| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) occurred again within the same organization. The ALTB had a history of software-related issues, including corrupted beam-control software and problems with a valve within the laser system [3165]. These incidents led to failures in tracking targets and steering the high-energy laser, ultimately resulting in the failure to zap the target missile during testing off the central California coast. The ALTB had faced challenges such as delays, budget overruns, and operational concept uncertainties, indicating a recurring pattern of software-related failures within the organization responsible for the project. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article [3165]. The incident occurred during testing of the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) off the central California coast. The failure was attributed to corrupted beam-control software that steered the high-energy laser slightly off center, leading to the test ending early. This issue was identified as a communications software error introduced during the design phase of the system.
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the same article [3165]. The ALTB's October test was impacted by the intermittent performance of a valve within the laser system, which was a contributing factor introduced during the operation or use of the system. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident mentioned in the article is primarily within the system. The article discusses how corrupted beam-control software caused the high-energy laser to steer slightly off-center during a test, leading to the trial ending early. Additionally, there were issues with the system not transitioning to active tracking, preventing the high-energy lasing from occurring as intended. These failures point to issues originating from within the system itself [3165]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was related to non-human actions. The incident occurred due to corrupted beam-control software steering the high-energy laser slightly off-center, apparently because of a communications software error [3165].
(b) The article does not mention any software failure incident related to human actions. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware can be seen in the article where the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) experienced a failure during testing. The incident was attributed to a corrupted beam-control software that steered the high-energy laser slightly off-center, likely due to a communications software error [3165].
(b) The software failure incident related to software itself is evident in the same article, where the ALTB failed to transition to active tracking, leading to the high-energy lasing not occurring as intended. Additionally, the article mentions that the ALTB's October test faced issues due to the intermittent performance of a valve within the laser system, indicating a software-related problem [3165]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident mentioned in the article is non-malicious. The failure was attributed to corrupted beam-control software steering the high-energy laser slightly off-center due to a communications software error during a test trial of the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) [3165]. This incident was not caused by malicious intent but rather by technical issues within the software system. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) can be attributed to poor decisions. The article mentions that the ALTB project had a long series of problems, including being billions over budget, years late, and having a muddy concept of operations. Additionally, Defense Secretary Gates reduced the fleet of laser jets to a single tester, indicating a shift in plans due to the challenges faced by the project [3165]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence can be seen in the article where it mentions that the September trial of the Airborne Laser Test Bed ended early due to corrupted beam-control software steering the high-energy laser slightly off center, apparently because of a communications software error [3165].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors can be observed in the article where it states that the ALTB's October test was impacted by the intermittent performance of a valve within the laser system, indicating an accidental hardware or software issue [3165]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident mentioned in the article seems to be temporary rather than permanent. The article describes how the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) had a series of problems, including a trial that "ended early when corrupted beam-control software steered the high-energy laser slightly off center, apparently because of a communications software error" [3165]. This indicates that the failure was due to specific circumstances related to the software error, rather than being a permanent issue inherent in all circumstances. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a crash. The incident mentions that during a test, the high-energy laser did not occur as the system failed to transition to active tracking, resulting in the failure to zap the target missile [3165].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. It is noted that the corrupted beam-control software steered the high-energy laser slightly off-center, likely due to a communications software error, leading to the test ending early without achieving the intended function [3165].
(c) timing: The software failure incident does not align with a timing failure as there is no indication that the system performed its intended functions too late or too early.
(d) value: The software failure incident can be associated with a value failure. The system failed to perform its intended function of destroying a solid-fuel, short-range ballistic missile while its rocket motors were still thrusting, indicating an incorrect performance [3165].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure as there are no mentions of inconsistent responses or interactions in the system behavior.
(f) other: The other behavior exhibited by the software failure incident is related to a valve within the laser system showing intermittent performance issues, which could be categorized as a hardware-related failure impacting the software's functionality indirectly [3165]. |