Incident: Fraudulent Digital Certificates Issued by DigiNotar Compromise Security

Published Date: 2011-09-20

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving the fraudulent digital certificates issued by DigiNotar occurred in July 2011 [7833]. 2. The incident was detected on July 19, 2011 [7833]. 3. The incident was acknowledged by DigiNotar in July 2011 [7811]. 4. The incident was reported on August 28, 2011 [7452]. 5. The incident was reported to have occurred in early June 2011 [7811]. 6. The incident was reported to have started on June 17, 2011 [7828]. 7. The incident was reported to have occurred in March 2011 [4927].
System 1. DigiNotar's Certificate Authority infrastructure [7811, 7452, 7833, 7823] 2. SSL certificates issued by DigiNotar [7811, 7452, 7833, 7823] 3. Certificate authorities (CAs) [7452, 7833] 4. Digital certificates [7811, 7452, 7833, 7823]
Responsible Organization 1. An unknown hacker using the alias "ComodoHacker" and "ichsunx" was responsible for causing the software failure incidents at Comodo and DigiNotar [4927, 7828, 7811, 7452, 7833]. 2. The Iranian government was suspected of involvement in the hack that led to the creation of fake security certificates used in the DigiNotar incident [7823].
Impacted Organization 1. Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, Skype, Mozilla, CIA, MI6, Facebook, Twitter, WordPress, and other major organizations were impacted by the software failure incident [7828, 7811, 7833]. 2. Dutch government websites were impacted as well [7811, 7823].
Software Causes 1. The software failure incident was caused by the issuance of fraudulent digital certificates by DigiNotar, a Dutch certificate authority, which were used to impersonate legitimate websites like Google, Microsoft, Facebook, and others [7811, 7452, 7833, 7823]. 2. The attack involved the creation of fake Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificates, which are used to authenticate secure websites and ensure encrypted communication, allowing the attacker to intercept user communications and potentially steal login credentials [7811, 7452, 7833, 7823]. 3. The fraudulent certificates were issued due to a security breach in DigiNotar's Certificate Authority infrastructure, where the attacker successfully requested and obtained certificates for numerous domains without proper authorization [7811, 7452, 7833, 7823]. 4. The incident highlighted flaws in the current system of trusting certificate authorities, as there were no automated processes to revoke fraudulent certificates, no public lists of issued certificates, and no mechanisms to prevent such incidents [4927, 7811, 7452, 7833]. 5. The attack was facilitated by weaknesses in DigiNotar's security practices, such as lacking basic safeguards like strong passwords, anti-virus protection, and up-to-date software patches, which allowed the intruder to compromise the system and issue fake certificates [7811, 7452, 7833, 7823].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of basic security safeguards such as strong passwords, anti-virus protection, and up-to-date software patches at DigiNotar [7811]. 2. Failure to detect the breach until mid-July despite the intrusion starting in June [7811]. 3. Delay in acknowledging the breach and taking action to revoke fraudulent certificates [7811]. 4. Inadequate auditing and monitoring of systems at DigiNotar, leading to missed signs of compromise [7811]. 5. Lack of automated processes to revoke fraudulent certificates and prevent their issuance [4927, 7811]. 6. Insufficient mechanisms to prevent fraudulent certificates from being issued by compromised companies or repressive regimes [4927]. 7. Potential involvement of a government in the hack, suggesting a political motive behind the attack [7823].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident involving DigiNotar led to the issuance of over 500 fraudulent security certificates, including ones for major organizations like the CIA, MI6, Facebook, Microsoft, Skype, Twitter, and WordPress [Article 7833]. 2. The Dutch government revoked all trust in digital certificates issued by DigiNotar, affecting online tax returns filed in the Netherlands and leading to browser companies like Microsoft's Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, and Google's Chrome rejecting certificates from the company [Article 7823]. 3. The incident resulted in a loss of trust in DigiNotar's integrity as an authority for issuing secure digital certificates, leading to the company filing for bankruptcy [Article 7811]. 4. The fraudulent certificates issued by DigiNotar could have been used to monitor users' communications with affected sites without their knowledge, potentially enabling a "man in the middle" attack [Article 7823]. 5. The attack on DigiNotar was suspected to have been orchestrated by the Iranian government, raising concerns about the potential use of the fake certificates for spying on Iranian dissidents [Article 7833].
Preventions 1. Implementing stronger security measures such as using strong passwords, anti-virus protection, and keeping software patches up-to-date could have prevented the software failure incident [7811]. 2. Having an automated process to revoke fraudulent certificates and maintaining a public list of issued certificates could have helped prevent the incident [4927]. 3. Enhancing the auditing and monitoring of certificate authorities' systems to detect intrusions and fraudulent activities earlier could have mitigated the risk of such incidents [7452]. 4. Implementing DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security) as an alternative way to validate the legitimacy of websites could have provided an additional layer of security [7452]. 5. Strengthening the overall SSL certificate issuance process and improving the trust model for certificate authorities could have reduced the likelihood of fraudulent certificates being issued [7833].
