| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems has happened again at the same organization. Security researcher Ruben Santamarta discovered vulnerabilities in the satellite communications equipment on passenger jets through their WiFi and inflight entertainment systems [29208]. Similarly, Chris Roberts, founder of OneWorldLabs, also identified susceptibilities in the system passengers use to watch television at their seats and shared his findings with the federal government [34374].
(b) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems has also happened at multiple organizations. The vulnerabilities were found in SATCOM technologies manufactured by some of the world's largest companies, as highlighted by Ruben Santamarta [34374]. Additionally, the research by Santamarta and Roberts showed that the vulnerabilities exist within the In-Flight Entertainment systems on both Panasonic and Thales installations, the two main providers of these systems across a wide variety of planes [34374]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The articles highlight a software failure incident related to the design phase. Security researchers Ruben Santamarta and Chris Roberts discovered vulnerabilities in the in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems of planes, which could potentially allow hackers to gain control of critical systems on aircraft [34374, 29208]. These vulnerabilities were identified through reverse engineering of firmware used to operate communications equipment, indicating flaws introduced during the design and development phases of the systems. The use of weak encryption algorithms, insecure protocols, and hardcoded login credentials were among the design flaws that could be exploited by hackers to compromise the safety and navigation systems of planes.
(b) Additionally, the articles suggest a software failure incident related to the operation phase. The vulnerabilities discovered by Santamarta and Roberts could be exploited through the operation of the in-flight entertainment systems and Wi-Fi networks on planes [34374, 29208]. If successfully hacked, these systems could potentially disrupt or modify satellite communications, interfering with the aircraft's navigation and safety systems. This indicates that the operation or misuse of the systems, such as unauthorized access through Wi-Fi signals, could lead to critical failures in the aircraft's communication and control systems. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to vulnerabilities within the in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems of planes. Security researchers like Ruben Santamarta and Chris Roberts discovered weaknesses in these systems that could allow hackers to gain privileged access to critical equipment on aircraft, potentially leading to the ability to intercept, manipulate, or block communications, and even remotely take control of the physical devices [34374, 29208]. These vulnerabilities were found to exist in the SATCOM technologies manufactured by major companies, indicating flaws within the systems themselves that could be exploited by hackers [34374].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident also involves contributing factors originating from outside the system, such as the actions of hackers or cyber attackers who exploit the vulnerabilities within the in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems. The hackers could potentially use a plane's onboard Wi-Fi signal or inflight entertainment system to hack into its avionics equipment, disrupting or modifying satellite communications and interfering with the aircraft's navigation and safety systems [29208]. The vulnerabilities discovered by the security researchers highlight the external threat posed by hackers who could exploit weaknesses in the systems from outside the aircraft. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- The articles discuss vulnerabilities in the in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems of planes that could potentially be exploited by hackers without human participation [34374, 29208].
- Security researcher Ruben Santamarta discovered vulnerabilities in the satellite communications equipment on passenger jets through their WiFi and inflight entertainment systems, which could allow hackers to disrupt or modify satellite communications without human involvement [29208].
- The vulnerabilities were found in the firmware used to operate communications equipment made by various companies, allowing potential access to critical systems on the aircraft [29208].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- The articles mention that security researchers like Chris Roberts and Ruben Santamarta discovered vulnerabilities in the in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems, which could be exploited by hackers through human actions such as reverse engineering and decoding specialized software [34374, 29208].
- The use of hardcoded login credentials in the equipment from various manufacturers was highlighted as a vulnerability that could be exploited by hackers through human actions to access sensitive systems [29208].
- The researchers decided to go public with their findings to encourage manufacturers to fix the security flaws, indicating a proactive human action in response to the identified vulnerabilities [29208]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The articles discuss vulnerabilities in satellite communications equipment used on aircraft, which could be exploited by hackers through Wi-Fi and inflight entertainment systems [29208].
- The vulnerabilities include the use of 'hardcoded' log-in credentials in the equipment from various manufacturers, allowing unauthorized access to critical systems [29208].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The software failure incident is primarily related to software vulnerabilities in the in-flight entertainment systems and satellite communications systems on aircraft, which could be exploited by hackers to gain control of the systems [34374, 29208].
- The vulnerabilities in the software systems could potentially allow hackers to intercept, manipulate, block communications, and even remotely take control of the physical devices on the aircraft [34374].
- The flaws in the software systems could lead to unauthorized access to the Satellite Data Unit and other critical systems on the aircraft, posing significant risks to aviation security [34374].
- The software vulnerabilities identified by security researchers could allow hackers to disrupt or modify satellite communications, interfering with the aircraft's navigation and safety systems [29208]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The objective of the software failure incident was malicious, as it involved vulnerabilities discovered by security researchers that could potentially allow hackers to gain control of aircraft systems through the in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems. The vulnerabilities could be exploited by hackers to intercept, manipulate, block communications, and even remotely take control of the physical devices, posing a serious threat to aviation security [34374, 29208]. The security researchers highlighted these vulnerabilities to encourage manufacturers to address the risky security flaws in the systems.
