| Recurring |
unknown |
The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident happening again at one specific organization or multiple organizations. Therefore, the answer to this question is 'unknown'. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
unknown |
The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident related to either the design phase or the operation phase. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is within_system. The failure was due to the software's inability to effectively detect dangerous crowd build-up within the system itself. The software developed by Barbara Krausz from the Fraunhofer Institute for Intelligent Analysis and Information Systems in Germany was designed to analyze crowd video footage and identify potential risks by detecting specific patterns of motion within the crowd [7365]. The failure occurred within the system's functionality to accurately predict and alert security staff about dangerous crowd conditions, ultimately leading to the tragic incident at the Love Parade in Duisburg. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case is related to non-human actions. The failure was not due to contributing factors introduced by human actions but rather due to the inability of the software to effectively detect dangerous crowd build-up and prevent tragic incidents like the crowd crush at the Love Parade in Duisburg. The software developed by Barbara Krausz from the Fraunhofer Institute for Intelligent Analysis and Information Systems in Germany aimed to detect crowd build-up by analyzing pixel motions in crowd video footage. The software was designed to pre-empt the problem and alert security staff to disperse crowds to safety. However, the failure occurred in the system's effectiveness in detecting the dangerous crowd build-up in time to prevent the tragic incident, as highlighted by the fact that the system produced its highest alert about half an hour before the disaster occurred [7365]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
unknown |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The article does not mention any software failure incident related to hardware. It focuses on the development of software to detect dangerous crowd build-up and prevent tragedies like the Love Parade crush incident in Germany [7365].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The software failure incident discussed in the article is not related to a failure originating in software. Instead, the article highlights the development of software aimed at preventing disasters by detecting dangerous crowd build-up [7365]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
The software discussed in the article [7365] was developed with the objective of preventing disasters like the crowd crush at the Love Parade in Duisburg. The software aimed to detect dangerous crowd build-up by analyzing crowd video footage to identify signs of potential danger, such as people being squeezed together or swaying in a congested area. The intention behind the software was non-malicious, focusing on enhancing crowd safety and providing security staff with early alerts to take necessary actions to disperse crowds and prevent tragic incidents. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
The intent of the software failure incident described in the article is related to poor_decisions. The failure incident, in this case, was the tragic crowd crush at the Love Parade in Duisburg, Germany, where 21 people were killed and hundreds injured. The finger of blame was pointed at the organizers for not noticing the dangerous build-up of the crowd. The new software developed by Barbara Krausz aimed to detect when crowds were starting to build up to dangerous levels, allowing security staff to disperse crowds to safety and prevent such tragedies in the future. The failure to prevent the crowd crush was attributed to the lack of effective crowd monitoring and decision-making by the organizers, which the software was intended to address [7365]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
unknown |
The articles do not mention any software failure incident related to development incompetence or accidental factors. Therefore, the information to answer this question is 'unknown'. |
| Duration |
unknown |
The software failure incident described in the article is not related to a permanent or temporary failure. Instead, the article discusses the development of a new software system aimed at preventing crowd crush disasters by detecting dangerous crowd build-up in real-time. The software analyzes crowd video footage to identify signs of potential danger, such as swaying movements indicating congestion, and alerts security staff to take necessary actions to disperse crowds to safety. The focus is on proactive prevention rather than addressing a specific software failure incident. |
| Behaviour |
timing, other |
(a) crash: The software developed to detect dangerous crowd build-up did not crash as there is no mention of it losing state and not performing any of its intended functions [7365].
(b) omission: The software was designed to detect dangerous crowd build-up and alert security staff in advance to take necessary actions. However, in the reported incident at the Love Parade, the software did not omit to perform its intended functions; rather, it successfully highlighted areas where people were squeezed together before the disaster occurred [7365].
(c) timing: The software's behavior can be categorized under timing failure. It successfully detected the dangerous build-up of the crowd and highlighted the problem areas before the disaster happened. However, the analysis was done only up to half an hour before the disaster, indicating that the system may have alerted too late for effective preventive measures to be taken [7365].
(d) value: There is no indication in the article that the software performed its intended functions incorrectly, so there is no evidence of a value failure [7365].
(e) byzantine: The software did not exhibit behavior characterized by inconsistent responses or interactions, so there is no evidence of a byzantine failure [7365].
(f) other: The software's behavior can be described as proactive and effective in detecting potential crowd safety issues by analyzing crowd movements and highlighting areas of concern. However, the system's limitation in providing real-time alerts closer to the time of the disaster could be considered a limitation or a form of failure in terms of real-time responsiveness [7365]. |