Fixes 1. Implementing a more secure and standardized process for revoking fraudulent certificates issued by certificate authorities like DigiNotar [7811, 7452]. 2. Enhancing the security measures within certificate authorities to prevent unauthorized access and issuance of fraudulent certificates [7811, 7452]. 3. Developing automated processes for revoking fraudulent certificates to prevent misuse and unauthorized access [4927, 7452]. 4. Strengthening the authentication and verification processes for issuing digital certificates to ensure the legitimacy of the certificates [7811, 7823]. 5. Enhancing collaboration between certificate authorities, governments, and software vendors to improve the security of digital certificates and protect users [7452, 7823].
References 1. Comodo CEO Melih Abdulhayoglu [4927] 2. FBI and Italian law enforcement [4927] 3. Comodohacker [7828] 4. DigiNotar [7811, 7452, 7833, 7823] 5. Dutch Ministry of Justice [7833] 6. Google [7452, 7833] 7. Mozilla [7452] 8. Yahoo [7452] 9. Tor Project [7452] 10. Fox-IT [7452] 11. Microsoft [7452, 7823] 12. Kaspersky Lab [7452, 7833] 13. F-Secure [7452] 14. S. Hamid Kashfi [7452] 15. Jacob Appelbaum [7833] 16. Ot van Daalen, director of Bits of Freedom [7833] 17. Roel Schouwenberg of Kaspersky [7833] 18. Dutch government [7823]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) In the articles, it is mentioned that the hacker known as Comodohacker was involved in both the DigiNotar incident [7828] and the Comodo incident [4927]. Comodohacker took responsibility for the attack against Dutch certificate authority DigiNotar and also claimed credit for breaching Comodo, another certificate authority, earlier in the year. This indicates that the same individual or group was involved in software failure incidents at both organizations. (b) The articles highlight that fraudulent security certificates were issued by a hacked Dutch firm not only for DigiNotar but also for other organizations such as the CIA, MI6, Facebook, Microsoft, Skype, Twitter, and WordPress [7833]. This shows that the incident involving fake security certificates affected multiple organizations beyond just DigiNotar. Additionally, the articles mention that earlier in the year, there was a similar incident involving Comodo where fraudulent certificates were obtained for major websites like Google and Microsoft [4927].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase: - The incident involving fraudulent digital certificates issued by DigiNotar was a result of lax security measures and a breach in the Certificate Authority infrastructure, allowing the intruder to issue more than 500 fake SSL certificates for major organizations like Google, CIA, MI6, Facebook, Microsoft, Skype, and Twitter [Article 7811]. - The breach at DigiNotar revealed that the company lacked basic security safeguards such as strong passwords, anti-virus protection, and up-to-date software patches, indicating a failure in the design and implementation of security measures [Article 7811]. - The incident highlighted flaws in the current method of trusting certificate authorities, as there was no automated process to revoke fraudulent certificates, no public list of issued certificates, and no mechanisms to prevent fraudulent certificates from being issued by compromised companies [Article 4927]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase: - The fraudulent certificates issued by DigiNotar could be used to monitor users' communications with various sites without their knowledge, but only by an organization capable of rerouting internet traffic to servers they control, indicating a failure in the operation and misuse of the certificates [Article 7823]. - The incident involving the fake SSL certificates issued by DigiNotar was discovered after Gmail users in Iran were at risk of having their log-in credentials stolen, highlighting the operational impact of the breach on users' security and privacy [Article 7452]. - The Dutch government took the exceptional step of revoking all trust in digital certificates issued by DigiNotar, affecting online tax returns filed in the Netherlands, showcasing the operational consequences of the incident on government services and online transactions [Article 7823].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) within_system: - The software failure incident involving the issuance of fraudulent digital certificates by DigiNotar was primarily due to factors originating from within the system. DigiNotar's infrastructure was breached, leading to the unauthorized issuance of over 500 fake SSL certificates for various major organizations [Article 7811]. - The breach at DigiNotar allowed the intruder to trick the system into issuing fraudulent digital certificates for top internet companies like Google, Mozilla, and Skype, posing a risk to users connecting to supposedly secure pages [Article 7811]. - DigiNotar lacked basic security safeguards such as strong passwords, anti-virus protection, and up-to-date software patches, which contributed to the successful intrusion and issuance of fraudulent certificates [Article 7811]. - The attack on DigiNotar was facilitated by the hacker obtaining an administrator's username and password, indicating weaknesses in the system's access control and authentication mechanisms [Article 7811]. - The incident at DigiNotar highlighted flaws in the system's certificate issuance process, including the lack of automated processes to revoke fraudulent certificates and the absence of a public list of issued certificates [Article 4927]. (b) outside_system: - The attack on DigiNotar, resulting in the issuance of fraudulent certificates, was linked to external factors such as hackers breaking into the Dutch company's system and obtaining unauthorized access [Article 7811]. - The hacker responsible for the DigiNotar breach was suspected to be associated with the Iranian government, suggesting external involvement in the attack [Article 7823]. - The fake certificates issued by DigiNotar could potentially be used by an organization with the ability to reroute internet traffic, indicating the possibility of external entities, possibly governments, utilizing the certificates for monitoring purposes [Article 7823]. - The incident at DigiNotar was part of a larger trend of fraudulent certificate issuance incidents involving major websites, indicating external threats to the security of digital certificates and SSL protocols [Article 7452].