Published Date: 2012-08-27
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident at Saudi Aramco happened in mid-August 2012 [Article 14198]. 2. The incident started on the morning of Wednesday, August 15, 2012 [Article 38916]. 3. The incident occurred on August 15, 2012 [Article 15131]. |
| System | 1. Saudi Aramco's internal corporate network [Article 15131] 2. Computers and servers at data centers worldwide [Article 38916] 3. Workstations at Saudi Aramco [Article 14198] |
| Responsible Organization | 1. The hackers who called themselves the "Cutting Sword of Justice" claimed responsibility for the software failure incident at Saudi Aramco [15131]. 2. Iran was suspected by United States intelligence officials to be the real perpetrator behind the attack on Saudi Aramco, although specific evidence was not provided [15131]. 3. A group called "Cutting Sword of Justice" claimed responsibility for the attack on Saudi Aramco, citing the company's support of the Al Saud royal family's authoritarian regime [38916]. 4. Saudi Aramco attributed the attack to a "malicious virus that originated from external sources" and mentioned ongoing investigations to determine the causes and responsible parties [14198]. 5. Security expert Jeffrey Carr speculated that the attack on Saudi Aramco was orchestrated by Iran as retaliation for Saudi Aramco's commitment to make up for cuts in Iran's oil exports due to the U.S.-European Union embargo [14198]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Saudi Aramco [15131, 38916, 14198] |
| Software Causes | 1. The software cause of the failure incident was a malicious virus that originated from external sources, affecting 30,000 workstations at Saudi Aramco [Article 14198]. 2. The attack involved a computer virus named Shamoon, designed to replace data on hard drives with an image of a burning American flag and report infected computer addresses back to a computer inside the company's network [Article 15131]. 3. The virus, Shamoon, had a kill switch set to attack at a specific time, 11:08 a.m., wiping the memory of Aramco's computers [Article 15131]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. An employee clicking on a bad link in a scam email, leading to the initial breach [Article 38916]. 2. Physical unplugging of every office from the Internet to prevent the virus from spreading further [Article 38916]. 3. Disruption of normal business operations, leading to the use of typewriters and faxes for communication [Article 38916]. 4. Temporary halt in selling oil to domestic gas tank trucks and later giving away oil for free to keep it flowing within Saudi Arabia [Article 38916]. 5. Purchase of 50,000 hard drives by Saudi Aramco, causing a temporary shortage and increased prices for hard drives globally [Article 38916]. |
| Impacts | 1. The software failure incident at Saudi Aramco resulted in the erasure of data on three-quarters of Aramco's corporate PCs, replacing it with an image of a burning American flag, causing significant damage to the company's internal communications network [15131]. 2. The incident led to 35,000 computers being partially wiped or totally destroyed, forcing Saudi Aramco to resort to using typewriters and faxes, disrupting the company's ability to supply 10% of the world's oil and impacting its operations significantly [38916]. 3. The attack caused Saudi Aramco to physically unplug every office from the Internet to prevent the virus from spreading further, leading to disruptions in managing supplies, shipping, contracts, and communication within the company [38916]. 4. Employees were unable to access corporate email and the internal network for several days, leading to a halt in selling oil to domestic gas tank trucks and eventually giving oil away for free to maintain operations within Saudi Arabia [15131]. 5. The incident forced Saudi Aramco to purchase 50,000 hard drives in a rush, disrupting the global supply chain and causing a temporary increase in hard drive prices for consumers worldwide [38916]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing robust cybersecurity measures, such as regular security audits, intrusion detection systems, and employee training to prevent phishing attacks like the one that initiated the Saudi Aramco hack [15131, 38916, 14198]. 2. Enforcing strict access controls and monitoring privileged access to critical systems to prevent insider threats like the one involving an insider at Saudi Aramco who introduced the virus [15131]. 3. Maintaining secure network segmentation to isolate critical operations from internal corporate networks, as seen in the case of Aramco where the oil production operations were segregated from the internal communications network [15131]. 4. Enhancing incident response capabilities to quickly identify and contain malware like Shamoon, which had a kill switch set to activate at a specific time [15131]. 5. Collaborating with cybersecurity experts and agencies to analyze and respond to sophisticated cyber threats, as demonstrated by Aramco flying in American computer security experts after the attack [15131]. |
