Published Date: 2010-08-25
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident happened in 2008 as reported in both Article 2619 and Article 2622. [2619, 2622] |
| System | 1. U.S. military computers' network security system [2619, 2622] 2. Central Command network [2619, 2622] 3. Classified and unclassified computer systems [2619, 2622] 4. Defense Department's procurement process for detecting counterfeit hardware [2619, 2622] |
| Responsible Organization | 1. A foreign intelligence agency [2619, 2622] |
| Impacted Organization | 1. U.S. military computers at a military base in the Middle East [2619, 2622] 2. U.S. Central Command network [2619, 2622] |
| Software Causes | 1. Malware-laden flash drive inserted into a U.S. military laptop at a base in the Middle East [2619, 2622] 2. Malicious computer code uploaded onto the Central Command network, spreading undetected on classified and unclassified systems [2619, 2622] 3. Rogue code, including logic bombs, inserted into software during development [2619, 2622] |
| Non-software Causes | 1. The insertion of a malware-laden flash drive into a U.S. military laptop at a base in the Middle East led to the breach of U.S. military computers [2619, 2622]. 2. The presence of counterfeit hardware in systems procured by the Defense Department, which could contain remotely operated "kill switches" and hidden backdoors, posed a risk of compromise in the manufacturing process [2619, 2622]. |
| Impacts | 1. The malware-laden flash drive incident at a U.S. military base in the Middle East in 2008 led to the "most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever," creating a digital beachhead for data transfer to servers under foreign control, highlighting the vulnerability of military and civilian networks to cyber intrusions [Article 2619, Article 2622]. 2. The incident exposed the risk of compromise in the manufacturing process, with counterfeit hardware detected in systems purchased by the Defense Department, raising concerns about the insertion of remotely operated "kill switches" and hidden backdoors in computer chips used by the military [Article 2619, Article 2622]. 3. The breach underscored the threat posed by rogue code, including logic bombs that cause sudden malfunctions, which can be inserted into software during development, emphasizing the need for enhanced cybersecurity measures and vigilance in software development processes [Article 2619, Article 2622]. 4. The incident served as a wake-up call for the Pentagon, leading to the establishment of a Cyber Command and initiatives to bolster cyber defenses, highlighting the importance of recognizing cyberspace as a critical domain of warfare and the need for rapid response capabilities [Article 2619, Article 2622]. 5. The breach raised concerns about the potential for cyberattacks to disrupt critical civilian infrastructure, such as power grids, transportation networks, and financial systems, emphasizing the need for proactive measures to safeguard against cyber threats that could cause significant physical damage and economic disruption [Article 2619, Article 2622]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing strict security protocols and procedures for handling external devices like flash drives to prevent malware infections [2619, 2622]. 2. Conducting regular cybersecurity training and awareness programs for military personnel to recognize and report suspicious activities or devices [2619, 2622]. 3. Enhancing network monitoring and detection capabilities to identify and respond to unauthorized access and data transfers [2619, 2622]. 4. Utilizing advanced cybersecurity tools and technologies to detect and prevent malware infections and unauthorized access attempts [2619, 2622]. 5. Strengthening supply chain security to prevent the insertion of counterfeit hardware or compromised components into military systems [2619, 2622]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implementing stricter security measures to prevent unauthorized devices like infected flash drives from being inserted into military computers [2619, 2622]. 2. Enhancing network monitoring and detection capabilities to identify and respond to malicious activities promptly [2619, 2622]. 3. Conducting regular cybersecurity training for military personnel to raise awareness about potential threats and how to mitigate them [2619, 2622]. 4. Strengthening supply chain security to prevent counterfeit hardware and compromised components from being used in military systems [2619, 2622]. 5. Investing in cybersecurity professionals and innovative technologies to stay ahead of evolving cyber threats [2619, 2622]. | References | 1. William J. Lynn III, U.S. deputy secretary of defense [2619, 2622] 2. U.S. Department of Defense [2619, 2622] 3. Foreign Affairs magazine [2619, 2622] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident involving the malware-laden flash drive that led to a significant breach of U.S. military computers in 2008 was attributed to a foreign intelligence agency inserting the malicious code into a U.S. military laptop at a base in the Middle East. This incident was described as the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever [2619, 2622]. (b) The articles mention that more than 100 foreign intelligence organizations are trying to break into U.S. networks, indicating that similar cyber attacks or attempts may have occurred at other organizations as well. Additionally, the risk of compromise in the manufacturing process of hardware, including the insertion of rogue code and hidden backdoors, poses a significant cyber threat not only to the Defense Department but potentially to other organizations as well [2619, 2622]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident described in the articles can be attributed to the design phase. Specifically, the incident was caused by the insertion of a malware-laden flash drive into a U.S. military laptop at a base in the Middle East. This action led to the uploading