| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident has happened again at one_organization:
The incident of a computer virus infecting the drones' systems at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada is not the first time such a security breach has occurred within the U.S. military. In late 2008, removable drives helped introduce the agent.btz worm to hundreds of thousands of Defense Department computers, leading to a widespread infection that the Pentagon is still disinfecting machines from three years later [8422].
(b) The software failure incident has happened again at multiple_organization:
The use of removable drives to transfer data and updates between computers has been a common practice in various drone units at Air Force bases worldwide. However, following the virus infection at Creech Air Force Base, drone units at other Air Force bases have been ordered to stop using removable drives to prevent the spread of similar malware incidents [8422]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. The virus that infected the drones' systems was able to resist multiple efforts to remove it, indicating a design flaw in the system's security measures. Despite attempts to wipe it off, the virus kept coming back, leading to the eventual need to erase the GCS' internal hard drives and rebuild them from scratch [8422].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also highlighted in the articles. The virus is believed to have spread through removable drives used by Predator and Reaper crews to load map updates and transport mission videos from one computer to another. This operation practice of using removable drives contributed to the spread of the virus within the system [8422]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the computer virus infecting the drones' cockpits at Creech Air Force Base can be categorized as within_system. The virus was detected within the military's Host-Based Security System and resisted multiple removal efforts from Creech's computers [8422]. Additionally, the virus is believed to have spread through removable hard drives used by Predator and Reaper crews to load map updates and transport mission videos [8422]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to non-human actions. The incident involved a computer virus infecting the cockpits of America's Predator and Reaper drones, logging pilots' keystrokes as they flew missions over warzones. The virus was first detected by the military's Host-Based Security System and resisted multiple removal efforts, indicating a non-human origin [8422]. Additionally, the virus was believed to have spread through removable drives used by drone crews to load map updates and transport mission videos, further emphasizing the non-human aspect of the failure [8422].
(b) However, human actions also played a role in the software failure incident. The use of removable hard drives by Predator and Reaper crews to transfer data between computers contributed to the spread of the virus. The article mentions that the virus is believed to have spread through these removable drives, indicating a human action of using these drives for data transfer [8422]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles is related to hardware as the computer virus infected the cockpits of America's Predator and Reaper drones, logging pilots' every keystroke as they remotely fly missions over Afghanistan and other warzones. The virus is believed to have spread through removable drives used by Predator and Reaper crews to load map updates and transport mission videos [8422].
(b) The software failure incident is also related to software as the virus, including its "keylogger" payload, has resisted multiple efforts to remove it from the computers at Creech Air Force Base. Technicians had to use a software tool called BCWipe to completely erase the GCS' internal hard drives, indicating a software-related issue [8422]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident involving the computer virus infecting the drones' cockpits at Creech Air Force Base appears to be malicious in nature. The virus, which included a keylogger payload, was logging pilots' every keystroke as they remotely flew missions over warzones. The virus was resistant to removal efforts and had the potential to capture and transmit classified data to an external source [8422].
(b) On the non-malicious side, the article mentions that the virus may have been introduced accidentally rather than intentionally. It raises the possibility that the virus was a common piece of malware that made its way into the sensitive networks at Creech Air Force Base [8422]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident involving the computer virus infecting the drones' cockpits at Creech Air Force Base could be attributed to poor decisions. The article mentions that the virus and its keylogger payload may have been introduced intentionally or by accident, indicating a potential security vulnerability due to poor decisions in network security ([8422]). Additionally, the use of removable hard drives to load map updates and transport mission videos, which ultimately led to the virus spreading, highlights a poor decision in the security practices at the base ([8422]). |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was not explicitly attributed to development incompetence. However, the article mentions that the virus infecting the drones' systems may have been introduced unintentionally or accidentally, indicating a potential accidental cause [8422].
(b) The article suggests that the virus infecting the drones' systems may have been introduced accidentally, as military network security specialists were unsure whether the virus and its keylogger payload were introduced intentionally or by accident. This uncertainty points towards a potential accidental introduction of the virus [8422]. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as both temporary and permanent:
(a) Permanent: The software failure incident can be considered permanent due to the ongoing security risks highlighted in the article. The virus infecting the drones' systems has resisted multiple removal efforts and keeps coming back despite attempts to eradicate it. This indicates a persistent and enduring issue that has not been fully resolved [8422].
(b) Temporary: On the other hand, the software failure incident can also be seen as temporary as efforts are being made to remove the virus from the affected systems. Technicians at Creech Air Force Base have been working on eradicating the virus by using software tools like BCWipe to completely erase the GCS' internal hard drives. This suggests a temporary disruption in the system that is being actively addressed and remediated [8422]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a crash. The virus infected the drones' systems, causing them to lose control over the keystrokes of the pilots and potentially compromising classified information. Despite efforts to remove the virus, it kept coming back, leading to a situation where the system was not functioning as intended [8422].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can also be linked to omission. The virus infected the drones' systems, potentially leading to the omission of performing their intended functions correctly. The keylogger aspect of the virus could have omitted the proper logging of keystrokes and compromised the security of the system [8422].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident is not explicitly mentioned in the article. However, the fact that the virus was detected nearly two weeks ago and efforts to remove it have been ongoing suggests a potential timing issue in terms of the system not being able to address the problem promptly [8422].
(d) value: The software failure incident can be associated with a value failure. The virus caused the system to perform its intended functions incorrectly by logging pilots' keystrokes and potentially transmitting classified information outside the military chain of command. This incorrect behavior compromised the integrity and security of the system [8422].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with a byzantine failure. The virus infection and keylogger behavior, although malicious, were consistent in their actions of logging keystrokes and potentially transmitting data outside the military network. There were no indications of inconsistent responses or interactions within the system [8422].
(f) other: The software failure incident can be further categorized as a security breach. The virus infection and keylogger behavior led to a breach in the security of the drones' systems, potentially exposing classified information to unauthorized sources. This breach in security goes beyond just a technical failure and encompasses a significant risk to national security [8422]. |