Incident: Cyberweapon Shamoon Strikes Saudi Organizations, Wiping Computers Clean

Published Date: 2016-12-02

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident happened on November 17, 2016 [58044].
System 1. Computers at six important Saudi organizations 2. Saudi Aramco's computers 3. Saudi government agency's computers 4. Organizations in the energy, manufacturing, and transportation sectors 5. Saudi aviation regulator's computers (General Authority of Civil Aviation) 6. GACA employees' computers These systems failed in the software failure incident reported in Article 58044.
Responsible Organization 1. The hackers targeted various Saudi organizations, including a government agency, the energy, manufacturing, and transportation sectors, and the Saudi aviation regulator, the General Authority of Civil Aviation [58044].
Impacted Organization 1. Saudi Aramco [58044] 2. Saudi government agency 3. Organizations in the energy, manufacturing, and transportation sectors 4. Saudi aviation regulator, the General Authority of Civil Aviation
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was a cyberattack using a specific type of cyberweapon called Shamoon, which wiped clean computers at Saudi organizations [58044].
Non-software Causes 1. The cyberattack was attributed to hackers, specifically targeting Saudi organizations, including government agencies and sectors like energy, manufacturing, and transportation [58044]. 2. The attack was linked to a long-running power struggle for influence in the Middle East between Iran and Saudi Arabia [58044]. 3. The timing of the attack coincided with significant events in the oil industry, particularly the agreement by OPEC countries to cut oil production, which favored Iran [58044].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident resulted in the destruction of computers at six important Saudi organizations, including at least one government agency, as well as organizations in the energy, manufacturing, and transportation sectors [58044]. 2. The cyberattack aimed at disabling all equipment and services being provided, stealing data, and planting viruses in the systems [58044]. 3. The malware wiped clean computers en masse, replacing all computer files with an image of a 3-year-old Syrian refugee boy lying dead on a beach, and taking over the computers' boot record to prevent them from being turned back on [58044]. 4. The attack occurred just days before oil-pumping OPEC countries agreed to cut oil production, potentially impacting the oil production deal and favoring Iran [58044]. 5. The software failure incident may have been used by Iran to put pressure on Saudi Arabia in the ongoing power struggle for influence in the Middle East [58044].
Preventions 1. Implementing robust cybersecurity measures such as intrusion detection systems, firewalls, and endpoint protection to detect and prevent cyberattacks [58044]. 2. Regularly updating and patching software to address known vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers [58044]. 3. Conducting regular security audits and assessments to identify and address potential weaknesses in the system [58044]. 4. Providing cybersecurity training and awareness programs for employees to recognize and report suspicious activities that could indicate a cyberattack [58044].
Fixes 1. Enhancing cybersecurity measures and protocols within the affected organizations to prevent future cyberattacks [58044]. 2. Implementing robust security software that can detect and prevent malware attacks like Shamoon [58044]. 3. Conducting regular security audits and assessments to identify vulnerabilities and address them promptly [58044]. 4. Increasing employee awareness and training on cybersecurity best practices to prevent social engineering attacks that could lead to malware infiltration [58044].
References 1. Security researchers with direct knowledge of the investigations into the attack [58044] 2. Saudi Arabia's state news agency SPA [58044] 3. Patrick Wardle, a researcher with cybersecurity firm Synack [58044] 4. Top cybersecurity firms such as CrowdStrike, FireEye, McAfee, Palo Alto Networks, Symantec [58044] 5. Dmitri Alperovitch, cofounder of CrowdStrike [58044] 6. Collin Anderson, expert on Iranian hacking activity [58044] 7. Eric Chien, technical director at Symantec [58044]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: The article reports that a similar incident to the recent cyberattack in Saudi Arabia had occurred before at the oil company Saudi Aramco in 2012. In that attack, 35,000 computers were destroyed using a cyberweapon called Shamoon, which replaced computer files with images of a burning American flag [58044]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: The cyberweapon Shamoon, which was used in the recent attack on Saudi organizations, has also been used in other attacks. The article mentions that this cyberweapon was previously used to destroy computers at Saudi Aramco and has now targeted at least one Saudi government agency, as well as organizations in the energy, manufacturing, and transportation sectors [58044].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to the design phase. The incident involved a cyberattack using a specific type of cyberweapon called Shamoon, which operates like a time bomb. The malware wiped computers at Saudi organizations, replacing all computer files with an image of a Syrian refugee boy. The malware then took over the computers' boot record, preventing them from being turned back on. This destructive attack was carefully timed to occur when no employees would be around to stop the destruction, indicating a well-thought-out design of the attack [58044]. (b) The software failure incident can also be linked to the operation phase. The attack targeted various government institutions and agencies in Saudi Arabia, including the Saudi aviation regulator, the General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA). The malware code specifically targeted employees of GACA, indicating that the operation of the system and the actions of employees were exploited by the hackers. The attack aimed at disabling equipment and services, stealing data, and planting viruses, showcasing the impact of operational vulnerabilities on the system [58044].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the article was caused by a cyberattack using a specific type of cyberweapon called Shamoon. The malware wiped clean computers at Saudi organizations, replacing all computer files with an image of a Syrian refugee boy. The malware then took over the computers' boot record, preventing them from being turned back on. This attack originated from within the system as it targeted the internal infrastructure and data of the organizations [58044]. (b) outside_system: The cyberattack on Saudi organizations was attributed to external factors, specifically hackers who were believed to be targeting Saudi Arabia. The attack was linked to Iran, although no specific country, criminal organization, or political group was definitively blamed. The attack was seen as potentially related to the power struggle for influence in the Middle East between Iran and Saudi Arabia [58044].