Incident: Voting System Logic Error Leads to Lost Votes in Elections

Published Date: 2010-09-15

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident with voting systems made by Premier Election Solutions in Ohio was discovered in 2008 [2819]. 2. The software problem with tabulation software for touchscreen machines made by Sequoia Voting Systems in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, was discovered in 2002 [2819].
System 1. Premier Election Solutions voting systems 2. Sequoia Voting Systems tabulation software for touchscreen machines
Responsible Organization 1. Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election Systems) - Initially blamed the problem on anti-virus software but later conceded it was a logic error in its own software [2819]. 2. Sequoia Voting Systems - Admitted it was a software problem that led to dropping ballots and failed to inform officials about known issues and neglected to install a patch to fix the problem [2819].
Impacted Organization 1. Election officials in Ohio [2819] 2. Election officials in Bernalillo County, New Mexico [2819]
Software Causes 1. Logic error in Premier Election Solutions' voting system software [2819] 2. Software problem in tabulation software for touchscreen machines made by Sequoia Voting Systems [2819]
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of oversight and reporting requirements for voting machine vendors to government agencies [2819] 2. Absence of a central location for election officials to find information about problems encountered with voting machines [2819] 3. Limited authority of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) over previously certified voting machines [2819] 4. Reliance on state legislation and local contracts to address voting machine problems instead of federal regulations [2819]
Impacts 1. The software failure incident led to the dropping of at least 1,000 votes in 9 county elections in Ohio, causing potential disenfranchisement of voters [2819]. 2. The incident in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, resulted in the disappearance of around 12,000 ballots, despite 48,000 people casting their votes, affecting the accuracy and integrity of the election results [2819]. 3. The software problems with voting machines from Premier Election Solutions and Sequoia Voting Systems highlighted the lack of oversight and reporting requirements for voting machine vendors, leading to repeated failures across different election districts and damaging public confidence in the electoral system [2819].
Preventions 1. Establishing a public clearinghouse to track voting machine problems nationwide and ensure that voters are not disenfranchised by faulty systems, as recommended by the Brennan Center for Justice report [2819]. 2. Requiring voting machine vendors to report problems to the public clearinghouse so election officials can take steps to prevent failures from repeating [2819]. 3. Providing authority for the federal Election Assistance Commission or another federal agency to establish and maintain a publicly searchable database for voting machine problems [2819]. 4. Requiring voting machine vendors to disclose problems that arise with their machines and fix them promptly [2819]. 5. Enforcing state legislation that holds vendors accountable for defects, faults, or failures in voting systems [2819]. 6. Negotiating stronger contracts with vendors that hold them responsible for problems that occur and do not bar election officials from publicly disclosing issues [2819].
Fixes 1. Establish a public clearinghouse to track voting machine problems nationwide and ensure that voters are not disenfranchised by faulty systems, similar to ones maintained by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the Food and Drug Administration [2819]. 2. Require voting machine vendors to report problems to the database so election officials can take steps to prevent failures from repeating [2819]. 3. Provide authority for the federal Election Assistance Commission or some other federal agency to establish and maintain a publicly searchable database for voting machine problems [2819]. 4. Require voting machine vendors to fix reported problems with their machines [2819]. 5. Enact state legislation holding vendors accountable for defects, faults, or failures in voting systems [2819].
References 1. Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election Systems) [2819] 2. Sequoia Voting Systems [2819] 3. Brennan Center for Justice [2819] 4. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [2819] 5. Food and Drug Administration [2819] 6. Lawrence Norden, senior counsel at the Brennan Center [2819] 7. National Association of Secretaries of State [2819]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to voting machines dropping votes has happened again within the same organization. Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election Systems) experienced a logic error in its software in Ohio in 2008, and a similar problem had occurred in Illinois in 2004 [2819]. (b) The software failure incident related to voting machines dropping votes has also happened at other organizations. Sequoia Voting Systems had a software problem in New Mexico in 2002, where the tabulation software for touchscreen machines recorded fewer votes than the actual number of ballots cast. Additionally, officials in a Nevada county had experienced the same issue with Sequoia's machines weeks before the election in New Mexico [2819].
