Incident: Supercomputer Simulation Reveals Critical Failure in Nuclear Weapon System

Published Date: 2011-11-01

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving the B-83 strategic nuclear bomb happened several years ago as per the article published on November 1, 2011.
System unknown
Responsible Organization 1. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [8315]
Impacted Organization 1. The B-83 strategic nuclear bomb and the military's handling procedures for the weapons were impacted by the software failure incident described in Article 8315. [8315]
Software Causes 1. The failure incident was caused by a fault in the "real dynamics of the vehicle" of the B-83 strategic nuclear bomb, which could not have been revealed by underground explosive testing or by examining the components. This fault was detected largely by computer simulation [8315].
Non-software Causes 1. The failure incident with the B-83 strategic nuclear bomb was caused by a fault in the "real dynamics of the vehicle," describing the weapon's trajectory and behavior, which could not have been revealed by underground explosive testing or by examining the components [8315]. 2. The incident was also attributed to a problem detected during traditional checks in 2003, which was not catastrophic but widespread, leading to the need for adjustments in handling procedures for the weapons [8315].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident in the simulation of the B-83 nuclear bomb revealed a critical fault that could have led to a catastrophic failure of the weapon, impacting its explosive yield and ability to hit the target [Article 8315]. 2. Following the discovery of the fault through computer modeling, changes had to be made in the military's handling procedures for the B-83 bombs to prevent potential catastrophic failures in the future [Article 8315]. 3. The incident highlighted the importance of advanced computer modeling in understanding the behavior of nuclear weapons, surpassing the knowledge gained from traditional underground explosive testing [Article 8315]. 4. The failure incident led to a significant shift in the nuclear weapons era, with the United States' weapons laboratories using supercomputers to gain a deeper understanding of thermonuclear explosions and the dynamics of nuclear weapons [Article 8315].
Preventions 1. Thorough investigation and discovery of the fault in the weapon's trajectory and behavior through supercomputer modeling [Article 8315]. 2. Implementation of changes in the military's handling procedures for the weapons based on the findings from the computer simulations [Article 8315]. 3. Continuous monitoring and certification of the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons through the stockpile stewardship program [Article 8315].
Fixes 1. The software failure incident in the nuclear weapon simulation was fixed by changing the military's handling procedures for the weapons based on the findings from the computer simulations [Article 8315]. 2. Livermore scientists performed a series of computer simulations and high-explosive nonnuclear experiments at Los Alamos to address a problem detected in the nuclear arsenal, which showed that the weapons did not need a major repair that might have cost billions of dollars [Article 8315].
References 1. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 2. Bruce T. Goodwin, principal associate director at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 3. Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher 4. Former nuclear weapons designer (anonymous) 5. National Nuclear Security Administration 6. Jeffrey G. Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies 7. Livermore physicist, Omar Hurricane 8. Fred Streitz, director of Livermore’s Institute for Scientific Computing Research

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring unknown The articles do not mention any specific software failure incident happening again at either the same organization (one_organization) or at multiple organizations (multiple_organization). Therefore, the information related to a repeated software failure incident within or across organizations is unknown based on the provided articles.
Phase (Design/Operation) unknown The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident related to the development phases (design or operation).
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system The software failure incident described in the articles is related to the boundary of the system. The failure was due to contributing factors that originated from within the system itself, specifically in the "real dynamics of the vehicle" which describes the weapon's trajectory and behavior [8315]. The failure was detected through computer simulations and required changes in the military's handling procedures for the weapons to prevent catastrophic failures during actual use. This incident showcases how advancements in computer modeling have allowed for the detection and resolution of critical issues within the system itself.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: The article discusses a significant software failure incident related to the simulation of a nuclear weapon, specifically the B-83 bomb, where a catastrophic failure was detected during the stockpile-to-target sequence. This failure was revealed through computer simulations and was related to the "real dynamics of the vehicle," which describes the weapon's trajectory and behavior. The fault was not something that could have been revealed by underground explosive testing or by examining the components [8315]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: The article does not provide information about a software failure incident occurring due to contributing factors introduced by human actions.
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident occurring due to hardware issues. (b) The software failure incident mentioned in the articles occurred due to contributing factors that originate in software. Specifically, the failure was related to the computer simulations of a nuclear weapon (B-83) that showed a "fail catastrophically" point during the stockpile-to-target sequence. This fault in the "real dynamics of the vehicle" could not have been revealed by underground explosive testing or by examining the components [8315]. The incident led to a multi-year effort to fix the B-83 bombs and the military's handling procedures for the weapons based on the findings from the computer simulations.
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) unknown The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident related to a malicious or non-malicious objective.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) unknown The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident related to poor decisions or accidental decisions.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) unknown (a) The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident related to development incompetence. (b) The software failure incident mentioned in the articles was not accidental. It was a result of a thorough investigation conducted by nuclear weapons designers and scientists at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory using supercomputer modeling. The computer simulations revealed a critical fault in the B-83 strategic nuclear bomb that would cause it to "fail catastrophically" at a certain point from stockpile to target. This fault in the "real dynamics of the vehicle" could not have been revealed by underground explosive testing or by examining the components [8315].
Duration unknown The articles do not provide information about a specific software failure incident related to the duration of the failure being permanent or temporary.
Behaviour value, other (a) crash: The article does not mention any software crash incidents. (b) omission: The article does not mention any software omission incidents. (c) timing: The article does not mention any software timing incidents. (d) value: The software failure incident mentioned in the article is related to a failure in the behavior of a nuclear weapon simulation software. The failure was described as a "catastrophic" failure where the weapon would not produce the expected explosive yield when used, indicating a failure in performing its intended function correctly [8315]. (e) byzantine: The article does not mention any software failure incidents related to a byzantine behavior. (f) other: The software failure incident described in the article is related to a fundamental fault in the behavior of the nuclear weapon simulation software, leading to a catastrophic failure in the expected performance of the weapon [8315].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence unknown (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of people losing their lives due to the software failure incident in the provided article [8315].
Domain knowledge, government The software failure incident discussed in the article is related to the government and specifically the nuclear weapons industry. The incident involved the simulation of a nuclear weapon, the B-83 strategic nuclear bomb, using supercomputers at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The failure discovered through computer simulations led to the realization that the weapon would "fail catastrophically" at a certain point in its trajectory, impacting its explosive yield [Article 8315]. The incident highlighted the shift towards using advanced computer modeling and simulations to understand and ensure the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons under the Department of Energy's stockpile stewardship program. It also emphasized the importance of computational advances in maintaining the nuclear arsenal without the need for nuclear explosive testing [Article 8315].

Sources

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