| Recurring |
multiple_organization |
The articles do not mention any specific software failure incident happening again at the same organization or with its products and services (option a). However, they do discuss the broader issue of missile defense systems, including Iron Dome, facing challenges and not performing as effectively as claimed. This indicates that similar incidents of performance issues with missile defense systems have been observed at multiple organizations or in different contexts (option b) [28376]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the case of the Iron Dome missile defense system. The system, designed to intercept and destroy incoming rockets, has been found to have a low success rate in actually destroying the targeted rockets. This failure in design is highlighted by the analysis conducted by experts like Ted Postol and Richard Lloyd, who question the high success rate claimed by the Israeli government [28376].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the Iron Dome defense system can be categorized as within_system. The failure of the Iron Dome missile defense system to effectively intercept and destroy incoming rockets was attributed to factors within the system itself. The analysis by experts such as Ted Postol and Richard Lloyd highlighted issues with the system's performance, indicating that only about 5% of engagements resulted in successful interception, while the majority of interceptions either missed entirely or lightly damaged the enemy munition [28376]. Postol's analysis of amateur videos and photos of Iron Dome interceptions over the years suggested that the system's performance had not significantly improved, indicating internal challenges within the system's design and functionality. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident related to non-human actions in the Iron Dome defense system is primarily attributed to the system's technical limitations and performance issues. The failure to intercept and destroy incoming rockets is described as a result of the radar-guided Iron Dome missile system working only a small fraction of the time, with evidence suggesting that only about 5 percent of engagements result in successful interception [28376]. This indicates a failure in the system's automated processes and technical capabilities rather than human actions.
(b) On the other hand, the article also mentions the Israeli government's response to criticisms of Iron Dome's effectiveness. The government dismisses studies questioning the system's success rate and emphasizes the system's role in saving lives by intercepting rockets [28376]. This highlights the human actions involved in defending the system's reputation and justifying its performance, despite technical evidence suggesting otherwise. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The article discusses the failure of the Iron Dome missile defense system to effectively intercept and destroy incoming rockets due to hardware-related issues. The system, which consists of radar arrays, launchers, and missiles, has been found to have a low success rate in destroying targeted rockets. This failure is attributed to the difficulty of guiding a missile to strike another missile accurately, which is a hardware-related challenge [28376].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The article does not specifically mention any software-related failures contributing to the issues with the Iron Dome missile defense system. The focus is primarily on the hardware aspects of the system, such as the radar-guided missiles and launchers. Therefore, there is no information provided in the article about software-related contributing factors to the failure incident. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident related to the Iron Dome defense system does not appear to be malicious. The failure is attributed to technical challenges and limitations of the system rather than intentional harm introduced by humans. The incident is described as a result of the system's inability to effectively intercept and destroy incoming rockets, with experts questioning the high success rate claimed by the Israeli government [28376]. The failure is mainly attributed to the difficulty of guiding a missile to intercept another missile, highlighting the complexity of the task rather than any malicious intent behind the failure. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
The software failure incident related to the Iron Dome defense system does not directly involve software failures in terms of poor decisions or accidental decisions. The failure discussed in the articles is related to the effectiveness and performance of the missile interception system itself, rather than being attributed to software-related issues caused by poor or accidental decisions. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the case of the Iron Dome missile defense system. The system, designed to intercept and destroy incoming rockets, has been found to have a very low success rate in actually destroying the targeted rockets. A detailed analysis by scientists at MIT, funded by reputable foundations, revealed that only about 5 percent of Iron Dome engagements result in the destruction or sufficient damage of the incoming rocket [28376].
Furthermore, experts like Ted Postol and Richard Lloyd have conducted studies questioning the high success rate claimed by the Israeli government. Postol, in particular, based his conclusions on amateur videos and photos of Iron Dome interceptions, indicating that the system's performance has not significantly improved over the years. This discrepancy between the actual performance of the system and the claims made by the Israeli government points towards a failure in accurately representing the capabilities of the software due to potential development incompetence [28376].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is not explicitly mentioned in the articles provided. Therefore, there is no specific information available to suggest that the failure of the Iron Dome missile defense system was due to accidental factors. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident related to the Iron Dome defense system discussed in the article is more of a temporary failure rather than a permanent one. The article highlights that the Iron Dome missile defense system has a low success rate in intercepting and destroying incoming rockets from Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups. The failure is attributed to the fact that in about 95% of cases, the interceptor either misses the target entirely or only lightly damages the enemy munition, allowing the rocket's intact warhead to continue towards the ground [28376].
This temporary failure is due to specific circumstances such as the difficulty of guiding a missile to strike a particular spot on another missile, the challenging nature of rocket-on-rocket interceptions, and the limitations of the technology involved in the Iron Dome system. Despite the significant investment in the system's development and deployment, the effectiveness of the Iron Dome in intercepting rockets is questioned by experts and analysts, indicating a temporary failure in achieving the desired outcome of destroying incoming rockets effectively. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value |
(a) crash: The Iron Dome missile defense system was reported to have a low success rate in intercepting rockets fired by Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups. The system failed to destroy or sufficiently damage the targeted rockets in the majority of cases, allowing the rockets to continue towards their intended targets [28376].
(b) omission: The Iron Dome system was found to have a low success rate in intercepting incoming rockets, with only about 5 percent of engagements resulting in the destruction or sufficient damage to the targeted rocket. In the other 95 percent of cases, the interceptor either missed entirely or lightly damaged the enemy munition, leading to the rocket's intact warhead continuing towards the ground [28376].
(c) timing: The Iron Dome system was criticized for its performance in intercepting rockets, with concerns raised about the timing of the interceptions. The system was described as needing to strike an incoming rocket head-on to wreck its warhead and minimize the rocket's destructive potential. If the interceptor hit the back end of the target rocket, it would have essentially no effect on the outcome of the engagement, allowing the rocket to still fall in the defended area and the warhead to explode [28376].
(d) value: The effectiveness of the Iron Dome system was questioned, with experts and studies suggesting that the system's high success rate claimed by the Israeli government might be exaggerated. There were doubts raised about the system's actual ability to save lives and prevent casualties from rocket attacks, indicating a discrepancy between the perceived value of the system and its actual performance [28376].
(e) byzantine: The Iron Dome system's behavior was not specifically described as exhibiting inconsistent responses or interactions in the articles provided.
(f) other: The Iron Dome system was reported to have faced criticism regarding its performance and effectiveness in intercepting rockets. Despite the significant investment in the system and the claims of a high success rate by the Israeli government, experts and studies raised doubts about the system's actual impact on preventing casualties from rocket attacks. The discrepancy between the reported success rate and the system's actual performance could be considered as a form of misleading behavior or misrepresentation of the system's capabilities [28376]. |