| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the weak encryption system using a flawed random number generator developed by the NSA has happened again within the same organization, RSA. The incident involved RSA advising thousands of customers to stop using the encryption system due to the weak formula used in the toolkit for developers [21474].
(b) The incident also highlights the broader issue of similar vulnerabilities potentially existing in products and services of other organizations. The article mentions that the NSA pushed for a formula it knew it could break, and the NIST accepted this proposal in 2006 as one of four systems acceptable for government use. This indicates that similar incidents or vulnerabilities may have occurred in products or services of other organizations that relied on the same flawed encryption standards [21474]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where it is mentioned that the default random number generator in a toolkit for developers used a weak formula, leading to RSA advising customers to switch to other formulas in the product [21474].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the article where it discusses how the weakened pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) has potentially been used in products developed over the past seven years, indicating a failure in the operation or use of the system by developers and customers [21474]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the weak encryption system using a flawed random number generator was primarily due to contributing factors that originated from within the system itself. The flawed formula was part of the default random number generator in a toolkit for developers, which was developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and accepted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2006 [21474].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident was also influenced by contributing factors that originated from outside the system. The incident was exacerbated by the revelations from whistleblower Edward Snowden about the NSA's involvement in debasing encryption standards and pushing for a formula that it could exploit. This external influence led to the reevaluation of the cryptographic standards by NIST and raised concerns about the security implications of using the flawed random number generator [21474]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles is related to non-human actions, specifically the use of a weak formula in the default random number generator in a toolkit for developers. This weak formula was identified as a vulnerability that could potentially be exploited by entities like the NSA for hacking purposes. The incident highlights how the slow-moving standards process and industry practices could lead to users being exposed to such vulnerabilities for an extended period of time [21474].
(b) The software failure incident is also connected to human actions, particularly the involvement of the NSA in pushing for a formula in the cryptographic standards that it knew could be exploited. The whistleblower Edward Snowden's disclosures revealed how the NSA influenced the process for setting voluntary cryptography standards to include a formula that had weaknesses, potentially compromising the security of encryption systems. This human action of pushing for a vulnerable formula raised concerns about the integrity of the standards and the trustworthiness of the system [21474]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The article mentions that a major American computer security company advised thousands of customers to stop using an encryption system due to a weak default random number generator in a toolkit for developers [21474].
- The issue with the random number generator in the software was a contributing factor originating in hardware, as it relied on a mathematical formula developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) [21474].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The software failure incident was primarily due to a weak default random number generator in the software toolkit for developers, which was a software-related issue [21474].
- The article highlights how the encryption system's vulnerability was caused by a flaw in the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) standard used in the software, making the code crackable if the number sequences generated could be predicted [21474]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. It involves the deliberate weakening of an encryption system by the NSA, as revealed by Edward Snowden's disclosures. The NSA pushed for a weak formula in the encryption standards, which could potentially allow for exploitation and hacking by the NSA or other malicious actors. This deliberate act of introducing a vulnerability into the encryption system can be considered a malicious software failure incident [21474]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
The software failure incident described in the articles is related to poor decisions made by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) regarding the encryption standards. The NSA pushed for a weak formula in the cryptographic standards, which was known to have vulnerabilities or even a potential backdoor [21474]. This decision to promote a flawed algorithm for encryption standards can be considered a poor decision that contributed to the software failure incident. Additionally, the NIST accepted the weakened PRNG code in part because many government agencies were already using it, indicating a lack of thorough evaluation and oversight in the decision-making process [21474]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as it discusses how the National Security Agency (NSA) pushed for a weak formula to be included in the cryptographic standards, which was later found to have vulnerabilities. The article mentions that the NSA used its influence to promote a formula that it could break, leading to potential security risks for users. This highlights a failure in professional competence by the NSA in promoting a flawed encryption standard [21474].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also apparent in the article. It describes how the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) accepted the weak formula proposed by the NSA in 2006, partly because many government agencies were already using it. This acceptance of a potentially flawed algorithm suggests an accidental introduction of vulnerabilities into the cryptographic standards, which could have long-term consequences for security [21474]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as a **temporary** failure. This is evident from the fact that the incident was caused by the use of a weak formula in the default random number generator in a toolkit for developers, which led to the recommendation for customers to switch to other formulas in the product [21474]. The weakness in the encryption system was identified, and steps were taken to address the issue by advising against the use of the cryptographic standard and re-evaluating the formula [21474]. This indicates that the failure was due to specific circumstances related to the weak formula and not a permanent failure inherent in all circumstances. |
| Behaviour |
value |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The failure is related to a weakness in the encryption system's random number generator, which could potentially lead to the encryption being crackable [Article 21474].
(b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, the issue lies in the weakness of the random number generator used in the encryption system, which could compromise the security of the encryption [Article 21474].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The issue is with the vulnerability of the random number generator used in the encryption system, which could allow for the encryption to be cracked [Article 21474].
(d) value: The software failure incident is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Specifically, the weakness in the random number generator used in the encryption system could potentially make the encryption crackable, compromising its security [Article 21474].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The issue is more focused on the vulnerability of the random number generator used in the encryption system, which could be exploited to compromise the encryption's security [Article 21474].
(f) other: The software failure incident in the article is primarily related to a security vulnerability in the random number generator used in the encryption system. This vulnerability could potentially allow for the encryption to be cracked, compromising its security. The incident highlights concerns about the integrity of encryption standards and the potential for exploitation by entities like the NSA [Article 21474]. |