| Fixes | 1. Enhancing cybersecurity measures to prevent future attacks, such as implementing stronger network security protocols, regular security audits, and employee training on recognizing phishing emails and malicious links [15131, 38916, 14198]. 2. Implementing stricter access controls and monitoring privileged access to prevent insider threats [15131]. 3. Regularly updating and patching software to address vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers [15131, 38916, 14198]. 4. Developing incident response plans to quickly isolate infected systems and prevent the spread of malware [15131, 38916, 14198]. 5. Conducting thorough investigations to identify the source of the attack and potentially collaborate with law enforcement agencies to track down the perpetrators [15131, 38916, 14198]. | References | 1. United States intelligence officials 2. Secretary of Defense, Leon E. Panetta 3. American computer security experts 4. Symantec, a Silicon Valley security company 5. Iranian oil ministry officials 6. Researchers 7. Saudi Aramco 8. Chris Kubecka, former security advisor to Saudi Aramco 9. CNNMoney 10. Security expert Jeffrey Carr, CEO of Taia Global |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: - The incident at Saudi Aramco in 2015 was a similar attack to the one that occurred in 2012. In 2015, 35,000 computers were partially wiped or totally destroyed, leading to disruptions in operations and forcing the company to resort to using typewriters and faxes [Article 38916]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: - The articles mention that similar cyberattacks have targeted other organizations as well. For example, there were subsequent attacks on RasGas, the Qatari natural gas giant, and American banks, which were believed to be engineered by Iran [Article 15131]. Additionally, there have been mentions of other groups like the Arab Youth Group being involved in cyberattacks [Article 14198]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase: - The incident at Saudi Aramco was a result of a malicious virus that originated from external sources, affecting 30,000 workstations [Article 14198]. - The attack involved a virus named Shamoon, which was designed to replace data on hard drives with an image of a burning American flag and report infected computer addresses back to a computer inside the company's network [Article 15131]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase: - An employee at Saudi Aramco opened a scam email and clicked on a bad link, allowing the hackers to gain access to the system [Article 38916]. - Saudi Aramco's computer technicians had to physically unplug every office from the Internet to prevent the virus from spreading further, leading to disruptions in operations such as managing supplies, shipping, and communication [Article 38916]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system, outside_system | (a) within_system: The software failure incident at Saudi Aramco was primarily caused by factors originating from within the system. The incident involved a malicious virus that affected 30,000 workstations, leading to data loss and disruption of operations [Article 14198]. The attack was initiated by a scam email that an employee clicked on, allowing hackers to gain access to the company's network [Article 38916]. The virus, named Shamoon, was designed to replace data on hard drives with an image of a burning American flag and report infected computer addresses back to a central server within the network [Article 15131]. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident at Saudi Aramco also had contributing factors originating from outside the system. The attack was attributed to external sources, with hackers claiming responsibility for sending a malicious virus to destroy computers within the energy company [Article 14198]. Additionally, there were suspicions that the attack was orchestrated by Iran as retaliation against Saudi Aramco for certain actions, indicating external motivations for the cyberattack [Article 14198]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - Article 15131 reports a software failure incident where a computer virus named Shamoon was unleashed on Saudi Aramco's computers, erasing data on three-quarters of the company's corporate PCs and replacing it with an image of a burning American flag. The virus was designed to replace data on hard drives with the image and report infected computer addresses back to a computer inside the company's network. The attack was initiated by a person with privileged access to the company's computers, and the virus had a kill switch set to attack at a specific time [15131]. - Article 38916 describes a massive cyberattack on Saudi Aramco where 35,000 computers were partially wiped or totally destroyed in a matter of hours. The attack began when a computer technician opened a scam email and clicked on a bad link, allowing the hackers to gain access. The attack led to the company being offline, with every office physically unplugged from the Internet to prevent the virus from spreading further. The attack forced the company to resort to using typewriters and faxes for communication and operations [38916]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - Article 14198 mentions a software failure incident at Saudi Aramco where a malicious virus originating from external sources affected 30,000 workstations. The attack was attributed to a group called Cutting Sword of Justice, which claimed responsibility for sending the virus to destroy computers in the energy company. The group targeted Aramco due to its support of the Al-Saud regime and alleged involvement in crimes and atrocities in various countries. The attack led to data and operating system files being wiped out on client computers and affected servers [14198]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - In the incident involving Saudi Aramco, the virus named Shamoon was designed to replace data on hard drives with an image of a burning American flag and report infected computer addresses back to a computer inside the company's network [15131]. - The attack led to the destruction of 35,000 computers at Saudi Aramco, forcing the company to resort to using typewriters and faxes as their systems were offline [38916]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The incident at Saudi Aramco was caused by a malicious virus that originated from external sources, affecting 30,000 workstations [14198]. - The virus named Shamoon, which was used in the attack on Saudi Aramco, was malware designed to destroy data [14198]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious | (a) The software failure incident at Saudi Aramco was malicious in nature. The incident involved a cyberattack orchestrated by hackers with the intent to harm the company's systems. The attackers unleashed a computer virus named Shamoon, which erased data on three-quarters of Aramco's corporate PCs and replaced it with an image of a burning American flag [15131]. The attack was claimed by a group calling themselves the "Cutting Sword of Justice," who cited their dissatisfaction with Saudi policies in the Middle East as the motive for the attack [15131]. Additionally, there were posts on Pastebin claiming responsibility for sending a malicious virus to destroy 30,000 computers in the energy company, targeting Aramco for its support of certain regimes and actions in the region [14198]. (b) The software failure incident was non-malicious in the sense that it was initiated by an unwitting action. The attack began when a computer technician at Saudi Aramco opened a scam email and clicked on a bad link, allowing the hackers to gain access to the system [38916]. This indicates that the initial entry point for the attack was a result of human error rather than a deliberate act to harm the system. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions, accidental_decisions | (a) The intent of the software failure incident: - The incident at Saudi Aramco involving the Shamoon virus was believed to be a deliberate act of cyber sabotage. The attackers, who called themselves the "Cutting Sword of Justice," claimed responsibility for the attack, citing their dissatisfaction with Saudi policies in the Middle East [15131]. - The attackers targeted Saudi Aramco's computers with the intent to erase data on a large scale and replace it with an image of a burning American flag. This act was seen as a significant escalation of the cyber threat, according to United States intelligence officials [15131]. - The attackers behind the Shamoon attack were suspected to have inserted misleading clues in the code, such as the term "Arabian Gulf," to misdirect blame and create confusion about the origin of the attack [15131]. - The attack on Saudi Aramco was believed to be a retaliatory measure, possibly orchestrated by Iran, in response to actions taken by Saudi Aramco that were perceived as detrimental to Iran's interests [14198]. (b) The intent of the software failure incident: - The incident at Saudi Aramco started when a technician clicked on a malicious link in a scam email, leading to the infiltration of the company's systems by hackers. This initial action was accidental and not intentional [38916]. - The attack on Saudi Aramco resulted in significant damage, including the partial wiping or total destruction of 35,000 computers within a matter of hours. The consequences of the attack, such as the disruption of operations and the need to resort to outdated technology like typewriters and faxes, were unintended outcomes of the initial breach [38916]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | accidental | (a) The articles do not provide information about the software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence. (b) The software failure incident reported in the articles was accidental. In Article 14198, it is mentioned that Saudi Aramco blamed a "malicious virus that originated from external sources" for the attack on their internal network. The attack was initiated by a group called "Cutting Sword of Justice" who claimed responsibility for sending a malicious virus to destroy 30,000 computers in the energy company. This incident was not a result of development incompetence but rather an intentional attack by external actors [14198]. |
| Duration | temporary | (a) The software failure incident described in the articles was temporary. The incident involved a cyberattack on Saudi Aramco's computers, resulting in the destruction of data and disruption of operations. The attack caused significant damage, leading to the shutdown of the company's internal corporate network, disabling employees' e-mail and Internet access to prevent the virus from spreading further [15131]. Additionally, the attack forced Saudi Aramco to operate using outdated methods such as typewriters and faxes while the systems were being secured and restored [38916]. The incident was not a permanent failure as the company eventually restored its computer network after implementing enhanced cybersecurity measures and purchasing new hard drives to replace the compromised ones. The attack did not result in a permanent loss of data or functionality, as the company was able to recover and resume normal operations after a period of disruption [38916]. |