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The software failure incidents reported in the articles were primarily caused by non-human actions, specifically through the hacking and intrusion into the systems of certificate authorities like Comodo and DigiNotar. These incidents involved the issuance of fraudulent digital certificates for major websites like Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and others [4927, 7828, 7811, 7452, 7833, 7823]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The software failure incidents reported in the articles were not directly caused by human actions but rather by the actions of hackers who exploited vulnerabilities in the systems of certificate authorities to issue fraudulent certificates. The incidents were not a result of intentional human error or negligence but rather malicious activities aimed at compromising the security of digital certificates [4927, 7828, 7811, 7452, 7833, 7823].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The articles do not provide information about the software failure incident occurring due to hardware issues. (b) The software failure incidents reported in the articles are primarily related to fraudulent digital certificates being issued by certificate authorities like Comodo and DigiNotar. These incidents were caused by vulnerabilities and flaws in the software systems and processes of these certificate authorities, allowing hackers to obtain fake certificates for major websites like Google, Microsoft, and others [4927, 7828, 7811, 7452, 7833, 7823]. The incidents involved breaches, intrusions, and compromises of the software systems, leading to the issuance of fraudulent certificates that could be used for malicious purposes such as intercepting communications and conducting man-in-the-middle attacks.
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident was malicious in nature, involving a hack with the intent to harm the system and potentially spy on users. The incident involved the issuance of fraudulent digital certificates by DigiNotar, a Dutch certificate authority, which were used to impersonate major websites like Google, Microsoft, CIA, MI6, Facebook, Twitter, and others [Article 7823]. The attack resulted in the creation of over 500 fake certificates, including those that could be used for fake Windows updates and connecting to sensitive sites like the CIA [Article 7823]. The incident was suspected to be orchestrated by hackers linked to the Iranian government, with the potential to monitor users' communications through man-in-the-middle attacks [Article 7823]. (b) The software failure incident was non-malicious in the sense that it involved a breach of security at DigiNotar, a root certificate authority, leading to the issuance of fraudulent SSL certificates for various domains [Article 7833]. The breach was detected after Google reported that Gmail users in Iran were at risk of having their log-in credentials stolen due to the fraudulent certificates issued by DigiNotar [Article 7833]. The incident was a result of lax security measures at DigiNotar, including weak passwords, lack of antivirus protection, and outdated software patches [Article 7811].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident: - The software failure incident involving the issuance of fraudulent digital certificates by DigiNotar was not accidental but rather intentional. The hackers behind the attack issued hundreds of bogus security certificates that could be used on websites including the CIA, Mossad, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter [Article 7823]. - The attack was suspected to be politically motivated, with the hacker claiming it was a form of political retaliation against the Dutch government for its alleged role in the Srebrenica genocide [Article 7828]. - The hacker hinted that the fraudulent certificates provided to the Iranian government could have been used for spying on political dissidents who used Gmail, indicating a deliberate intent to monitor communications [Article 7811]. - The attack on DigiNotar was seen as potentially more serious than the Stuxnet worm, with implications for cyberwar and political agendas of Western governments [Article 7833].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development_incompetence: - The incident involving fraudulent digital certificates issued by DigiNotar was a result of lax security practices within the company, including the lack of basic security safeguards such as strong passwords, anti-virus protection, and up-to-date software patches [Article 7811]. - DigiNotar's audit trail was incomplete, and the company missed signs of the breach, such as defaced web pages on their site indicating Iranian hackers, which were still present years later [Article 7452]. (b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally: - The breach at DigiNotar, resulting in the issuance of fraudulent certificates, was not intentional but rather due to an intrusion into the company's Certificate Authority infrastructure [Article 7833]. - The Dutch government took steps to revoke trust in all digital certificates issued by DigiNotar after discovering the extent of the fraudulent certificates, indicating that the incident was not planned but a consequence of the hack [Article 7823].
