| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to insecure smart meters has happened before within the same organization. In 2009, Puerto Rican smart meters were hacked en masse, leading to widespread billing fraud [57848]. This indicates a previous occurrence of a similar incident within the same organization or related to its products and services.
(b) The software failure incident related to insecure smart meters has also happened at multiple organizations. The article mentions that the problems with smart meters stem from outdated protocols, half-hearted implementations, and weak design principles, indicating that similar issues may exist in smart meters used by various utilities [57848]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. The lack of security in smart utilities, particularly smart meters, is highlighted as a significant issue. The problems stem from outdated protocols, half-hearted implementations, and weak design principles [57848]. These design flaws have led to vulnerabilities such as hardcoded credentials, weak encryption keys, and simplified code that can easily crash the devices. The use of outdated standards like GSM and Zigbee, along with the lack of proper security implementations, contribute to the insecurity of smart meters.
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also discussed in the article. The vulnerabilities in the smart meters, such as hardcoded credentials and weak security protocols, can be exploited by attackers to take control of the meters and potentially cause harm, including billing fraud and even causing meters to explode [57848]. These operational failures are a result of the weak security decisions made by vendors and the lack of proper authentication mechanisms in place, allowing attackers to manipulate the meters through the network. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the smart meters' insecurity can be attributed to factors originating from within the system. The lack of security in the smart utilities was highlighted due to outdated protocols, half-hearted implementations, weak design principles, and specific vulnerabilities within the smart meters themselves. For example, hardcoded credentials, encryption keys derived from short device names, pairing standards with no authentication required, and simplified code for low-power devices were identified as internal weaknesses contributing to the software failure incident [57848].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident also involved contributing factors originating from outside the system. Specifically, the use of GSM, the 2G mobile standard, for communication with utility companies was identified as problematic due to its vulnerability to attacks from fake mobile towers. This external factor allowed attackers to manipulate the smart meters by providing a strong signal to cause devices to hand over to the fake tower, compromising the security of the system [57848]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The article mentions that the lack of security in smart utilities, particularly in smart meters, poses significant risks such as a single line of malicious code cutting power to a home or causing catastrophic overloads leading to exploding meters or house fires [57848]. These risks are attributed to outdated protocols, half-hearted implementations, weak design principles, and vulnerabilities in wireless communication protocols used by smart meters. For example, the article highlights weaknesses in the GSM 2G mobile standard used by most smart meters, where an attacker with a fake mobile tower can manipulate devices by providing a strong signal [57848]. Additionally, the use of Zigbee standard for communication within homes is criticized for its convoluted nature, leading to security vulnerabilities due to vendors choosing what security features to implement [57848].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The article also mentions instances where human actions have contributed to software failure incidents related to smart meters. For example, in 2009, Puerto Rican smart meters were hacked en masse, leading to widespread billing fraud [57848]. Furthermore, the article discusses a house fire in Ontario in 2015 that was traced back to a faulty smart meter, although hacking was not implicated in that specific incident [57848]. Additionally, the article highlights poor security decisions made by vendors, such as using hardcoded credentials, weak encryption keys, and simplified code on low-power devices, which can be exploited by attackers [57848]. These human actions in terms of design choices and implementation practices contribute to the overall insecurity of smart meters and the software failures associated with them. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The article mentions that the problems at the heart of the insecurity in smart meters stem from outdated protocols, half-hearted implementations, and weak design principles. While the physical security of smart meters is strong, the wireless protocols many of them use are problematic [57848].
- The smart meters' communication with the utility company using GSM, the 2G mobile standard, has a weakness where an attacker with a fake mobile tower can cause devices to hand over to the fake version from the real tower, simply by providing a strong signal [57848].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The article highlights various weak security decisions made by vendors, such as encryption keys derived from short device names, pairing standards with no authentication required, hardcoded credentials, and simplified code that skips important checks [57848].
- The article also mentions that the communications inside the home are rendered insecure by outdated standards and bad implementation, with almost all smart meters using the Zigbee standard, which is convoluted and often implemented without proper security measures [57848]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious, non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident related to malicious intent is highlighted in the article. It discusses how smart electricity meters are "frequently 'dangerously insecure'" and vulnerable to hacking, allowing attackers to take control of the meters and potentially cause harm by cutting power to a home, causing overloads, or even leading to exploding meters or house fires [57848].
(b) The software failure incident related to non-malicious factors is also mentioned in the article. It points out that the problems with the security of smart meters stem from outdated protocols, half-hearted implementations, weak design principles, and insecure communication standards, rather than intentional malicious actions [57848]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the smart electricity meters can be attributed to poor decisions made by vendors and utilities. The lack of security in the smart utilities was highlighted due to outdated protocols, half-hearted implementations, and weak design principles [57848]. Vendors made poor security decisions such as using hardcoded credentials, encryption keys derived from short device names, pairing standards with no authentication required, and simplifying code on low-power devices, which ultimately led to the vulnerability of the smart meters [57848]. Additionally, the use of outdated standards like Zigbee, with vendors choosing what security features to implement, further contributed to the insecurity of the smart meters [57848]. These poor decisions made by vendors and utilities regarding security aspects of the smart meters ultimately led to the software failure incident. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, unknown |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the smart electricity meters' lack of security. The article highlights various issues such as outdated protocols, weak design principles, and half-hearted implementations leading to vulnerabilities in the smart meters [57848]. These vulnerabilities include hardcoded credentials, weak encryption keys, and simplified code that can easily crash the device. The use of outdated standards like GSM and Zigbee, along with the lack of proper authentication mechanisms, showcases the incompetence in the development of secure software for these smart meters.
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is not explicitly mentioned in the article. Therefore, it is unknown if the failure was due to accidental factors. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
(a) The software failure incident related to the lack of security in smart electricity meters can be considered as a permanent failure. The article highlights various contributing factors that have led to the insecurity of smart meters, such as outdated protocols, weak design principles, hardcoded credentials, and vulnerabilities in communication standards like GSM and Zigbee. These inherent flaws in the design and implementation of smart meters indicate a systemic issue that is not easily rectified and poses a long-term risk to users [57848].
(b) On the other hand, the article also mentions specific instances of temporary failures resulting from hacking attempts on smart meters. For example, in 2009, Puerto Rican smart meters were hacked en masse, leading to widespread billing fraud. Additionally, in 2015, a house fire in Ontario was traced back to a faulty smart meter, although hacking was not implicated in that particular incident. These temporary failures were caused by specific hacking incidents rather than inherent design flaws, highlighting the vulnerability of smart meters to external attacks [57848]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, byzantine |
(a) crash: The article mentions a scenario where an attacker who controls the meter's software could cause it to literally explode, indicating a system crash [57848].
(b) omission: The article discusses the risk of a hacker taking control of a smart meter and being able to manipulate billing fraud, indicating the system omitting to perform its intended functions correctly [57848].
(c) timing: The article does not specifically mention any failures related to timing issues.
(d) value: The article highlights the risk of a hacker being able to set the billing amount to whatever they like, indicating a failure in the system performing its intended functions incorrectly [57848].
(e) byzantine: The article discusses various security vulnerabilities in smart meters, such as hardcoded credentials, weak encryption keys, and simplified code, which could lead to inconsistent responses and interactions with the system, suggesting a byzantine behavior [57848].
(f) other: The article does not provide information on a specific behavior that falls outside the options mentioned. |