Incident: NSA Exploits Windows Error Messages for Spying.

Published Date: 2013-12-31

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident mentioned in Article 55822 happened in 2013 (Published on 2013-12-31) [55822]. 2. The software failure incident mentioned in Article 33952 happened in 2001 (Published on 2015-02-16) [33952].
System 1. Windows error messages system [Article 55822] 2. Hard drive firmware system [Article 33952]
Responsible Organization 1. National Security Agency (NSA) [55822, 33952] 2. The Equation group [33952]
Impacted Organization 1. Government and military institutions, telecommunication companies, banks, energy companies, nuclear researchers, media, and Islamic activists were impacted by the software failure incident reported in Article 33952 [33952].
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was related to Windows error messages allowing the NSA to spy on PC users by gaining access through crash reports sent by users, as reported in Article 55822. 2. Another software cause of the failure incident was the NSA's ability to hide spying software deep within hard drives, allowing them to monitor and eavesdrop on computers worldwide, even when not connected to the internet, as reported in Article 33952.
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of awareness by computer users that crash reports on Windows computers could potentially be sent to the NSA instead of Microsoft, leading to unintentional data sharing [Article 55822]. 2. Infiltration of spying software deep within hard drives by the NSA, even without the knowledge of the hard drive manufacturers, allowing for monitoring and eavesdropping on computers [Article 33952].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident involving Windows error messages potentially allowed the National Security Agency (NSA) to spy on PC users by gaining access through crash reports sent by computer users, impacting user privacy and security [55822]. 2. The NSA's ability to hide spying software deep within hard drives, even without internet connection, allowed them to monitor and eavesdrop on computers globally, impacting the security and confidentiality of sensitive information stored on these devices [33952].
Preventions 1. Ensuring secure measures to prevent tampering or reverse engineering of firmware and other technologies in hard drives could have prevented the software failure incident [33952]. 2. Implementing strict security protocols to safeguard proprietary source code that directs the actions of hard drives could have prevented the software failure incident [33952]. 3. Conducting thorough security audits to verify the safety of source code before sharing it with government agencies could have prevented the software failure incident [33952].
Fixes 1. Ensuring that error reports sent by computer users are only accessible by the intended recipient, in this case, Microsoft, to prevent unauthorized access by entities like the NSA [55822]. 2. Implementing stricter security measures to prevent the embedding of malicious software in firmware of hard drives, which allows for spying on computers even when they are not connected to the internet [33952].
References 1. Der Spiegel 2. Edward Snowden 3. Graham Cluley 4. The Huffington Post 5. Kaspersky Lab 6. Former intelligence operatives 7. NSA spokeswoman Vanee Vines 8. Eugene Kaspersky 9. NSA employee 10. NSA Review Group 11. Western Digital Corp 12. Seagate Technology Plc 13. Toshiba Corp 14. IBM 15. Micron Technology Inc 16. Samsung Electronics Co Ltd 17. Vincent Liu [55822, 33952]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to the NSA spying on PC users through Windows error messages has happened again at Microsoft. The incident involved error messages on Windows computers enabling the NSA to spy on users by gaining access through crash reports sent to Microsoft [55822]. (b) The software failure incident related to the NSA hiding spying software deep within hard drives has happened again at multiple organizations. The incident involved the NSA hiding spying software in hard drives, allowing them to monitor computers worldwide, even when not connected to the internet. The spying programs were found in computers in 30 countries, targeting various institutions and individuals [33952].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in Article 55822, where it is reported that error messages on Windows computers could enable the National Security Agency (NSA) to spy on PC users. The NSA was able to gain 'passive access' to computers through crash reports, which were designed to be sent to Microsoft for improving products and fixing bugs. However, these reports were also being sent to the NSA, indicating a failure in the design of the error reporting system that allowed for potential spying [55822]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in Article 33952, where it is revealed that the National Security Agency (NSA) had developed techniques to hide spying software deep within hard drives, allowing them to monitor and eavesdrop on computers worldwide. This operation failure occurred as the NSA was able to infect personal computers in various countries without the knowledge of the hard drive manufacturers or the users, showcasing a significant failure in the operation and security of these systems [33952].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incidents reported in the articles are primarily related to failures within the system. For example, in Article 55822, it is mentioned that error messages on Windows computers could enable the National Security Agency (NSA) to spy on PC users by gaining 'passive access' to computers through crash reports [55822]. Similarly, Article 33952 discusses how the NSA has figured out how to hide spying software deep within hard drives, allowing them to monitor and eavesdrop on computers, even when they are not connected to the internet [33952]. (b) outside_system: There is no specific information in the articles indicating software failure incidents caused by contributing factors originating from outside the system.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - Article 33952 reports on a software failure incident where the National Security Agency (NSA) figured out how to hide spying software deep within hard drives, allowing them to monitor and eavesdrop on computers even when they are not connected to the internet. This incident involved the embedding of malicious software in the firmware of hard drives, a non-human action, to enable spying [33952]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - Article 55822 discusses how error messages on Windows computers could enable the NSA to spy on PC users. This incident involves human actions where computer users might unknowingly send error reports to the NSA when they think they are sending them to Microsoft, potentially aiding in spying activities [55822].