Published Date: 2014-07-31
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident happened in July 2014. [Article 28442, Article 28484] |
| System | 1. USB devices' firmware control chips were exploited, allowing for the installation of malicious software [28442, 31936, 28484]. 2. USB devices, including thumb drives and smartphones, were vulnerable to attacks due to the lack of security measures in the firmware [28442, 28484]. 3. USB controller chips made by manufacturers like Phison Electronics Corp were susceptible to reprogramming, leading to the spread of malware [28484]. 4. USB devices, such as keyboards, mice, and smartphones, were at risk of being infected and spreading malware due to the firmware vulnerability [28442, 28484]. 5. The USB technology itself was shown to have fundamental security flaws that allowed for undetectable attacks [28442, 28484]. |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Malicious actors who created and distributed the malware-infected USB devices, such as the BadUSB malware, were responsible for causing the software failure incident [28442, 31936, 28484]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Personal computers were impacted by the software failure incident involving USB devices [28442, 28484]. 2. A specific individual, an executive, had their computer infected by malware from a made in China e-cigarette when plugged into a USB port [31936]. |
| Software Causes | 1. The software cause of the failure incident was the discovery of a new class of attacks that evade all known security protections by loading malicious software onto USB control chips used in devices like thumb drives and smartphones [Article 28484]. 2. Another software cause was the proof-of-concept attack called "BadUSB," which involved reprogramming USB devices at the hardware level, allowing for the installation of malware on computers when infected USB devices were connected [Article 31936]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. USB devices' firmware being reprogrammable at the hardware level, allowing for the installation of malicious software [28442, 31936] 2. Lack of built-in shields against tampering with the code of USB control chips used in devices like thumb drives and smartphones [28484] |
| Impacts | 1. The software failure incident involving USB devices being used to hack into personal computers highlighted a new class of attacks that evade known security protections, as hackers could load malicious software onto USB control chips without detection by anti-virus programs [28484]. 2. The incident raised concerns about the security risks posed by USB devices, as the malware created, called BadUSB, could completely take over a PC, alter files, redirect internet traffic, and even impersonate a USB keyboard to execute commands [28442]. 3. The impacts of the incident extended beyond just thumb drives to include various USB devices like keyboards, mice, smartphones, and e-cigarettes, which could all potentially be compromised by malware embedded in their firmware [28442, 31936]. 4. The incident highlighted the vulnerability of USB devices to firmware reprogramming attacks, leading to calls for enterprises to consider disabling USB ports or using device management to allow only authorized devices, while consumers were advised to use trusted devices and run up-to-date anti-malware [31936]. 5. The incident underscored the need for manufacturers to improve the protection of USB controller chips to prevent unauthorized software changes, as the current lack of security measures made it easy for hackers to exploit these devices for malicious purposes [28484]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing code-signing protections on USB devices to ensure any new code added to the device has the unforgeable cryptographic signature of its manufacturer could have prevented the software failure incident [28442]. 2. Disabling USB ports in enterprises or using device management to allow only authorized devices could have helped prevent the incident [31936]. 3. Buying USB devices from respected manufacturers and checking for authenticity markers like "scratch checkers" on the box could have mitigated the risk of malware infections [31936]. 4. Manufacturers improving the protection of USB controller chips to prevent reprogramming at the hardware level could have prevented the incident [28484]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implementing code-signing protections on USB devices to ensure any new code added to the device has the unforgeable cryptographic signature of its manufacturer [28442]. 2. Disabling USB ports in enterprises or using device management to allow only authorized devices [31936]. 3. Buying from respected manufacturers such as Aspire, KangerTech, and Innokin for electronic devices like e-cigarettes to ensure safety [31936]. 4. Improving protection of USB controller chips by manufacturers to prevent reprogramming and exploitation by hackers [28484]. | References | 1. Security researchers Karsten Nohl and Jakob Lell [Article 28442] 2. Rik Ferguson, a security consultant for Trend Micro [Article 31936] 3. Dave Goss, of London’s Vape Emporium [Article 31936] 4. Berlin-based firm SRLabs [Article 31936] 5. Alex Chiu, an attorney with Phison Electronics Corp [Article 28484] 6. NSA spokeswoman [Article 28484] 7. Phison Electronics Corp [Article 28484] 8. Google Inc [Article 28484] 9. Silicon Motion Technology Corp [Article 28484] 10. Alcor Micro Corp [Article 28484] 11. Christof Paar, a professor of electrical engineering at Germany’s University of Bochum [Article 28484] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident related to USB devices being used to hack into personal computers has happened again within the same organization or with its products and services. The incident involved the discovery that USB devices such as keyboards, thumb-drives, and mice can be used to hack into personal computers by loading malicious software onto USB control chips [Article 28484]. (b) The software failure incident related to USB devices being used to spread malware has also happened at other organizations or with their products and services. For example, e-cigarettes have become a new vector for malicious software, with reports of malware being hardcoded into e-cigarette chargers that infect computers when plugged into USB ports [Article 31936]. This incident highlights the potential risks associated with using USB devices from untrustworthy suppliers. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the articles. The incident involves a significant security flaw in USB devices that stems from the design of the devices themselves. Security researchers discovered that the firmware controlling the basic functions of USB devices can be reprogrammed to hide attack code, allowing malware to infect computers undetectably [Article 28442]. This flaw in the design of USB devices poses a serious threat as it allows for the installation of malicious software that can take over a PC, alter files, redirect internet traffic, and even act as a man-in-the-middle for spying on communications. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also present in the articles. One specific example is the case of e-cigarettes being used as a vector for malicious software. A report highlighted how an e-cigarette charger from an untrustworthy supplier had malware hardcoded into it, which infected a user's computer when plugged into a USB port, demonstrating the risks associated with the operation and use of such devices [Article 31936]. This incident showcases how the operation of seemingly harmless devices can lead to unexpected software failures and security breaches. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system, outside_system | (a) within_system: - The software failure incident discussed in the articles is related to USB devices being used as a vector for malware attacks. The malware, known as BadUSB, can be installed on a USB device to take over a PC, alter files, redirect internet traffic, and perform various malicious activities [Article 28442]. - Security researchers discovered that USB firmware, which controls the basic functions of USB devices, can be reprogrammed to hide attack code, making it difficult to detect and remove malware from infected USB devices [Article 28442]. - The attack method involves writing malicious code onto USB control chips used in thumb drives and smartphones, allowing the malware to log keystrokes, spy on communications, and destroy data when the infected USB device is connected to a computer [Article 28484]. (b) outside_system: - The software failure incident is also influenced by factors originating from outside the system, such as the physical access of USB devices to computers. For example, e-cigarettes that can be charged via USB were reported to have malware hardcoded into the charger, leading to infections when plugged into a computer's USB port [Article 31936]. - The incident highlights the risk posed by untrustworthy suppliers who may introduce malware into USB devices, exploiting the physical connection between the devices and computers [Article 31936]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The articles discuss the BadUSB malware, which is a type of malicious software that resides in the firmware of USB devices, allowing it to take over a PC, alter files, redirect internet traffic, and perform various malicious activities without the need for human intervention [28442, 31936, 28484]. - The BadUSB malware can be installed on a USB device and can remain hidden in the firmware, making it difficult to detect even after the device's memory appears to be deleted [28442]. - The malware can spread undetectably from USB devices to computers and vice versa, highlighting a vulnerability in USB technology that can be exploited without human interaction [28442]. - The incident involving e-cigarettes being used as a vector for malware also demonstrates how non-human actions, such as malware hardcoded into the charger of an e-cigarette, can lead to software failures when the device is connected to a computer [31936]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The articles mention that security researchers have been able to write malicious code onto USB control chips used in thumb drives and smartphones, which can then infect computers when the tainted USB devices are connected. This action involves human intervention in creating and deploying the malware onto the USB devices [28484]. - The potential for attacks using USB devices involves human actions in terms of creating and executing the malicious code that can exploit vulnerabilities in USB technology [28484]. - Recommendations for users to only use trusted devices and to run up-to-date anti-malware software suggest that human actions, such as making informed choices about device purchases and security measures, can help mitigate the risks associated with software failures caused by malware-infected USB devices [31936]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The articles discuss a software failure incident related to USB devices being used as a vector for malware infections due to vulnerabilities in the hardware components. Specifically, the firmware that controls the basic functions of USB devices can be reprogrammed to hide attack code, leading to potential security breaches [Article 28442]. - The incident involving e-cigarettes being used to spread malicious software also highlights a hardware-related software failure. Malware was hardcoded into the charger of an e-cigarette, and when plugged into a computer's USB port, the malware infected the system, showcasing how hardware components can introduce software vulnerabilities [Article 