| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to Facebook's privacy settings being exploited by a software engineer to harvest data about users has happened again within the same organization. Reza Moaiandin, the software engineer who discovered the flaw, alerted Facebook to the vulnerability in April through its "bug bounty" scheme and then again on 28 July, indicating a recurrence of the incident within Facebook itself [38700].
(b) The incident highlights a potential vulnerability that could be exploited by hackers to build databases of users for sale on internet black markets, indicating a broader risk for multiple organizations that handle user data. Security experts emphasized the need for tighter privacy settings to prevent the widescale hoovering up of data, suggesting that similar incidents could potentially occur in other organizations that may have similar loopholes in their systems [38700]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to design factors introduced during the system development phase. The incident occurred because of a loophole in Facebook's privacy settings that allowed a software engineer to harvest data about thousands of users by exploiting a little-known privacy setting that allowed anyone to find a Facebook user by typing their phone number into the social network [38700]. This design flaw in the default setting of the "Who can find me?" feature enabled the engineer to generate tens of thousands of mobile numbers and retrieve users' profiles within minutes, highlighting a failure in the system's design that left it open to abuse.
(b) The software failure incident can also be linked to operational factors introduced by the misuse of the system. The software engineer exploited the loophole in Facebook's privacy settings by sending generated mobile numbers to Facebook's API, a tool that allows developers to build apps linked to the social network. This misuse of the system's functionality allowed the engineer to access scores of users' profiles within minutes, showcasing how operational misuse can lead to significant data breaches and privacy violations [38700]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to a loophole in Facebook's privacy settings that allowed a software engineer to harvest data about thousands of users by exploiting a little-known privacy setting within Facebook's system. The engineer was able to generate mobile numbers and send them to Facebook's API, which then provided him with users' profiles. This loophole within Facebook's system allowed for the unauthorized access to users' data [38700].
(b) outside_system: The incident also involved external factors such as the actions of the software engineer who discovered the flaw and exploited it to gather data. The engineer's algorithm and actions were external to Facebook's system but were able to interact with the system due to the loophole in the privacy settings. Additionally, the potential implications of this loophole, such as the creation of databases for sale on internet black markets, involve external threats and risks to Facebook's system [38700]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to a loophole in Facebook's privacy settings that allowed a software engineer to harvest data about thousands of users by exploiting a little-known privacy setting that allowed anyone to find a Facebook user by typing their phone number into the social network. This loophole was a contributing factor introduced without human participation [38700].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
On the other hand, the incident also involved human actions as the software engineer, Reza Moaiandin, discovered and exploited the flaw in Facebook's privacy settings. He actively used an algorithm to generate tens of thousands of mobile numbers a second and sent them to Facebook's API to obtain users' profiles. Additionally, the software engineer reported the vulnerability to Facebook through its bug bounty scheme, indicating human involvement in both discovering and addressing the issue [38700]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident in the provided article is not related to hardware issues. It primarily revolves around a privacy loophole in Facebook's software that allowed a software engineer to harvest data about users by exploiting a privacy setting and using Facebook's API [38700].
(b) The software failure incident is directly related to software issues. The incident occurred due to a flaw in Facebook's software that allowed the software engineer to exploit a privacy setting and gather data about users on a large scale [38700]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the articles can be categorized as malicious. The incident involved a software engineer who exploited a loophole in Facebook's privacy settings to harvest data about thousands of users by guessing their mobile numbers. The engineer used a simple algorithm to generate tens of thousands of mobile numbers a second and sent them to Facebook's API to obtain users' profiles on a large scale. This act was intentional and aimed at gathering users' information without their consent for potential abuse or sale on the black market [38700]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was related to poor_decisions. The incident occurred because of a loophole in Facebook's privacy settings that allowed a software engineer to harvest data about thousands of users by exploiting a little-known privacy setting that allowed anyone to find a Facebook user by typing their phone number into the social network. This default setting, which allowed anyone to find users by their mobile numbers, even if the users had chosen to withhold their mobile numbers from their public profiles, contributed to the vulnerability [38700]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was related to development incompetence. A software engineer was able to harvest data about thousands of Facebook users simply by guessing their mobile numbers due to a flaw in Facebook's privacy settings. The engineer exploited a little-known privacy setting that allowed anyone to find a Facebook user by typing their phone number into the social network. This flaw was a result of the development team's failure to properly secure user data and privacy settings, leading to a significant breach of user information [38700].
(b) The software failure incident was not accidental but rather a result of a deliberate exploitation of a loophole in Facebook's privacy settings by the software engineer. The engineer intentionally generated tens of thousands of mobile numbers a second and sent them to Facebook's API to obtain users' profiles. This deliberate action highlights the intentional nature of the incident rather than it being accidental [38700]. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles seems to be more of a permanent nature. The incident was related to a loophole in Facebook's privacy settings that allowed a software engineer to harvest data about thousands of users by exploiting a little-known privacy setting [38700]. This loophole, which allowed anyone to find a Facebook user by typing their phone number into the social network, was a fundamental flaw in the system that could potentially lead to the widescale hoovering up of data by hackers [38700].
The fact that the default setting for the privacy feature was set to Everyone/public, allowing anyone to find a user by their mobile number even if the user had chosen to withhold their number from their public profile, indicates a systemic issue in the design of the software [38700]. Additionally, the software engineer was able to generate tens of thousands of mobile numbers a second and access scores of users' profiles within minutes, highlighting a significant vulnerability in the system that could be exploited on a large scale [38700].
Overall, the incident points towards a permanent failure in the software system due to inherent design flaws and vulnerabilities that allowed unauthorized access to user data. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The incident described in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and stops performing its intended functions [Article 38700].
(b) omission: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as an omission where the system omits to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). In this case, the software engineer was able to exploit a loophole in Facebook's privacy settings to harvest data about users who had chosen not to make their mobile numbers public, indicating an omission in the system's privacy controls [Article 38700].
(c) timing: The incident does not involve a timing failure where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early [Article 38700].
(d) value: The software failure incident can be classified as a value failure where the system performs its intended functions incorrectly. In this case, the flaw in Facebook's privacy settings allowed the software engineer to access users' data that they had chosen to keep private, indicating a failure in correctly handling the privacy settings [Article 38700].
(e) byzantine: The incident does not exhibit a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [Article 38700].
(f) other: The other behavior exhibited in this software failure incident is a loophole exploitation. The software engineer exploited a little-known privacy setting in Facebook that allowed him to harvest data about users by guessing their mobile numbers, showcasing a vulnerability in the system that was not intended or designed for such data harvesting [Article 38700]. |