Phase (Design/Operation) design (a) The software failure incidents mentioned in the articles were primarily due to design issues introduced during system development or updates. For example, Premier Election Solutions' voting systems experienced a logic error in its software that caused the dropping of votes in Ohio elections [2819]. Similarly, Sequoia Voting Systems' tabulation software had a software problem that led to the miscounting of ballots in New Mexico, which was attributed to a known issue with the machines' software [2819]. (b) The articles do not provide specific information about software failure incidents caused by factors related to the operation or misuse of the system.
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incidents related to voting systems in Ohio and New Mexico were primarily attributed to issues within the system itself. Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election Systems) initially blamed the problem on anti-virus software installed on the systems running the election software, but later admitted that the issue was a logic error in its own software [2819]. Similarly, Sequoia Voting Systems acknowledged that the incident in New Mexico, where the tabulation software for touchscreen machines dropped thousands of ballots, was a software problem that the company failed to address by neglecting to install a patch that could have fixed the issue [2819]. These incidents highlight failures originating from within the voting system software itself.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incidents mentioned in the articles were primarily due to non-human actions. For example, in the case of Premier Election Solutions, the problem was initially blamed on anti-virus software installed on the systems running the election software, but it was later revealed to be a logic error in the voting system software itself [2819]. Similarly, in the case of Sequoia Voting Systems, the issue of dropping ballots was attributed to a software problem that the company had neglected to address, leading to the loss of votes in the election [2819]. (b) However, human actions also played a role in these software failure incidents. For instance, the companies involved failed to inform election officials about known issues with their voting systems, neglected to install necessary patches to fix software problems, and did not disclose problems that occurred in other states [2819]. Additionally, the lack of oversight and enforcement by government agencies, as well as the failure of election officials to negotiate stronger contracts with vendors or pass local laws holding vendors accountable, contributed to the recurring failures and disenfranchisement of voters [2819].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incidents mentioned in the articles were primarily due to contributing factors originating in software rather than hardware. For example, in the case of Premier Election Solutions, the issue was identified as a logic error in its own software [2819]. Similarly, Sequoia Voting Systems admitted that the problem in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, was a software problem [2819]. These incidents highlight failures in the software systems used for voting machines, leading to issues such as dropped votes and tabulation errors.
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) non-malicious (a) The articles do not mention any software failure incidents related to malicious intent to harm the system. [2819] (b) The software failure incidents mentioned in the articles are non-malicious in nature. The failures were attributed to logic errors in the software, known issues that were not disclosed to election officials, failure to install necessary patches, lack of communication about problems, and lack of oversight in reporting malfunctions. These incidents were not intentional acts to harm the system but rather resulted from negligence, lack of transparency, and inadequate communication. [2819]
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The articles provide information about software failure incidents related to poor decisions. For example, in the incident involving Premier Election Solutions in Ohio, the company initially blamed the problem on anti-virus software installed by the county, but it was later revealed that the issue was actually a logic error in Premier's own software [2819]. Additionally, Sequoia Voting Systems admitted to a software problem in New Mexico but failed to install a patch that could have fixed the issue, indicating a lack of proactive decision-making on the part of the company [2819]. These instances highlight how poor decisions, such as blaming external factors or neglecting to address known software issues, contributed to the software failures.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incidents mentioned in the articles can be attributed to development incompetence. Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election Systems) initially blamed the problem on anti-virus software installed by the county, but it was later revealed that the issue was a logic error in their own software [2819]. Similarly, Sequoia Voting Systems admitted that the incident in New Mexico, where 12,000 ballots were dropped, was due to a software problem that the company had neglected to address properly [2819]. These instances highlight failures resulting from a lack of professional competence in software development. (b) The software failures discussed in the articles can also be categorized as accidental. Premier Election Solutions and Sequoia Voting Systems did not intentionally introduce the issues in their software; rather, they were accidental outcomes of flaws in the systems. Premier initially blamed the problem on anti-virus software, indicating an accidental misattribution of the issue [2819]. Additionally, Sequoia neglected to inform its employees in New Mexico about the problem that occurred in another state, leading to the accidental omission of crucial information that could have prevented the software failure [2819].
