initiating the intercepts. The incident highlighted the vulnerability of BGP routing and the potential for intentional interception of data [55761]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
operation |
The software failure incident described in the articles is more related to the operation phase [(#55761)]. The incident involved intentional hijacking of internet traffic through the exploitation of a vulnerability in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). The attackers manipulated BGP messages to intercept and redirect data to their controlled systems without the sender or recipient being aware of the unauthorized diversion. This operation phase failure was deliberate and involved tweaking the attack over time to refine it, indicating intention rather than a mistake. The incident highlighted the risks associated with the operation and misuse of the BGP routing system, leading to data interception and potential data breaches. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the articles is primarily due to contributing factors that originate from within the system. The incident involved intentional hijacking of internet traffic through manipulation of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) by sending out bogus announcements to redirect traffic to the attackers' routers. This manipulation exploited the trust-based architecture of BGP routers, allowing the attackers to intercept specific internet traffic without the sender or recipient being aware of the diversion [55761]. The incident involved deliberate actions by the attackers to control the propagation of their BGP messages and tweak their approach over time to achieve the desired outcome [55761].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident also had contributing factors that originated from outside the system. For example, the attackers could have potentially hijacked systems in Belarus and Iceland to use them as proxies for the attacks, which suggests a level of external involvement beyond the immediate system being targeted [55761]. Additionally, there is a mention of the possibility that a third party could have hijacked systems in Belarus and Iceland to carry out the attacks, indicating external influence on the incident [55761]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles was primarily due to non-human actions. The incident involved intentional hijacking of internet traffic through the exploitation of a vulnerability in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), a key protocol for routing internet traffic. The attackers manipulated BGP messages to redirect traffic to systems they controlled in Belarus and Iceland, allowing them to intercept and potentially tamper with sensitive data without being detected. The hijacks were intentional and sophisticated, involving the crafting of BGP messages to control how far and where the announcements propagated, ultimately leading the traffic back to its legitimate destination [55761].
(b) While the software failure incident was primarily caused by non-human actions, there were also human actions involved in the response and aftermath of the incident. For example, the response from the affected ISPs and companies involved human actions such as investigating the incidents, providing explanations for the traffic redirections, and attempting to resolve the issues. Additionally, there were discussions about potential future risks and the need for organizations to monitor their IP prefixes to prevent similar hijacking incidents in the future, highlighting the importance of human actions in addressing and mitigating the consequences of software failures [55761]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The incident reported in the articles is primarily related to a security vulnerability in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is a routing protocol used to direct internet traffic [55761].
- The vulnerability allowed attackers to hijack internet traffic by manipulating BGP announcements, leading to data interception and redirection to unauthorized destinations [55761].
- While the vulnerability exploited was in the software implementation of BGP, the incident also involved hardware components such as routers and network infrastructure that were used to carry out the hijacking [55761].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The software failure incident was primarily caused by a security vulnerability in the BGP protocol, which is a software-based routing protocol used for directing internet traffic [55761].
- The attackers exploited this software vulnerability to manipulate BGP announcements and redirect internet traffic to unauthorized destinations [55761].
- The incident highlights a flaw in the software design and implementation of BGP, which allowed for the unauthorized interception and redirection of data [55761]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. It involves intentional hijacking of internet traffic through the exploitation of a vulnerability in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) by diverting data to systems controlled by the attackers in Belarus and Iceland [55761].
The attackers demonstrated a sophisticated man-in-the-middle routing attack, intercepting internet traffic intended for government agencies, corporate offices, and other recipients in the U.S. and elsewhere. They redirected the traffic to their controlled systems in Belarus and Iceland, allowing them to potentially access and manipulate sensitive information such as emails, credit card numbers, and other unencrypted data [55761].
The hijackers targeted specific entities like foreign ministries and a large VoIP provider, indicating a deliberate selection of victims rather than random interception. The attack involved multiple instances of traffic diversion, lasting for varying durations, and showed signs of refinement and evolution over time, suggesting a calculated and intentional effort to exploit the BGP vulnerability [55761].
The incident involved multiple hijacks initiated by different ISPs in Belarus and Iceland, with the attackers altering their tactics and locations to obfuscate their activity. The attackers also appeared to have hand-picked targets and refined their techniques, indicating a deliberate and intentional effort to intercept internet traffic for potentially malicious purposes [55761]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
The intent of the software failure incident described in the articles is related to intentional actions rather than accidental decisions. The incident involved deliberate hijacking of internet traffic through the exploitation of a vulnerability in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [55761]. The attackers intentionally diverted traffic multiple times to specific destinations, including government agencies, corporate offices, and foreign ministries, indicating a targeted approach [55761]. Renesys, the network monitoring firm, concluded that the characteristics of the hijacks suggested intentional interception rather than accidental mistakes [55761]. Additionally, the attackers refined their techniques over time, demonstrating a deliberate effort to manipulate the BGP messages for their benefit [55761]. The incident was not attributed to accidental decisions or mistakes but rather to a sophisticated and intentional exploitation of the BGP vulnerability for data interception. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is not explicitly mentioned in the provided articles.
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is discussed in the articles. The incident involving the hijacking of internet traffic to Belarus and Iceland was initially attributed to a software malfunction in Síminn's internet gateway in Montreal, resulting in the corruption of routing data and misrouting of traffic that was not intended for Síminn or its customers [55761]. This accidental misrouting of traffic through Belarus and Iceland was explained as a bug that had since been patched by Síminn, the ISP involved in the incident. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as a temporary failure. The incident involved intentional hijacking of internet traffic through the manipulation of BGP announcements, leading to the diversion of data to unauthorized destinations. This manipulation was not a result of a permanent flaw in the software but rather a deliberate exploitation of the trust-based architecture of the BGP protocol [55761]. The hijackers experimented over time, modifying different attributes of the BGP messages to control how the traffic propagated, indicating a deliberate and evolving approach to the attack [55761]. The incident was characterized by intentional actions aimed at intercepting specific traffic rather than a systemic failure affecting all circumstances. |
| Behaviour |
byzantine |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and stops performing its intended functions. The incident involves intentional hijacking of internet traffic through manipulation of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [55761].
(b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, the incident revolves around the intentional redirection of internet traffic to unauthorized destinations [55761].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but at the wrong time. The incident is focused on the deliberate manipulation of BGP routing to intercept and redirect internet traffic [55761].
(d) value: The software failure incident does not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly in terms of the value it provides. The incident is centered around the intentional hijacking of internet traffic for potential data interception and manipulation [55761].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident aligns more closely with a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident involves sophisticated manipulation of BGP routing to intercept and redirect internet traffic without detection [55761].
(f) other: The software failure incident does not fit into the categories of crash, omission, timing, or value. The other behavior observed in this incident is intentional and sophisticated manipulation of BGP routing to intercept and redirect internet traffic for potential data interception and tampering [55761]. |