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically a cyberattack by hackers using a destructive cyberweapon called Shamoon. The attack aimed at disabling equipment and services, stealing data, and planting viruses in various Saudi organizations, including a government agency and sectors like energy, manufacturing, and transportation [58044]. (b) Human actions also played a role in the software failure incident as the hackers executed the cyberattack by deploying the Shamoon malware on computers at Saudi organizations. The attackers timed the attack when employees were not around to stop the destruction, indicating a deliberate human action to maximize the impact of the cyberweapon [58044].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident in Article 58044 was not primarily due to hardware issues. The incident was a cyberattack where hackers used a specific type of cyberweapon called Shamoon to destroy computers at various Saudi organizations. The malware wiped clean computers en masse, replaced files with images, and took over the computers' boot record, preventing them from being turned back on. This cyberweapon operated like a time bomb and was designed to cause destruction in the targeted systems [58044]. (b) The software failure incident in Article 58044 was primarily due to contributing factors that originated in software. The cyberattack involved the use of malware, specifically the Shamoon cyberweapon, which was used to wipe computers, replace files with images, and prevent the computers from being restarted. The malware targeted specific organizations in Saudi Arabia, including the General Authority of Civil Aviation, and was designed to disable equipment, steal data, and plant viruses in the systems. Security researchers were investigating how the hackers were able to carry out the attack using this destructive software [58044].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. Hackers destroyed computers at several important Saudi organizations using a cyberweapon known as Shamoon. The attack aimed at disabling equipment and services, stealing data, and planting viruses. The malware wiped computers clean and replaced files with an image of a dead Syrian refugee boy, preventing the computers from being turned back on. The attack was timed to occur when employees were not present to stop the destruction, indicating a deliberate intent to harm the systems ([58044]).
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions The intent of the software failure incident described in the article is related to poor_decisions. The incident involved a cyberattack using the Shamoon cyberweapon that targeted Saudi organizations, including a government agency and various sectors like energy, manufacturing, and transportation. The attack aimed at disabling equipment, stealing data, and planting viruses, ultimately wiping clean computers en masse. The malware used in the attack was timed strategically to prevent employees from stopping the destruction, indicating a deliberate and calculated approach by the hackers [58044].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence (a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to development incompetence. The malware used in the cyberattack, known as Shamoon, was described as rather poorly written and had been used before in a similar attack on Saudi Aramco in 2012. This indicates a lack of sophistication in the malware, suggesting that the attackers may have exploited vulnerabilities due to inadequate security measures or ineffective security software at the targeted organizations [58044]. (b) The software failure incident can also be considered accidental in nature. The attack was timed to occur when employees would not be present to stop the destruction, indicating a deliberate effort to maximize the impact of the malware. However, the specific targeting of Saudi organizations and the use of a known cyberweapon like Shamoon suggest a deliberate and intentional act rather than an accidental failure [58044].
Duration temporary The software failure incident described in the article is temporary. The incident involved a cyberattack using the Shamoon cyberweapon that wiped clean computers at Saudi organizations, replacing files with an image of a Syrian refugee boy and preventing the computers from being turned back on [58044]. The attack was timed to occur when no employees would be around to stop the destruction, indicating a deliberate and targeted effort to disrupt operations [58044]. Additionally, the attack was linked to geopolitical tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, suggesting a specific motive behind the temporary failure [58044].
Behaviour crash, other (a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article can be categorized as a crash. The malware used in the cyberattack on Saudi organizations caused the computers to crash by wiping all computer files and taking over the computers' boot record, preventing them from being turned back on [Article 58044]. (b) omission: The incident does not specifically mention a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). (c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident is significant as the malicious software started wiping computers at Saudi organizations at 8:45 p.m. local time on Nov. 17, which was strategically chosen when no employees would be around to stop the destruction, as it was the last day of the Saudi work week [Article 58044]. (d) value: The incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit behavior characteristic of a byzantine failure. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a deliberate cyberattack orchestrated by hackers to destroy computers and disrupt services at Saudi organizations, indicating a malicious intent beyond typical system failures [Article 58044].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human (a) death: The software failure incident resulted in a tragic consequence where all computer files were replaced by the image of a 3-year-old Syrian refugee boy, Alan Kurdi, lying dead on a beach. This imagery was part of the cyberattack that wiped computers at Saudi organizations, preventing them from being turned back on [Article 58044].
Domain information, transportation, manufacturing, government (a) The failed system was intended to support the information industry as it targeted organizations in the energy, manufacturing, and transportation sectors, as well as at least one Saudi government agency [Article 58044]. (b) The failed system also impacted the transportation sector as it targeted the Saudi aviation regulator, the General Authority of Civil Aviation [Article 58044]. (c) There is no specific mention of the failed system being related to the extraction of natural resources. (d) There is no specific mention of the failed system being related to sales or commercial transactions. (e) There is no specific mention of the failed system being related to the construction industry. (f) The failed system was intended to support the manufacturing industry as it targeted organizations in this sector [Article 58044]. (g) There is no specific mention of the failed system being related to utilities. (h) There is no specific mention of the failed system being related to the finance industry. (i) There is no specific mention of the failed system being related to the knowledge industry. (j) There is no specific mention of the failed system being related to the health industry. (k) There is no specific mention of the failed system being related to the entertainment industry. (l) The failed system was intended to support the government sector as it targeted various government institutions and agencies in Saudi Arabia [Article 58044]. (m) The failed system was not related to any other industry mentioned in the options provided.

Sources

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