31936]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The articles also mention software failures originating from vulnerabilities in the software itself. For example, the incident involving USB devices being used to hack into personal computers reveals how malicious software can be loaded onto USB control chips, allowing for keystroke logging, spying on communications, and data destruction once the infected USB device is connected to a computer [Article 28484]. - The concept of "BadUSB" involves reprogramming USB devices at the hardware level, showcasing a software failure incident where the software controlling the USB devices can be manipulated to carry out malicious activities [Article 31936]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious, non-malicious | (a) The articles discuss software failure incidents related to malicious intent: 1. The articles describe how USB devices can be used as a vector for malicious software, such as the BadUSB malware, which can be installed on a USB device to take over a PC, alter files, redirect internet traffic, and perform various malicious activities [28442, 31936]. 2. Researchers have demonstrated attacks where malicious code is written onto USB control chips used in thumb drives and smartphones, allowing for activities like logging keystrokes, spying on communications, and destroying data when the infected USB device is connected to a computer [28484]. (b) The articles also mention software failure incidents that are non-malicious in nature: 1. The articles mention incidents where e-cigarettes, which can be charged over USB, have been found to contain malware hardcoded into the charger, leading to infections when plugged into a computer's USB port [31936]. 2. The articles highlight how USB firmware, which controls the basic functions of USB devices, can be reprogrammed to hide attack code, leading to potential security vulnerabilities without the user's knowledge [28442]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions, accidental_decisions | From the provided articles, the software failure incident related to the USB devices and e-cigarettes can be attributed to both poor decisions and accidental decisions. (a) poor_decisions: - The incident involving USB devices being used to hack into personal computers was a result of poor decisions in the design and implementation of USB firmware that allowed for malicious software to be loaded onto USB control chips, leading to serious security vulnerabilities [Article 28484]. - The lack of code-signing restrictions and trusted USB firmware to verify the authenticity of code added to USB devices contributed to the vulnerability exploited by the BadUSB attack, highlighting poor decisions in the security design of USB devices [Article 28442]. (b) accidental_decisions: - The incident where e-cigarettes were found to be a vector for malicious software was an unintended consequence of using USB ports for charging, allowing for malware to be hardcoded into the charger and infect computers when connected [Article 31936]. - The accidental decision of trusting an e-cigarette charger from an untrustworthy supplier led to a malware infection on a computer, showcasing how unintended decisions can result in software failure incidents [Article 31936]. Therefore, the software failure incidents discussed in the articles involved a combination of poor decisions in security design and accidental decisions in trusting devices that led to vulnerabilities and malware infections. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence, accidental | (a) The articles discuss a software failure incident related to development incompetence. In Article 28442, security researchers Karsten Nohl and Jakob Lell discovered a major flaw in USB devices' firmware that allowed for the creation of malicious software called BadUSB. This flaw was not due to traditional malware infections but rather a fundamental issue in how USB devices were designed, highlighting a lack of professional competence in ensuring the security of USB devices [28442]. (b) The incident can also be categorized as accidental. In Article 31936, it is reported that e-cigarettes have become a vector for malicious software due to malware hardcoded into the charger of a cheap e-cigarette from an untrustworthy supplier. This incident was accidental as the user suffered a malware infection on their computer unknowingly due to the e-cigarette charger, highlighting how accidental factors can introduce software failures [31936]. |
| Duration | permanent | The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as a permanent failure. The incident involves a fundamental flaw in the design of USB devices, specifically in the firmware that controls their basic functions. This flaw allows for the installation of malicious software, such as BadUSB, which can lead to a complete takeover of a PC, alteration of files, redirection of internet traffic, and various other malicious activities [28442]. The attack code can remain hidden even after files on the device appear to be deleted, making it extremely difficult to detect and counter without significant changes in how USB devices are used and trusted [28442]. Additionally, the incident involves the reprogramming of USB devices at the hardware level, allowing for the installation of malware that can log keystrokes, spy on communications, and destroy data once the infected device is connected to a computer. This attack method, known as BadUSB, poses a serious threat to the security of both personal and business computers [28484]. These articles highlight that the software failure incident related to USB devices is not a temporary issue caused by specific circumstances but rather a permanent flaw in the design and security of USB devices that can be exploited by malicious actors. |