Duration permanent, temporary The software failure incident related to the fraudulent security certificates issued by DigiNotar can be categorized as both temporary and permanent. Temporary: - The initial breach into DigiNotar's Certificate Authority infrastructure was detected on July 19, but the company only acknowledged it in late August [Article 7452]. - The Dutch government took control of DigiNotar and revoked all trust in its digital certificates, leading browser companies like Microsoft's Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, and Google Chrome to reject certificates from the company [Article 7823]. Permanent: - The breach allowed the intruder to issue more than 500 fraudulent digital certificates for major organizations like the CIA, MI6, Facebook, Microsoft, Skype, Twitter, and others [Article 7823]. - The Dutch government expressed a lack of confidence in DigiNotar and took control of the company, indicating a permanent loss of trust in its integrity as an authority for issuing secure digital certificates [Article 7833].
Behaviour crash, omission, timing, value, byzantine, other (a) crash: - The incident involving DigiNotar resulted in a crash as the system lost its integrity and issued more than 500 fake Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificates for various major organizations, including the CIA, MI6, Facebook, Microsoft, Skype, and Twitter [Article 7828]. - The Dutch government revoked all trust in digital certificates issued by DigiNotar, which had been used for all online tax returns filed in the Netherlands, indicating a crash in the system's trustworthiness [Article 7823]. (b) omission: - The system omitted to perform its intended functions by failing to automatically revoke fraudulent certificates, leading to a lack of automated processes to prevent fraudulent certificates from being issued [Article 4927]. - DigiNotar lacked basic security safeguards such as strong passwords, anti-virus protection, and up-to-date software patches, which resulted in the omission of necessary security measures [Article 7811]. (c) timing: - The incident involving DigiNotar can be considered a timing failure as the system detected an intrusion into its Certificate Authority infrastructure on July 19 but did not uncover the breach until mid-July, indicating a delay in identifying and responding to the attack [Article 7811]. - The Dutch government took control of DigiNotar and revoked all trust in its digital certificates after the incident, indicating a timing failure in the system's response to the security breach [Article 7823]. (d) value: - The incident involving DigiNotar resulted in a value failure as the system issued fraudulent certificate requests for a number of domains, allowing someone to impersonate secure versions of websites and compromise user security [Article 7811]. - The fake certificates issued by the hacked Dutch firm could be used to monitor users' communications with sites without their knowledge, indicating a failure in the system's value of ensuring secure and private communication [Article 7833]. (e) byzantine: - The incident involving DigiNotar can be considered a byzantine failure as the fake certificates issued could be used to create cryptographically secure links between users and sites, potentially allowing for a "man in the middle" attack by an intermediary [Article 7823]. - The attack on DigiNotar, which led to the creation of hundreds of fake security certificates, could be linked to the Iranian government, suggesting a byzantine behavior with inconsistent responses and interactions in the system [Article 7823]. (f) other: - The incident involving DigiNotar showcased a failure in the system's trustworthiness and integrity, leading to a significant impact on the Dutch government's IT infrastructure and disrupting communications, which could be categorized as an integrity failure [Article 7823].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence, other (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident in the articles. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - There is no mention of physical harm to individuals due to the software failure incident in the articles. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted by the software failure incident in the articles. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident resulted in the issuance of fraudulent digital certificates for major organizations, potentially exposing users to security risks and data breaches [7828]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - The software failure incident did not directly lead to the postponement of any activities as mentioned in the articles. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident impacted various organizations, including Google, Microsoft, CIA, MI6, Facebook, Skype, Twitter, and WordPress, through the issuance of fake SSL certificates [7823, 7833]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident had significant consequences, including loss of trust in the affected certificate authority, revocation of certificates, and potential security risks [7811, 7823, 7833]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The potential consequences discussed included the ability to monitor users' communications, conduct man-in-the-middle attacks, and spy on dissidents, but the actual occurrence of these consequences is not explicitly mentioned in the articles [7823, 7833]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The software failure incident led to a loss of trust in the affected certificate authority, disruption of services, and potential risks to online security and privacy [7811, 7823, 7833].
Domain information, finance, government (a) The failed system was related to the information industry, specifically in the context of digital security certificates for websites like Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and others [4927, 7828, 7811, 7452, 7833, 7823]. (h) The incident also impacted the finance industry indirectly as the compromised security certificates could potentially be used for financial transactions and sensitive data exchanges [7811, 7452, 7833]. (l) The government sector was significantly affected by the failure incident as the Dutch government took control of the compromised company, DigiNotar, and revoked trust in its certificates, impacting online tax returns and government services [7811, 7823]. (m) The incident had broader implications beyond the industries listed, affecting internet users, cybersecurity practices, and potentially endangering individuals, especially in Iran, due to the compromised security certificates [7811, 7452, 7833].

Sources

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