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - Article 33952 reports on a software failure incident related to hardware. The National Security Agency (NSA) figured out how to hide spying software deep within hard drives' firmware, allowing them to monitor and eavesdrop on computers worldwide, even when not connected to the internet. This malicious software was embedded in the firmware of hard drives, which launch every time a computer is turned on [33952]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - Article 55822 discusses a software failure incident related to software. It mentions how error messages on Windows computers could enable the NSA to spy on PC users. The crash reports sent to Microsoft could also be accessed by the NSA, providing a 'neat way' of gaining 'passive access' to computers. This incident highlights a software vulnerability that could be exploited for spying purposes [55822].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious, non-malicious (a) The software failure incident described in Article 33952 is malicious in nature. The National Security Agency (NSA) figured out how to hide spying software deep within hard drives, allowing them to monitor and eavesdrop on computers worldwide, even when they are not connected to the internet. The NSA infected computers in various countries with spying programs, targeting government institutions, military entities, banks, energy companies, and more. The spying software was hidden in the firmware of hard drives, a sophisticated technique that allowed for remote control over machines belonging to high-value foreign targets [33952]. (b) The software failure incident described in Article 55822 is non-malicious. It involves Windows error messages that could potentially enable the NSA to spy on PC users. When a Windows program stops working or freezes, users can choose to send an error report to Microsoft to help improve products and fix bugs. However, conscientious computer users might inadvertently be sending reports to the NSA as well, as the crash reports are seen as a 'neat way' for the NSA to gain passive access to computers. This incident highlights a potential unintended consequence of error reporting functionality in software systems [55822].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions: - The software failure incidents described in the articles involve intentional actions by the National Security Agency (NSA) to embed spying software deep within hard drives and hide spying software in firmware without the knowledge of the hard drive manufacturers [33952]. - The NSA's actions in infecting computers with spying programs and concealing spyware in hard drives were deliberate decisions made to enable monitoring and eavesdropping on computers worldwide [33952]. (b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions: - There is no indication in the articles that the software failure incidents were a result of accidental decisions or unintended mistakes. The actions described were intentional and part of a sophisticated espionage campaign conducted by the NSA [33952].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the articles. In Article 55822, it is reported that the National Security Agency (NSA) was able to spy on PC users by exploiting Windows error messages that pop up when a Windows program stops working or freezes. The NSA used crash reports as a 'neat way' to gain 'passive access' to computers [55822]. This incident highlights a failure in the development process of Windows software, allowing for potential exploitation by external entities due to a lack of professional competence in ensuring user data privacy and security. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also present in the articles. In Article 33952, it is revealed that the NSA developed sophisticated techniques to hide spying software deep within hard drives, allowing them to monitor computers worldwide, even when not connected to the internet. The spying software was embedded in the firmware of hard drives, and even the manufacturers of the hard drives were unaware of these programs being installed [33952]. This accidental embedding of spying software in hard drives showcases a failure in ensuring the security and integrity of hardware components, potentially leading to unintended consequences for users.
Duration permanent, temporary (a) The software failure incident described in Article 33952 can be categorized as a permanent failure. The National Security Agency (NSA) had figured out how to hide spying software deep within hard drives, allowing them to monitor and eavesdrop on the majority of the world's computers, even when they are not connected to the internet. This technique had been active for almost two decades, starting in 2001 and ramping up efforts in 2008 [33952]. (b) The software failure incident described in Article 55822 can be categorized as a temporary failure. The incident involved Windows error messages that could enable the NSA to spy on PC users by intercepting crash reports that users send to Microsoft. This temporary failure occurred when users encountered errors in Windows programs and chose to send error reports to Microsoft, which could potentially be intercepted by the NSA [55822].
Behaviour crash, value, byzantine (a) crash: - Article 55822 mentions that error messages on Windows computers could enable the National Security Agency to spy on PC users when a Windows program stops working or freezes, and users choose to send an error report to Microsoft [55822]. - Article 33952 discusses how the NSA has figured out how to hide spying software deep within hard drives, allowing them to monitor and eavesdrop on computers, even when they are not connected to the internet. This could lead to a crash or system failure due to the presence of malicious software within the firmware of hard drives [33952]. (b) omission: - There is no specific mention of a software failure incident related to omission in the provided articles. (c) timing: - There is no specific mention of a software failure incident related to timing in the provided articles. (d) value: - Article 55822 mentions that error messages on Windows computers could enable the NSA to spy on PC users, indicating a failure in the system performing its intended functions correctly [55822]. (e) byzantine: - Article 33952 discusses how the NSA has hidden spying software deep within hard drives, allowing them to monitor and eavesdrop on computers, even when they are not connected to the internet. This behavior of hiding spying software within hard drives can lead to inconsistent responses and interactions, which align with a byzantine failure scenario [33952]. (f) other: - The articles do not provide information on a software failure incident related to a behavior not covered by the options (a) to (e).

