| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the vulnerability of the high-tech digital radios using the Project 25 standard has happened again within the same organization or with its products and services. The University of Pennsylvania researchers have previously taken a critical look at Project 25 and published a security analysis that concluded it is "strikingly vulnerable to a range of attacks" [7410].
(b) The software failure incident related to the vulnerability of the high-tech digital radios using the Project 25 standard has also happened at multiple organizations. The radios using this standard are widely adopted across the federal government and many state and local police agencies. The vulnerability in the radios, which can be jammed by a $30 children's toy, poses a significant risk to sensitive radio communications used by every major federal law enforcement agency [7410]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. The expensive high-tech digital radios used by federal law enforcement agencies were found to be poorly designed, allowing them to be jammed by a simple $30 children's toy, the GirlTech IMME. The security researchers from the University of Pennsylvania discovered vulnerabilities in the radios' wireless standard, Project 25, which was intended to provide secure encrypted communications but failed to do so effectively. The radios were designed with a unique identifier broadcast in unencrypted form, making it susceptible to eavesdropping and traffic analysis [7410].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also highlighted in the article. Despite the radios being equipped with encryption capabilities, federal agents frequently did not turn encryption on during their operations. This operational failure led to the disclosure of sensitive law enforcement information, including names and locations of criminal investigative targets, wiretap plant information, plans for arrests and raids, and other confidential operations. The failure to operate the radios securely resulted in the exposure of critical information to potential interception [7410]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident in this case is primarily within the system. The vulnerability lies within the design and implementation of the high-tech digital radios used by federal law enforcement agencies. The radios, which use the Project 25 wireless standard, were found to be susceptible to jamming by a relatively inexpensive device, the GirlTech IMME, due to the lack of encryption being turned on by federal agents [7410].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident also involves factors originating from outside the system. The vulnerability exploited by the inexpensive jamming device highlights the external threat posed by potential attackers who could disrupt sensitive radio communications used by major federal law enforcement agencies. The ease with which the radios can be jammed by external devices like the GirlTech IMME raises concerns about the security of the system against external threats [7410]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles is primarily related to non-human actions. The incident describes how expensive high-tech digital radios used by federal law enforcement agencies can be jammed by a $30 children's toy, the GirlTech IMME device. The vulnerability in the radios, specifically those using the Project 25 standard, allows for the disruption of sensitive radio communications without direct human involvement in the jamming process. The vulnerability lies in the design and implementation of the radios, making them susceptible to interference from external devices like the GirlTech IMME [7410].
(b) While the vulnerability and subsequent failure of the radios to jamming are primarily due to non-human actions, there is also an aspect of human actions contributing to the failure. The article mentions that federal agents frequently do not turn on encryption on the radios, which exposes sensitive law enforcement information to potential interception. This human action of not enabling encryption on the radios contributes to the security vulnerability and potential exploitation of the system by external parties [7410]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
The incident reported in the article is related to a vulnerability in high-tech digital radios used by federal law enforcement agencies like the FBI, Secret Service, and Homeland Security. The vulnerability allows these radios to be jammed by a $30 children's toy, specifically the GirlTech IMME device. The vulnerability arises from the design flaw in the radios themselves, making them susceptible to external interference from low-cost devices like the GirlTech IMME [7410].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
The software failure incident in this case is not directly attributed to software issues but rather to the vulnerability in the hardware design of the digital radios. The vulnerability allows for the radios to be jammed, but the root cause lies in the hardware design flaw rather than a software-related issue [7410]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The incident involves security researchers from the University of Pennsylvania discovering vulnerabilities in the high-tech digital radios used by federal law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, Secret Service, and Homeland Security. These vulnerabilities could be exploited to disrupt sensitive radio communications used by these agencies, potentially leading to serious consequences like intercepting sensitive law enforcement information, including details about criminal investigative targets, wiretap plants, forthcoming operations, counter-terrorism investigations, and executive protection of high-ranking officials [7410]. Additionally, the incident highlights the potential for malicious actors to exploit these vulnerabilities in the future, as mentioned by associate professor Matt Blaze, who co-authored the paper on the security analysis of the APCO Project 25 Two-Way Radio System [7410].
(b) The software failure incident is non-malicious in the sense that the vulnerabilities discovered by the University of Pennsylvania researchers were not intentionally introduced to harm the system. The vulnerabilities were inherent in the design and implementation of the Project 25 wireless standard used in the radios, which were meant to enhance interoperability and provide secure encrypted communications across different law enforcement agencies. However, the failure to enable encryption by federal agents and the presence of vulnerabilities like unencrypted unique identifiers in the radios made it possible for security researchers to intercept sensitive communications without malicious intent [7410]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
The software failure incident described in the article is more aligned with poor_decisions. The incident highlights how expensive high-tech digital radios used by federal law enforcement agencies were designed poorly, making them vulnerable to being jammed by a simple $30 children's toy. The radios, which were meant to provide secure encrypted communications, were found to have vulnerabilities that allowed sensitive law enforcement information to be intercepted easily. Additionally, the failure was exacerbated by the fact that federal agents frequently did not turn encryption on, exposing critical information [7410]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles can be attributed to development incompetence. The high-tech digital radios used by federal law enforcement agencies were found to be poorly designed, allowing them to be jammed by a simple $30 children's toy. The radios, which were supposed to provide secure encrypted communications using the Project 25 standard, were found to have vulnerabilities that exposed sensitive law enforcement information. The failure to properly implement encryption and secure communication protocols led to the exploitation of these radios by security researchers from the University of Pennsylvania [7410].
(b) The software failure incident can also be considered accidental to some extent. While the vulnerabilities in the radios were exploited by security researchers intentionally to demonstrate the weaknesses in the system, the fact that such critical flaws existed in the design and implementation of the radios can be seen as an accidental oversight by the developers and manufacturers. The unintended consequence of these vulnerabilities being discovered and potentially exploited by malicious actors highlights the accidental nature of the software failure incident [7410]. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles seems to be more of a permanent nature. The vulnerability in the radios using the Project 25 standard was significant and allowed for the interception of sensitive law enforcement information. The vulnerability was not due to specific circumstances but rather inherent in the design of the radios and the lack of encryption being turned on by federal agents [7410]. The researchers highlighted the ease with which the radios could be jammed, indicating a fundamental flaw in the system that could potentially persist unless addressed at a deeper level. |
| Behaviour |
omission, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the vulnerability highlighted in the articles allows for the interception and disruption of sensitive radio communications used by federal law enforcement agencies [7410].
(b) omission: The vulnerability in the software system allows for the omission of encryption by federal agents, leading to the disclosure of sensitive law enforcement information, including names and locations of criminal investigative targets, wiretap information, and plans for confidential operations [7410].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The vulnerability allows for the interception and disruption of communications rather than delayed or premature execution of functions [7410].
(d) value: The software failure incident does not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly in terms of producing incorrect outputs or results. Instead, the vulnerability allows for the unauthorized access and disclosure of sensitive information due to the lack of encryption implementation by federal agents [7410].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The vulnerability described in the articles focuses on the interception and disruption of radio communications rather than erratic or inconsistent system behavior [7410].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security vulnerability that allows for the unauthorized interception and disruption of sensitive radio communications used by federal law enforcement agencies. This behavior falls under the category of a critical security flaw rather than a specific software failure mode like crash, omission, timing, value, or byzantine behavior [7410]. |