| Behaviour | crash, omission, value, other | (a) crash: The incident described in Article 15131 involved a crash where a computer virus initiated by a person with privileged access to Saudi Aramco's computers caused the system to lose data on three-quarters of Aramco's corporate PCs, replacing it with an image of a burning American flag. This led to the company shutting down its internal corporate network to stop the virus from spreading [15131]. (b) omission: The incident in Article 38916 involved an omission where 35,000 computers at Saudi Aramco were partially wiped or totally destroyed, leading to screens flickering, files disappearing, and some computers shutting down without explanation. This resulted in the company having to operate using typewriters and faxes, omitting the usual digital operations [38916]. (c) timing: The incident in Article 14198 involved a timing issue where a malicious virus affected 30,000 workstations at Saudi Aramco during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan when most employees were on holiday. The attack began on a specific morning when employees noticed their computers acting weird, indicating a specific timing for the failure [14198]. (d) value: The incident in Article 15131 involved a value-related failure where the computer virus replaced data on Aramco's PCs with an image of a burning American flag, indicating that the system performed its intended functions incorrectly by altering the data [15131]. (e) byzantine: There is no specific mention of a byzantine behavior in the provided articles. (f) other: The incident in Article 14198 involved a failure related to a malicious virus that originated from external sources, leading to the system being affected and causing disruptions in normal business operations. This could be categorized as an "external attack" behavior, where the system's failure was caused by an external entity infiltrating the network [14198]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | None | None |
| Communication | None | None |
| Application | None | None |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | property, delay, other | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - No information about people losing their lives due to the software failure incident was mentioned in the articles. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - No information about people being physically harmed due to the software failure incident was mentioned in the articles. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - The software failure incident did not directly impact people's access to food or shelter. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident resulted in the destruction or wiping of data on thousands of computers at Saudi Aramco, impacting the company's operations and causing significant disruption [15131, 38916, 14198]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - The software failure incident caused significant disruption to Saudi Aramco's operations, leading to the company resorting to using typewriters and faxes, temporarily halting oil sales to domestic gas tank trucks, and conducting business operations manually until the systems were secured and brought back online [38916]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident primarily impacted the operations and systems of Saudi Aramco, a major oil company, and did not mention specific impacts on non-human entities. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident had significant consequences on Saudi Aramco's operations, including the destruction or wiping of data on thousands of computers, disruption of business operations, and the need to secure and restore the computer network [15131, 38916, 14198]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles did not mention potential consequences discussed that did not occur as a result of the software failure incident. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The software failure incident led to a significant impact on Saudi Aramco's ability to supply oil, with 35,000 computers being partially wiped or totally destroyed, and the company resorting to using outdated technology like typewriters and faxes to conduct business operations [38916]. |
| Domain | information, utilities, finance | (a) The failed system was intended to support the information industry as it affected the production and distribution of information within the company. The incident involved the destruction of data on corporate PCs, including documents, spreadsheets, emails, and files, which disrupted the company's internal communications network and led to the shutdown of the internal corporate network [Article 15131]. (g) The incident also impacted the utilities industry as it targeted Saudi Aramco, a state-owned oil company, which is a major player in the oil and gas sector. The attack on Aramco, one of the world's largest oil companies, disrupted its operations and forced the company to shut down its internal corporate network to prevent the virus from spreading further [Article 15131, Article 38916]. (m) The incident could also be related to the finance industry indirectly as it mentioned that the attack on Saudi Aramco was speculated to be orchestrated by Iran as a retaliation against Aramco for committing to make up for cuts in Iran's oil exports due to the U.S.-European Union embargo. This suggests a potential link to financial implications in the oil and gas sector [Article 14198]. |
Article ID: 15131
Article ID: 38916
Article ID: 14198