| Recurring |
multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
The article does not provide information about a similar incident happening again within the same organization or with its products and services. Therefore, it is unknown if a similar incident has occurred again at the same organization.
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
The article mentions that the botnet infiltration affected computers in multiple countries, including Georgia, the U.S., Canada, Ukraine, and several other countries. This indicates that the software failure incident involving the botnet attack has occurred at multiple organizations or entities across different countries [Article 15133]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to the design phase. The failure occurred due to the development of malware by the alleged hacker, which was then used to infect various computers and create a botnet. The malware was hidden inside a file titled 'Georgian-Nato Agreement' and was spread through malicious links planted on specific news-site webpages to target specific individuals and organizations [Article 15133].
(b) The software failure incident can also be linked to the operation phase. The malware, once installed on a targeted computer, seized control of the system, searched for sensitive documents, took screenshots, and even controlled embedded webcams and microphones to eavesdrop on targets. This operation of the malware led to the compromise of various systems and the gathering of sensitive information [Article 15133]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident in the article is primarily within the system. The failure occurred due to the infiltration of a botnet that infected the computers of politicians, civil servants, banks, and NGOs in multiple countries. The malware planted malicious links on specific news-site webpages to install the malware on targeted computers. The virus then seized control of the targeted computers, searched for sensitive documents, took screenshots, and even controlled embedded webcams and microphones on the infected machines [Article 15133].
(b) outside_system: The contributing factors that originated from outside the system in this software failure incident include the alleged hacker's actions and the external entities involved. The hacker, linked to Russian security agencies and other hackers in Germany, was targeted by cyber-security experts from Georgia. Additionally, the botnet infiltration and the subsequent malware infection were orchestrated by external threat actors, indicating an external origin of the failure [Article 15133]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically the actions of a hacker who infected computers with malware, leading to the spread of a botnet to government agencies and NGOs in several countries [Article 15133].
(b) Human actions also played a significant role in the software failure incident. The cyber-security experts from Georgia's Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-Georgia) actively engaged in investigating and countering the hacker's activities. They tricked the alleged hacker by infecting his computer with his own malware, capturing video of him at work, and gathering information linking him to Russian security agencies and other hackers in Germany [Article 15133]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was not directly attributed to hardware issues. The incident primarily involved a cyber attack where a hacker targeted various organizations by infecting computers with malware, leading to a botnet being created [Article 15133].
(b) The software failure incident in the article was caused by contributing factors originating in software. The hackers used malware to infiltrate computers, seize control, search for sensitive documents, take screenshots, and eavesdrop using webcams and microphones. The malware was sophisticated, highly encrypted, and used stealthy techniques to avoid detection by security tools [Article 15133]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. The incident involved an alleged hacker who targeted networks in Georgia and other countries by infecting computers with malware, seizing control of targeted computers, searching for sensitive documents, and eavesdropping on targets using compromised webcams and microphones. The cyber-security experts from CERT-Georgia turned the tables on the hacker by infecting his computer with his own malware, capturing video of him at work, and gathering information linking him to Russian security agencies and other hackers in Germany. The malware used in the incident was sophisticated, highly encrypted, and employed contemporary stealthy techniques to avoid detection by security tools. The hackers behind the incident were actively modifying the virus to evade security measures and maintain control over the infected computers. The incident was part of a larger botnet operation orchestrated by the hacker to infiltrate various organizations and entities [15133].
(b) The software failure incident described in the article does not align with a non-malicious failure scenario. The incident was clearly driven by malicious intent, with the hacker deploying malware to compromise systems, steal sensitive information, and conduct espionage activities. The actions taken by the cyber-security experts to counter the attack, including infecting the hacker with his own malware, demonstrate a response to a deliberate and harmful intrusion rather than an unintentional software failure [15133]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was related to poor_decisions. The cyber-security experts from CERT-Georgia intentionally infected the alleged hacker's computer with his own malware by tricking him into executing a malicious file disguised as the 'Georgian-Nato Agreement' [Article 15133]. This action was a deliberate decision made by the experts to gain control over the hacker's activities and gather information about his operations, including his connections to Russian security agencies and other hackers in Germany. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the provided article can be attributed to development incompetence. The incident involved a hacker who targeted networks in Georgia and other countries. Cyber-security experts from Georgia's CERT-Georgia were able to turn the tables on the hacker by infecting his computer with his own malware. This action was possible because the hacker fell for a file titled 'Georgian-Nato Agreement' that contained the virus. The experts were able to seize control of the hacker's computer, capture video of him at work, and gather information linking him to Russian security agencies and other hackers in Germany [Article 15133].
(b) The software failure incident can also be considered accidental as the hacker inadvertently infected his own computer with the malware that he had created. The hacker was tricked into executing malicious files contained in a fake ZIP archive titled 'Georgian-Nato Agreement', leading to the cyber-security experts gaining control over his computer and capturing video of his activities. This accidental infection allowed the experts to gather valuable information about the hacker's identity and connections to other malicious actors [Article 15133]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article was temporary. The incident involved cyber-security experts from Georgia's CERT team infecting an alleged hacker's computer with his own malware, capturing video of him at work, obtaining information about his activities, and linking him to Russian security agencies and other hackers in Germany. The experts were able to take control of the botnet and develop countermeasures to fight the infections. The incident was a result of specific circumstances and actions taken by the experts to counter the hacker's activities [Article 15133]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a crash. The cyber-security experts were able to infect the alleged hacker's computer with his own malware, causing the system to lose control and allowing the experts to capture video of the hacker at work [Article 15133].
(b) omission: The software failure incident does not align with the omission type of failure as the system did not omit to perform its intended functions at any instance mentioned in the article.
(c) timing: The software failure incident does not align with the timing type of failure as there is no mention of the system performing its intended functions too late or too early in the article.
(d) value: The software failure incident can be categorized as a value failure as the malware installed on the targeted computers searched for specific sensitive words like 'USA', 'NATO', 'Russia', and 'CIA' in documents, indicating that the system was performing its intended functions incorrectly by targeting specific content [Article 15133].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with the byzantine type of failure as there is no mention of the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions in the article.
(f) other: The software failure incident can be categorized as an 'other' type of failure due to the system's behavior of infecting the hacker with his own malware, taking control of his computer, capturing video of him at work, and obtaining sensitive information about the hacker's identity and connections [Article 15133]. |