of malicious computer code onto the Central Command network, which then spread undetected on both classified and unclassified systems, creating a "digital beachhead" for data transfer to servers under foreign control [2619, 2622]. (b) Additionally, the incident can also be linked to the operation phase. The malware on the flash drive operated silently, allowing for the transfer of operational plans into the hands of an unknown adversary. This highlights the impact of the operation or misuse of the system in facilitating the breach of U.S. military computers [2619, 2622]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system, outside_system | From the provided articles [2619, 2622], the software failure incident related to the cyber attack on U.S. military computer systems in 2008 can be categorized as both within_system and outside_system: (a) within_system: The failure was within the system as it was caused by a malware-laden flash drive inserted into a U.S. military laptop at a base in the Middle East, leading to the upload of malicious computer code onto the Central Command network [2619, 2622]. (b) outside_system: The failure was also influenced by factors outside the system, specifically by a foreign spy agency that was responsible for the cyber attack on the U.S. military computer systems [2619, 2622]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The software failure incident in the U.S. military computers was caused by a malware-laden flash drive that was inserted into a laptop at a U.S. military base in the Middle East in 2008. The malware uploaded itself to the U.S. Central Command network and spread undetected on classified and unclassified computers, creating a "digital beachhead" for data transfer to servers under foreign control [2619, 2622]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The malicious code on the flash drive was placed there by a "foreign intelligence agency," indicating human involvement in introducing the malware into the system [2619, 2622]. - Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn mentioned that more than 100 foreign intelligence organizations are trying to break into U.S. networks, highlighting the human factor in cyber attacks on military systems [2619, 2622]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident in the articles was primarily due to hardware-related factors. Specifically, the incident involved a malware-laden flash drive being inserted into a U.S. military laptop at a base in the Middle East, which led to the uploading of malicious computer code onto the Central Command network [2619, 2622]. This hardware-related action initiated the breach and spread of the malware within the military computers, creating a significant security breach. (b) The software failure incident also had contributing factors originating in software. The malicious code uploaded from the infected flash drive spread undetected on both classified and unclassified systems, establishing a "digital beachhead" from which data could be transferred to servers under foreign control [2619, 2622]. This highlights the role of software vulnerabilities in allowing the malware to propagate and compromise the military computers. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious | (a) The software failure incident described in the articles was malicious in nature. It involved a malware-laden flash drive being inserted into a U.S. military laptop at a base in the Middle East, leading to the uploading of malicious computer code onto the Central Command network. This incident was described as the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever and was attributed to a foreign intelligence agency [2619, 2622]. The attack aimed to establish a "digital beachhead" from which data could be transferred to servers under foreign control, indicating a clear intent to harm the system and compromise sensitive information. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions | (a) The software failure incident described in the articles was primarily due to poor decisions. Specifically, the incident involved a malware-laden flash drive being inserted into a U.S. military laptop at a base in the Middle East, leading to the most significant breach of American military cyber security. This breach allowed malicious code to spread undetected on both classified and unclassified systems, creating a digital beachhead from which data could be transferred to servers under foreign control [2619, 2622]. Additionally, the incident highlighted the risks associated with compromised hardware, including counterfeit hardware with remotely operated "kill switches" and hidden backdoors, as well as the insertion of rogue code like logic bombs into software during development [2619, 2622]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | accidental | (a) The software failure incident described in the articles was not due to development incompetence. Instead, it was a deliberate cyber attack orchestrated by a foreign spy agency by inserting a malware-laden flash drive into a U.S. military laptop, leading to the breach of U.S. military computers [2619, 2622]. (b) The software failure incident was accidental in the sense that the malicious code was uploaded onto the U.S. Central Command network through the infected flash drive, spreading undetected on classified and unclassified systems. This incident was not caused accidentally but rather intentionally by a foreign intelligence agency [2619, 2622]. |
| Duration | temporary | The software failure incident described in the articles was temporary. It was caused by a malware-laden flash drive inserted into a U.S. military laptop at a base in the Middle East in 2008, which led to the breach of the U.S. military computers [2619, 2622]. The malicious code uploaded itself to the U.S. Central Command network and spread undetected on classified and unclassified systems, creating a "digital beachhead" for data transfer to servers under foreign control. This incident was described as the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever and served as a wake-up call for the Pentagon to enhance its cyberdefense strategies. |
