| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident has happened again at one_organization:
The article mentions that this is not the first time Tesla has been hacked. Previously, a group of researchers at the University of South Carolina were able to manipulate Tesla's autopilot system. This indicates that Tesla has experienced software vulnerabilities and hacking incidents in the past [47732].
(b) The software failure incident has happened again at multiple_organization:
There is no specific mention in the article about similar incidents happening at other organizations or with their products and services. Therefore, it is unknown if this particular type of software failure has occurred at multiple organizations. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. The hackers were able to target the Tesla cars wirelessly and remotely by exploiting vulnerabilities in the car's controller area network (Can bus), which is a critical component designed to control various functions of the vehicle [47732]. This indicates that the failure was due to contributing factors introduced during the system development phase, where vulnerabilities in the design of the Can bus system allowed for unauthorized remote access and control of the car's features.
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also highlighted in the article. The hackers were able to take remote control of a Tesla Model S by setting up a malicious Wi-Fi hotspot, which required the car to be physically near and connected to the hotspot. This operation-based failure was triggered when the car's web browser was used, allowing the hackers to exploit the system while it was in operation [47732]. This demonstrates that the failure was due to contributing factors introduced during the operation or misuse of the system, where the use of the web browser in conjunction with a malicious Wi-Fi hotspot enabled the unauthorized access and control of the vehicle. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the article is within the system. The hackers were able to target the car wirelessly and remotely by exploiting vulnerabilities in the car's controller area network (Can bus) and other electronically controlled features [47732]. The attack required the car to be connected to a malicious Wi-Fi hotspot set up by the hacking team, and it could only be triggered when the car's web browser was used. Tesla responded by creating a software update to address the vulnerabilities and deliver it over-the-air [47732].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident is also influenced by factors outside the system. The hackers needed to set up a malicious Wi-Fi hotspot to carry out the attack, which means the vulnerability was exploited through an external network connection [47732]. This highlights the importance of considering external cybersecurity threats when assessing and addressing software vulnerabilities in high-tech connected systems like Tesla vehicles. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The software failure incident in the Tesla Model S occurred due to hackers remotely taking control of the car's features, such as brakes, door locks, dashboard screen, and more, from a distance of 12 miles. The hackers targeted the car's controller area network (Can bus) wirelessly and remotely, demonstrating the vulnerability in a video. This incident was a result of non-human actions, specifically the malicious actions of the hackers [47732].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The software failure incident involving the Tesla Model S was not directly caused by human actions but rather by the actions of hackers exploiting vulnerabilities in the car's systems. The hackers targeted the car's Can bus wirelessly and remotely, demonstrating the potential havoc they could cause for Tesla drivers. However, it was the responsible disclosure of these vulnerabilities by the Chinese security researchers to Tesla that led to the company creating a software update to address the issue. Therefore, while human actions were involved in discovering and mitigating the vulnerability, the initial software failure incident was primarily due to non-human actions [47732]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The hackers were able to target the car wirelessly and remotely by exploiting vulnerabilities in the car's controller area network (Can bus), which is a hardware component found inside every modern vehicle [47732].
- The attack required the car to be connected to a malicious Wi-Fi hotspot set up by the hacking team, indicating a hardware-related aspect of the vulnerability [47732].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The hackers were able to remotely interfere with various electronically controlled features of the Tesla Model S, such as brakes, door locks, dashboard computer screen, indicators, wing mirrors, windscreen wipers, sunroof, and boot, by hijacking the car's Can bus, which is a software-controlled system [47732].
- Tesla responded to the vulnerability by creating a software update that was delivered over-the-air to address the software-related issues exploited by the hackers [47732]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. Hackers were able to remotely take control of a Tesla Model S by targeting the car's controller area network (Can bus) wirelessly and interfering with various electronically controlled features, including the brakes, door locks, dashboard computer screen, and more [47732]. The hackers were able to manipulate the car's functions while it was driving, posing a serious safety risk. The attack required the car to be connected to a malicious Wi-Fi hotspot set up by the hacking team, demonstrating a deliberate intent to harm the system. Tesla responded by issuing a software update to address the vulnerabilities exploited by the hackers. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
accidental_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions:
- The software failure incident involving the remote control of a Tesla Model S by hackers was not due to poor decisions by the security researchers who discovered the vulnerability. They acted responsibly by disclosing the vulnerabilities to Tesla [47732].
- Tesla responded quickly by creating a software update to address the vulnerabilities, showing a proactive attitude towards cybersecurity [47732].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions:
- The software failure incident could be attributed to accidental decisions made by Tesla drivers who connected their cars to a malicious Wi-Fi hotspot set up by the hacking team, triggering the vulnerability [47732].
- The incident highlights the potential risks associated with using the car's web browser in proximity to a malicious Wi-Fi hotspot, which could be considered an unintended decision leading to the software failure [47732]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article.
(b) The software failure incident in the article is related to an accidental hack by Chinese security researchers from Keen Security Lab who were able to remotely take control of a Tesla Model S by targeting the car's controller area network (Can bus) wirelessly. This accidental hack allowed them to interfere with various electronically controlled features of the car, including the brakes, door locks, dashboard computer screen, indicators, wing mirrors, windscreen wipers, sunroof, and boot [47732]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article was temporary. The incident was caused by hackers who were able to remotely take control of a Tesla Model S by targeting the car's controller area network (Can bus) wirelessly and triggering various electronically controlled features [47732]. The vulnerability was specific to the car being connected to a malicious Wi-Fi hotspot and using the web browser, indicating that the failure was due to certain circumstances introduced by the hackers' actions rather than a permanent flaw in the software. Tesla responded quickly by creating a software update to address the vulnerability, demonstrating that the failure was not inherent but rather a temporary issue that could be mitigated [47732]. |
| Behaviour |
value, byzantine, other |
(a) crash: The article reports a software failure incident where hackers were able to take remote control of a Tesla Model S, interfering with various electronically controlled features such as brakes, door locks, and dashboard computer screen [47732].
(b) omission: The hackers were able to control the car's brakes, which could be dangerous if deployed suddenly while the vehicle was traveling at high speed on a motorway [47732].
(c) timing: The attack required the car to be connected to a malicious Wi-Fi hotspot set up by the hacking team, and this could only be triggered when the car's web browser was used [47732].
(d) value: The hackers were able to move the seats back and forth, trigger indicators, wing mirrors, windscreen wipers, open the sunroof and boot while the car was driving and in parking mode, indicating incorrect functioning of the software [47732].
(e) byzantine: The hackers were able to control various features of the car wirelessly and remotely, demonstrating inconsistent responses and interactions with the car's systems [47732].
(f) other: The software failure incident involved hackers targeting the car's controller area network (Can bus), which controls various functions of the vehicle, showcasing a different type of behavior not covered by the other options [47732]. |