| Behaviour | crash, omission, value, other | (a) crash: - Article 28442 discusses a software failure incident related to USB devices being used to hack into personal computers, leading to a potential new class of attacks that evade known security protections. The malicious software loaded onto USB control chips can log keystrokes, spy on communications, and destroy data once the USB device is attached to a computer. This behavior can be considered a form of crashing the system by causing it to lose its state and not perform its intended functions [28442]. (b) omission: - The incident described in Article 31936 involves e-cigarettes being used as a vector for malicious software. In one case, an individual unknowingly plugged an e-cigarette charger into a computer's USB port, leading to a malware infection on the system. This failure can be categorized as an omission, where the system omits to perform its intended functions of protecting against malware when a potentially harmful device is connected [31936]. (c) timing: - There is no specific information in the provided articles that directly relates to a software failure incident caused by timing issues. (d) value: - The software failure incident discussed in Article 28484 involves USB devices being used to hack into personal computers by loading malicious software onto USB control chips. This attack results in the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, such as logging keystrokes, spying on communications, and destroying data. This behavior aligns with a failure due to the system performing its functions incorrectly [28484]. (e) byzantine: - The incidents described in the provided articles do not directly relate to a software failure incident caused by the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: - The software failure incidents discussed in the articles involve USB devices and e-cigarettes being used as vectors for malicious software, leading to security vulnerabilities and potential attacks on personal computers. These incidents can be considered as a form of security breach or exploitation, where the system is compromised by external threats, which may fall under the category of "other" behavior in terms of software failure incidents. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | None | None |
| Communication | None | None |
| Application | None | None |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | property, non-human, theoretical_consequence | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - No information about people losing their lives due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - No information about people being physically harmed due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - No information about people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incidents described in the articles impacted people's property in terms of potential malware infections on USB devices, leading to compromised computers and potential data loss [28442, 31936, 28484]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - No information about people having to postpone an activity due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incidents described in the articles impacted non-human entities such as computers, USB devices, and electronic cigarettes [28442, 31936, 28484]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The articles clearly outlined the consequences of the software failure incidents, particularly related to potential malware infections and security vulnerabilities associated with USB devices. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles discussed potential consequences of the software failures, such as the ability for malware to spread undetectably from USB to PC and vice versa, as well as the potential for compromised USB devices to be used for malicious activities [28442, 31936, 28484]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - No other consequences of the software failure were mentioned in the articles. |
| Domain | information, manufacturing, finance, government | (a) The articles discuss software failures related to the production and distribution of information. For example, Article 28442 talks about how USB devices can be used to hack into personal computers, potentially evading all known security protections, which can lead to the compromise of sensitive information [Article 28442]. (b) The transportation industry is not directly mentioned in the articles. (c) The natural resources industry is not directly mentioned in the articles. (d) The sales industry is not directly mentioned in the articles. (e) The construction industry is not directly mentioned in the articles. (f) The manufacturing industry is indirectly mentioned in the articles. The articles discuss how USB devices, including those used in manufacturing processes, can be exploited to carry out malicious activities, potentially impacting the security of manufacturing operations [Article 28484]. (g) The utilities industry is not directly mentioned in the articles. (h) The finance industry is indirectly mentioned in the articles. The articles discuss the potential risks posed by USB devices that can be used to hack into personal computers, which could have implications for financial transactions and data security [Article 28484]. (i) The knowledge industry is not directly mentioned in the articles. (j) The health industry is not directly mentioned in the articles. (k) The entertainment industry is not directly mentioned in the articles. (l) The government industry is indirectly mentioned in the articles. The articles discuss the potential security threats posed by USB devices that can be exploited to compromise government systems and sensitive information [Article 28442]. (m) The articles do not directly mention any other specific industry related to the software failure incidents. |
Article ID: 28442
Article ID: 31936
Article ID: 28484