(b) The software failure incident was non-malicious in the sense that the vulnerabilities were discovered by security researchers through reverse engineering and controlled testing in laboratory environments. The researchers aimed to raise awareness about the security flaws and prompt manufacturers to fix the vulnerabilities to prevent potential cyber attacks on aircraft systems. The researchers acknowledged that their hacks were tested in controlled environments and might be difficult to replicate in the real world [29208]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions can be seen in the articles. The vulnerabilities in the in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems were discovered by security researchers like Chris Roberts and Ruben Santamarta [34374, 29208]. These vulnerabilities allowed hackers to potentially gain control of the aircraft's systems, intercept communications, and even remotely take control of the physical device. Despite these serious risks, the response from airplane manufacturers and companies providing the systems was lacking. Chris Roberts mentioned that most companies did not engage in any meaningful manner to address the identified issues [34374].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental decisions or mistakes is evident in the articles as well. The vulnerabilities in the systems were not intentional but were discovered through reverse engineering and research conducted by security analysts like Ruben Santamarta [34374, 29208]. These vulnerabilities were not deliberately introduced but existed due to flaws in the design and implementation of the systems. Additionally, the hardcoded login credentials found in the equipment from multiple manufacturers were a result of poor security practices rather than intentional actions [29208]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence:
- The articles highlight vulnerabilities in the in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems of planes, which could potentially be exploited by hackers to take control of the aircraft systems [34374, 29208].
- Security researchers like Ruben Santamarta and Chris Roberts discovered flaws in the systems that could allow unauthorized access and control of critical components of the aircraft [34374, 29208].
- The vulnerabilities were attributed to weak encryption algorithms, insecure protocols, and hardcoded login credentials in the SATCOM technologies used by major aviation communications companies [34374, 29208].
- Despite the researchers sharing their findings with the federal government and aviation companies, there was a lack of meaningful engagement to address the identified issues, indicating a potential lack of response to the reported vulnerabilities [34374].
(b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally:
- The vulnerabilities in the aircraft systems were discovered through reverse engineering and controlled testing in laboratory environments by security researchers like Ruben Santamarta [29208].
- The researchers acknowledged that their hacks were tested in controlled settings and might be difficult to replicate in the real world, suggesting that the vulnerabilities were not intentionally introduced but rather discovered through research efforts [29208].
- Representatives from companies like Cobham, Harris, Hughes, and Iridium downplayed the risks associated with the vulnerabilities, indicating that they may not have intentionally introduced these weaknesses but were made aware of them through external research [29208]. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
From the provided articles, the software failure incident related to the vulnerability in the in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems on planes can be categorized as both permanent and temporary:
(a) Permanent Failure:
- The vulnerabilities in the in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems, as highlighted by security researchers like Ruben Santamarta and Chris Roberts, represent a permanent failure as these flaws are inherent in the systems and can potentially be exploited by hackers indefinitely [34374, 29208].
- The hardcoded login credentials and other vulnerabilities identified in the firmware of the communication equipment indicate a permanent failure that could persist unless addressed by the manufacturers [29208].
(b) Temporary Failure:
- The temporary aspect of the failure can be seen in the sense that the vulnerabilities were discovered by researchers like Ruben Santamarta and Chris Roberts, and there is a window of opportunity for these issues to be addressed and patched by the manufacturers to mitigate the risks [34374, 29208].
- The fact that the vulnerabilities were identified in controlled environments and have not been confirmed to be practically exploitable in the real world suggests a temporary nature of the failure until further exploitation or mitigation measures are taken [29208]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The articles describe potential vulnerabilities in the in-flight entertainment and satellite communications systems that could allow hackers to potentially take control of the aircraft's systems, including the ability to turn off engines at 35,000 feet without alerting the cockpit [34374]. This type of failure could lead to a system crash where the software loses its state and fails to perform its intended functions.
(b) omission: The articles mention that a hacker could potentially hack into the avionics equipment through the onboard Wi-Fi signal or inflight entertainment system, which could disrupt or modify satellite communications, interfering with the aircraft's navigation and safety systems [29208]. This indicates a potential omission failure where the system omits to perform its intended functions at instances.
(c) timing: There is no specific mention of a timing-related failure in the articles.
(d) value: The articles discuss vulnerabilities in the satellite communications equipment that could allow hackers to access critical systems relying on satellite communications for navigation and safety [29208]. If exploited, this could lead to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, indicating a value failure.
(e) byzantine: The articles do not explicitly mention a byzantine behavior of the software failure incident.
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident described in the articles includes potential unauthorized access to critical systems, interception, manipulation, blocking of communications, and the ability to remotely take control of physical devices [34374]. This could be categorized as an "unauthorized access" behavior in addition to the mentioned options. |