| Behaviour | crash, other | (a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as a crash. The incident involved a malware-laden flash drive being inserted into a U.S. military laptop, leading to the system being compromised and losing control over its functions. This resulted in the malicious code spreading undetected on both classified and unclassified systems, creating a "digital beachhead" for data transfer to servers under foreign control [2619, 2622]. (b) omission: The incident did not specifically mention a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, the focus was on the breach caused by the malware and the unauthorized data transfer [2619, 2622]. (c) timing: The incident did not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The primary issue was the unauthorized access and data transfer facilitated by the malware [2619, 2622]. (d) value: The incident did not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The focus was on the breach and data exfiltration rather than the system's incorrect performance [2619, 2622]. (e) byzantine: The incident did not exhibit a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The primary concern was the successful infiltration and data transfer to servers under foreign control [2619, 2622]. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security breach leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration rather than a specific software failure mode like crash, omission, timing, value, or byzantine behavior [2619, 2622]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | None | None |
| Communication | None | None |
| Application | None | None |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | property, non-human, theoretical_consequence | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident in the articles [2619, 2622]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - There is no mention of people being physically harmed due to the software failure incident in the articles [2619, 2622]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure incident in the articles [2619, 2622]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident led to the breach of U.S. military computers, resulting in the potential transfer of data to servers under foreign control [2619, 2622]. - Sensitive information such as weapons blueprints, operations plans, and surveillance data were stolen by adversaries [2619]. - Counterfeit hardware was detected in systems purchased by the Defense Department, posing a risk of compromise and potential manipulation of computer systems [2619, 2622]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - There is no mention of people having to postpone activities due to the software failure incident in the articles [2619, 2622]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident impacted U.S. military computers and networks, potentially compromising sensitive military information [2619, 2622]. - The incident highlighted the vulnerability of military and civilian networks to cyber intrusions, including the risk of compromise in the manufacturing process of hardware [2619, 2622]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident had significant consequences, including the breach of U.S. military computers and the potential theft of sensitive data [2619, 2622]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles discuss potential consequences such as the disruption of critical civilian infrastructure, computer-induced failures in power grids, transportation networks, or financial systems, and the risk of compromising intellectual property and competitive edge in the global economy [2619]. - The articles also mention the potential for cyberattacks to paralyze U.S. society and the need for the Pentagon to consider extending capabilities to protect civilian infrastructure from cyber threats [2622]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The articles do not mention any other specific consequences of the software failure incident beyond those related to data theft, potential compromise of military systems, and the broader implications for national security and infrastructure [2619, 2622]. |
| Domain | information, government | (a) The failed system was related to the information industry as it involved a significant breach of U.S. military computers due to a malware-laden flash drive inserted in a laptop at a U.S. military base in the Middle East in 2008. The malware uploaded itself to the U.S. Central Command network and spread undetected on classified and unclassified computers, creating a "digital beachhead" for data transfer to servers under foreign control [2619, 2622]. (h) The incident also highlighted the risk of compromise in the manufacturing process, including the detection of counterfeit hardware in systems purchased by the Defense Department. Computer chips could be written with remotely operated "kill switches" and hidden backdoors, posing a significant threat to the security of the systems [2619, 2622]. (l) The defense industry was directly impacted by the software failure incident, as it involved a breach of U.S. military computers and sensitive information related to military operations and infrastructure. The incident prompted the Pentagon to launch Operation Buckshot Yankee and establish a Cyber Command to bolster defenses against cyber threats [2619, 2622]. (m) The incident also raised concerns about the need to protect civilian infrastructure from cyber attacks, indicating a broader impact beyond the defense industry. The question of whether national resources should be used to protect civilian infrastructure, such as defense mechanisms guarding military networks, was brought up as policymakers considered extending Pentagon capabilities to shield civilian systems [2622]. |
Article ID: 2619
Article ID: 2622