| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the Lifx smart LED bulbs being hacked into their Wi-Fi network by security experts in England is specific to the Lifx organization. This incident involved a vulnerability in Lifx's mesh networking protocol that allowed hackers to exploit the system and gain access to Wi-Fi credentials [28480]. The vulnerability was identified and reported by Context, a UK-based consulting firm specializing in security, prompting Lifx to release a firmware update to address the issue.
(b) There is no information in the provided article indicating that a similar software failure incident has happened at other organizations or with their products and services. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to the design phase. The security experts hacked into a smart home's Wi-Fi network by exploiting a weakness within Lifx's mesh networking protocol. This weakness allowed them to pose as a new slave bulb and trick the master bulb into sending them Wi-Fi credentials. The vulnerability stemmed from the design of the networking protocol and the encryption/decryption process used by Lifx bulbs, which the hackers were able to reverse-engineer and exploit [28480].
(b) The software failure incident does not seem to be directly related to the operation phase or misuse of the system. The vulnerability was a result of a design flaw in the networking protocol and encryption method used by Lifx bulbs, rather than any operational misuse of the system by users. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident in this case was within the system. The security vulnerability that allowed hackers to access the smart home's Wi-Fi network originated from within the Lifx smart LED bulbs themselves. The hackers were able to exploit a weakness in Lifx's mesh networking protocol, posing as a new slave bulb and tricking the master bulb into sharing Wi-Fi credentials. Additionally, the decryption protocol used by Lifx bulbs was a global one, making it easier for hackers to decrypt the credentials and potentially access any network using Lifx bulbs [28480]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to non-human actions. The security experts from Context were able to hack into the smart home's Wi-Fi network by exploiting a weakness within Lifx's mesh networking protocol. They posed as a new slave bulb and tricked the master bulb into sending them Wi-Fi credentials, gaining access to the network. The decryption protocol used by Lifx bulbs to decode these credentials was a global one, making it vulnerable to exploitation by hackers [28480].
(b) However, it is important to note that the vulnerability exploited by the security experts was introduced by human actions, specifically the design and implementation of the Lifx mesh networking protocol and encryption methods. The firmware fix issued by Lifx after being informed by Context demonstrates a proactive response to address the vulnerability introduced by human actions [28480]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to a hardware-related vulnerability in the Lifx smart LED bulbs. The security experts were able to hack into the smart home's Wi-Fi network by exploiting a weakness within Lifx's mesh networking protocol, specifically targeting the communication between the master and slave bulbs. This hardware vulnerability allowed the hackers to trick the master bulb into sharing Wi-Fi credentials with a fake slave bulb, compromising the network security [28480].
(b) The software failure incident also had contributing factors originating in software. The vulnerability exploited by the security experts was related to the encryption and decryption protocols used by the Lifx bulbs. The hackers were able to decrypt the Wi-Fi credentials rather easily using Lifx's own reverse-engineered firmware. Additionally, the decryption protocol used by Lifx bulbs was a global one, making it a significant software-related weakness that could potentially allow access to any network using Lifx bulbs. However, Lifx responded proactively by issuing a firmware update that addressed the software vulnerability and implemented a new, non-global method of decryption based on the specific Wi-Fi network, thereby mitigating the software-related risks [28480]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was malicious. The team of security experts in England hacked into a smart home's Wi-Fi network by exploiting a weakness within Lifx's mesh networking protocol. They posed as a new slave bulb and tricked the master bulb into sending them Wi-Fi credentials, which were then decrypted easily using Lifx's own reverse-engineered firmware. This act was done with the intent to gain unauthorized access to the network, highlighting a malicious objective [28480].
(b) The software failure incident was non-malicious in the sense that the vulnerability was promptly reported to Lifx by Context, and Lifx responded proactively by issuing a firmware update to eliminate the problem. The update also introduced a new decryption method based on the specific Wi-Fi network, addressing the vulnerability and preventing unauthorized access. This response indicates a non-malicious intent to address and rectify the security issue [28480]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
accidental_decisions |
The intent of the software failure incident described in the article was more aligned with (b) accidental_decisions, where the failure occurred due to contributing factors introduced by mistakes or unintended decisions.
Context, the UK-based consulting firm, accidentally discovered an exploitable weakness within Lifx's mesh networking protocol while conducting security testing [28480]. This accidental discovery led to the demonstration of how a hacker could pose as a new slave bulb and trick the master bulb into sharing Wi-Fi credentials, highlighting a vulnerability that Lifx was not aware of initially.
Furthermore, the article mentions that the decryption protocol used by Lifx bulbs to decode Wi-Fi credentials was a global one, making it easier for Context's team to decrypt the credentials and potentially giving hackers a universal access key to any network using Lifx bulbs. This aspect of the incident points towards unintended consequences of the encryption method used by Lifx.
Overall, the software failure incident in this case seems to have stemmed more from accidental decisions or oversights rather than deliberate poor decisions. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in this case can be attributed to development incompetence. The team of security experts from Context in England was able to hack into a smart home's Wi-Fi network by exploiting a weakness within Lifx's mesh networking protocol. They were able to pose as a new slave bulb and trick the master bulb into sending them Wi-Fi credentials, which were then decrypted rather easily using Lifx's own reverse-engineered firmware. This incident highlights a lack of professional competence in ensuring the security of the smart LED system [28480].
(b) The software failure incident can also be categorized as accidental. The vulnerability in Lifx's mesh networking protocol that allowed the security experts to hack into the system was not intentionally created by the developers. It was an accidental weakness that was discovered and exploited by the Context team. The incident was not a deliberate act but rather a result of an unintentional flaw in the software system [28480]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article was temporary. The vulnerability in the Lifx smart LED bulbs' mesh networking protocol allowed security experts to hack into a smart home's Wi-Fi network by posing as a new slave bulb and tricking the master bulb into sharing Wi-Fi credentials. This incident prompted Lifx to issue a quick firmware fix to address the exploitable weakness [Article 28480]. The temporary nature of this failure is evident from the fact that a firmware update was able to eliminate the problem and institute a new decryption method based on the specific Wi-Fi network, resolving the vulnerability and preventing further exploitation. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and stops performing its intended functions.
(b) omission: The software failure incident in the article involves an omission where the system omits to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The Lifx smart LED system failed to detect and raise any red flags when a new bulb was posing as a slave and requesting to join the network, allowing the hacker to obtain Wi-Fi credentials without detection [28480].
(c) timing: The software failure incident in the article does not involve a timing issue where the system performs its intended functions too late or too early.
(d) value: The software failure incident in the article involves a value issue where the system performs its intended functions incorrectly. The Lifx bulbs were using a global decryption protocol that allowed hackers to easily decrypt Wi-Fi credentials, posing a significant security risk [28480].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident in the article does not involve a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The software failure incident in the article could be categorized as a security vulnerability. The system's failure to properly authenticate new devices and the use of a global decryption protocol led to a critical security flaw that could potentially compromise any network using Lifx bulbs [28480]. |