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception processing_unit, embedded_software (a) sensor: The failure was not related to the perception layer of the cyber physical system that failed [55822, 33952]. (b) actuator: The failure was not related to the perception layer of the cyber physical system that failed [55822, 33952]. (c) processing_unit: The failure was related to the processing unit as the NSA figured out how to hide spying software deep within hard drives, allowing them to monitor and eavesdrop on computers [33952]. (d) network_communication: The failure was not related to the perception layer of the cyber physical system that failed [55822, 33952]. (e) embedded_software: The failure was related to embedded software as the NSA figured out how to hide spying software deep within hard drives, allowing them to monitor and eavesdrop on computers [33952].
Communication unknown The software failure incidents reported in the provided articles do not directly relate to a failure at the communication layer of the cyber-physical system. Instead, the articles focus on how the National Security Agency (NSA) utilized techniques to embed spying software deep within hard drives and gain access to computers for surveillance purposes. The failures discussed in the articles are more related to security breaches and espionage activities rather than failures at the communication layer of a cyber-physical system.
Application FALSE The software failure incidents described in the provided articles are not related to the application layer of the cyber physical system that failed due to bugs, operating system errors, unhandled exceptions, or incorrect usage. Instead, the incidents discussed in the articles are related to sophisticated spying techniques employed by the National Security Agency (NSA) to hide spying software deep within hard drives and gain access to computers for surveillance purposes. Therefore, the failure incidents mentioned in the articles do not align with the definition provided for application layer failures.

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human (a) unknown (b) unknown (c) unknown (d) [33952] The software failure incident described in Article 33952 resulted in the National Security Agency (NSA) being able to hide spying software deep within hard drives, allowing them to monitor and eavesdrop on the majority of the world's computers. This impacted people's data and privacy as their computers were infected with spying programs without their knowledge. (e) unknown (f) [33952] The software failure incident impacted non-human entities such as personal computers in 30 countries that were infected with spying programs, including government and military institutions, telecommunication companies, banks, energy companies, nuclear researchers, media, and Islamic activists. (g) unknown (h) unknown (i) unknown
Domain information, government (a) The failed system was related to the industry of information, specifically in the context of software vulnerabilities being exploited for spying purposes by the National Security Agency (NSA) [55822, 33952]. (b) The transportation industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (c) The natural resources industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (d) The sales industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (e) The construction industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (f) The manufacturing industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (g) The utilities industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (h) The finance industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (i) The knowledge industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (j) The health industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (k) The entertainment industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (l) The failed system was related to the government industry as it involved the NSA using software vulnerabilities to spy on individuals and organizations [55822, 33952]. (m) The failed system was not directly related to any other specific industry mentioned in the articles.

Sources

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