| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to eavesdropping on encrypted GSM cellphone calls and text messages using security flaws and shortcuts in the GSM network operators' technology and operations has happened before within the same organization or with its products and services. The incident was demonstrated by researchers Karsten Nohl and Sylvain Munaut at the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) Congress [54198]. They showcased how vulnerabilities in GSM networks could be exploited to intercept communications.
(b) The software failure incident involving the security flaws in GSM networks has also happened at multiple organizations or with their products and services. The incident highlighted the overall insecurity of GSM technology and the potential risks associated with eavesdropping on cellphone communications [54198]. This indicates a broader issue within the telecommunications industry regarding the security of GSM networks. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where researchers demonstrated a start-to-finish means of eavesdropping on encrypted GSM cellphone calls and text messages by exploiting security flaws and shortcuts in the GSM network operators' technology and operations [54198].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the same article where the researchers were able to determine a subscriber's current location with a simple internet query, send "silent" or "broken" SMS messages to a target phone, and decrypt and record live GSM calls between phones by sniffing the headers and cracking session-encryption keys [54198]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the article is primarily due to contributing factors that originate from within the system. The researchers demonstrated a start-to-finish means of eavesdropping on encrypted GSM cellphone calls and text messages by exploiting security flaws and shortcuts in the GSM network operators' technology and operations [54198]. They were able to decrypt GSM's encryption, determine a subscriber's location, and crack session-encryption keys by manipulating the network and system information exchange processes within the GSM infrastructure. The vulnerability lies within the design and implementation of the GSM network itself, making it susceptible to such attacks.
(b) outside_system: While the software failure incident is mainly attributed to factors within the system, it is worth noting that the researchers leveraged external tools and resources such as sub-$15 telephones, a laptop computer, and open-source software to carry out the eavesdropping attack [54198]. However, the core vulnerabilities and weaknesses exploited in the GSM network's security protocols and operations were intrinsic to the system itself, highlighting the significance of addressing internal system flaws to prevent such incidents. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is primarily due to non-human actions. The researchers demonstrated a start-to-finish means of eavesdropping on encrypted GSM cellphone calls and text messages by taking advantage of security flaws and shortcuts in the GSM network operators' technology and operations [54198]. The vulnerability exploited in the GSM network allowed for the interception of communication and decryption of encrypted data without direct human involvement in creating these vulnerabilities.
(b) However, human actions are also involved in this software failure incident. The researchers actively demonstrated and exploited the security vulnerabilities present in the GSM network, showcasing how a motivated tech-savvy programmer could eavesdrop on encrypted communications using readily available tools and software [54198]. Additionally, the researchers suggested various measures that operators could take to address these vulnerabilities, indicating that human actions in implementing proper security measures could mitigate such software failures. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware can be seen in the article where researchers demonstrated a start-to-finish means of eavesdropping on encrypted GSM cellphone calls and text messages using four sub-$15 telephones as network "sniffers" and a laptop computer [54198]. This hardware setup was used to intercept and decrypt GSM communications, highlighting a vulnerability in the hardware components used in the network.
(b) The software failure incident related to software can be observed in the exploitation of security flaws and shortcuts in the GSM network operators' technology and operations to eavesdrop on encrypted GSM cellphone calls and text messages [54198]. The researchers utilized open-source software and their own alternative firmware to manipulate the network and decrypt the information, showcasing vulnerabilities in the software systems used in GSM networks. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. The researchers demonstrated a start-to-finish means of eavesdropping on encrypted GSM cellphone calls and text messages by exploiting security flaws and shortcuts in the GSM network operators' technology and operations [54198]. They were able to decrypt GSM's encryption, determine a subscriber's location, send silent or broken SMS messages, sniff network traffic, extract and crack session-encryption keys, and decrypt live GSM calls between phones. This incident involved intentional actions to exploit vulnerabilities for unauthorized access to sensitive information. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is more aligned with poor_decisions. The incident involved exploiting security flaws and shortcuts in the GSM network operators' technology and operations, which allowed for eavesdropping on encrypted GSM cellphone calls and text messages. The researchers demonstrated how the GSM network's exchange of subscriber location data could be used to determine a subscriber's current location with a simple internet query. Additionally, the reuse of encryption keys for several successive communications made it easier for the researchers to crack the encryption and intercept calls and messages [54198]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is not related to development incompetence. The incident was a result of exploiting security flaws and shortcuts in the GSM network operators' technology and operations, rather than a lack of professional competence by humans or development organizations.
(b) The software failure incident in the article is related to an accidental failure. The researchers demonstrated a start-to-finish means of eavesdropping on encrypted GSM cellphone calls and text messages by exploiting vulnerabilities in the GSM network operators' technology and operations. The hack was pieced together using open source software and inexpensive telephones as network "sniffers," showing how the power to eavesdrop on GSM calls was within reach of almost any motivated tech-savvy programmer [54198]. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is more of a permanent nature. The vulnerability in the GSM network's security flaws and shortcuts allowed for eavesdropping on encrypted GSM cellphone calls and text messages using a pieced-together hack. The researchers demonstrated how these security weaknesses in the GSM network operators' technology and operations could be exploited, making it insecure and vulnerable to attacks [54198].
(b) The software failure incident does not seem to be temporary as the underlying security flaws and vulnerabilities in the GSM network were fundamental and systemic, rather than being specific to certain circumstances. The researchers highlighted that the GSM network's security issues were akin to the security challenges faced by computers on the internet in the 1990s, indicating a long-standing and pervasive problem [54198]. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the incident involves exploiting security flaws and shortcuts in the GSM network operators' technology to eavesdrop on encrypted GSM cellphone calls and text messages [54198].
(b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, the incident revolves around the ability to intercept and decrypt GSM communications due to vulnerabilities in the network operators' technology and operations [54198].
(c) timing: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The incident is centered around the real-time interception and decryption of GSM communications by exploiting weaknesses in the GSM network [54198].
(d) value: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Instead, the incident highlights how security vulnerabilities in the GSM network allow for the interception and decryption of encrypted communications [54198].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident primarily focuses on the exploitation of security flaws in the GSM network to eavesdrop on encrypted communications [54198].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security vulnerability exploit. The incident demonstrates how weaknesses in the GSM network operators' technology and operations can be leveraged to intercept and decrypt GSM cellphone calls and text messages, highlighting the importance of addressing these vulnerabilities to enhance security [54198]. |