Duration permanent, temporary The software failure incidents related to voting systems in Ohio and New Mexico, as reported in Article 2819, can be categorized as both permanent and temporary failures. 1. Permanent Failure: The article mentions that the voting systems made by Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election Systems) dropped at least 1,000 votes in 9 county elections in Ohio due to a logic error in the software [2819]. This indicates a permanent failure as the issue was inherent to the software itself and not easily resolved. 2. Temporary Failure: In the case of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, the tabulation software for touchscreen machines made by Sequoia Voting Systems recorded no more than 36,000 votes in any race, despite 48,000 people casting ballots. This issue was attributed to a software problem that Sequoia admitted to, and it was disclosed that a patch existed to fix the problem but was neglected to be installed on the system in New Mexico [2819]. This situation represents a temporary failure as the issue could have been resolved with the installation of the patch. Therefore, the software failure incidents in Ohio and New Mexico involved both permanent and temporary aspects.
Behaviour crash, omission, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident mentioned in the articles includes crashes where the voting systems dropped votes in various elections. For example, Premier Election Solutions' voting systems dropped at least 1,000 votes in 9 county elections in Ohio [2819]. Additionally, Sequoia Voting Systems' tabulation software for touchscreen machines recorded no more than 36,000 votes in any race, even though 48,000 people had cast ballots in Bernalillo County, New Mexico [2819]. (b) omission: The incident also involved omissions where the voting systems omitted to perform their intended functions. For instance, Sequoia Voting Systems' software problem in New Mexico resulted in the omission of some 12,000 ballots despite 48,000 people casting ballots [2819]. (c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident is not explicitly mentioned in the articles. (d) value: The software failure incident involved the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Premier Election Solutions initially blamed the problem on anti-virus software installed by the county, but later conceded that the issue was a logic error in its own software [2819]. Sequoia Voting Systems also admitted to a software problem that led to the incorrect tabulation of votes in New Mexico [2819]. (e) byzantine: The incident did not exhibit behaviors of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: The software failure incident also involved a lack of oversight and transparency in reporting problems with voting machines, leading to repeated failures and disenfranchisement of voters. The incident highlighted the need for a public clearinghouse to track voting machine problems nationwide and ensure that voters are not affected by faulty systems [2819].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence theoretical_consequence, other The consequence of the software failure incident discussed in the articles is primarily related to the potential consequences and observed impacts on the electoral process and voter confidence. The articles highlight the following points: - The software failures in the voting systems led to the loss of votes in various elections across different states, potentially disenfranchising voters [2819]. - The repeated failures of voting systems in different locales damaged public confidence in the electoral system [2819]. - The lack of oversight and reporting mechanisms for voting machine problems resulted in temporary or permanent loss of votes, sometimes in the tens of thousands [2819]. - The absence of a central location for election officials to access information about problems with the voting machines they use led to repeated failures and disenfranchisement of voters [2819]. - The federal government and state governments lacked strong authority to investigate and address voting machine failures effectively, leading to a fragmented approach to handling such issues [2819]. Therefore, the consequence of the software failure incident in this case falls under the category of "theoretical_consequence" and "other" as it pertains to potential disenfranchisement of voters, damage to public confidence, and the lack of a comprehensive system to address voting machine problems.
Domain government (a) The failed system was related to the government industry, specifically in the context of election systems. The software failure incident involved voting systems made by Premier Election Solutions and touchscreen machines made by Sequoia Voting Systems, which are critical components of the electoral process [2819].

Sources

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