Incident: Home Depot Data Breach: Massive Credit Card Compromise.

Published Date: 2014-09-08

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident at Home Depot occurred between April and September 2014 [30093]. 2. The malware that compromised credit card information at Home Depot was present in Home Depot store systems between April and September 2014 [30093]. 3. Home Depot revealed that the malware was present in its systems between April and September 2014 [30093].
System 1. Outdated software used by Home Depot to protect its network [29712] 2. Symantec antivirus software from 2007 relied on by Home Depot [29712] 3. Failure to continuously monitor the network for unusual behavior, such as a strange server talking to checkout registers [29712] 4. Failure to perform vulnerability scans regularly on computer systems inside stores [29712] 5. Failure to assess more than a dozen systems handling customer information [29712] 6. Failure to comply with credit card industry security rules regarding scanning and assessments [29712]
Responsible Organization 1. Criminals who used unique, custom-built malware to evade detection were responsible for causing the software failure incident at Home Depot [Article 30093]. 2. The malware strains, specifically a new variant of a malware strain known as "BlackPOS," were responsible for the cyberattacks against both Target and Home Depot, indicating the involvement of cybercriminals in causing the software failure incident at Home Depot [Article 30089].
Impacted Organization 1. Home Depot [29712, 30093, 30089]
Software Causes 1. The software failure incident at Home Depot was primarily caused by the use of outdated software to protect its network and irregular scanning of systems handling customer information, leading to vulnerabilities [29712]. 2. The malware used in the attack, a new variant of the BlackPOS strain, was able to steal credit and debit card information from the physical memory of point-of-sale devices, indicating a software vulnerability [30089]. 3. Home Depot's reliance on outdated Symantec antivirus software from 2007 and failure to continuously monitor the network for unusual behavior contributed to the breach [29712]. 4. The delay in implementing enhanced encryption and security measures, despite being aware of the risks following the Target breach, also played a role in the software failure incident [29712, 30093].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of timely response to early threats and slow action in raising defenses despite warnings dating back to 2008 [29712] 2. Reliance on outdated software and irregular scanning of systems handling customer information [29712] 3. Failure to continuously monitor the network for unusual behavior and perform vulnerability scans regularly [29712] 4. Hiring an individual with a history of malicious actions in a security role [29712] 5. Failure to prioritize security threats and invest in necessary software and training [29712]
Impacts 1. The software failure incident at Home Depot compromised 56 million customers' credit cards, potentially leading to $3 billion in illegal purchases [29712]. 2. The breach resulted in the theft of data on more than 40 million cards before the holiday season [29712]. 3. Home Depot had to offer free identity protection services, including credit monitoring, to customers who used payment cards at their stores from April 2014 onwards [30093]. 4. The incident caused inconvenience and anxiety to customers, but Home Depot reassured them that they would not be liable for fraudulent charges [30093]. 5. The breach led to the implementation of enhanced encryption of payment data in all US stores by Home Depot [30093].
Preventions 1. Regularly updating and maintaining security software: Home Depot relied on outdated software to protect its network, which left vulnerabilities that hackers exploited [29712]. 2. Continuous monitoring of network behavior: Managers at Home Depot did not continuously monitor the network for unusual behavior, such as strange servers communicating with checkout registers, which could have detected the breach earlier [29712]. 3. Conducting regular vulnerability scans: Home Depot performed vulnerability scans irregularly on its computer systems inside stores, violating credit card industry security rules that require such scans at least once a quarter [29712]. 4. Taking security threats more seriously: Former employees mentioned that managers at Home Depot failed to take security threats seriously and did not prioritize new software and training to enhance security measures [29712]. 5. Implementing enhanced encryption and payment systems: Home Depot started introducing enhanced encryption in some stores in response to the Target breach but the rollout was not completed until after the breach occurred [29712]. 6. Sharing information and collaborating with other retailers: Retailers, including Home Depot, have been reluctant to share information with each other about security breaches, hindering collective efforts to combat cyber threats [29712]. 7. Conducting thorough background checks on employees: Home Depot hired a security engineer who had a history of malicious actions at a previous company, highlighting the importance of thorough background checks for employees with access to sensitive systems [29712].
Fixes 1. Implementing enhanced encryption of payment data in all stores to prevent future breaches [Article 30093]. 2. Regularly monitoring the network for unusual behavior and continuously scanning systems for vulnerabilities [Article 29712]. 3. Updating outdated software and security measures to meet industry standards for protecting customer data [Article 29712]. 4. Conducting routine vulnerability scans on all systems handling customer information and ensuring compliance with Payment Card Industry Security Standards [Article 29712]. 5. Enhancing threat-sharing associations and adopting new encryption and payment systems to thwart hackers [Article 29712].
References 1. Former employees of Home Depot's cybersecurity team who spoke on condition of anonymity [29712] 2. Home Depot's official statements and press releases [30093, 30089] 3. Security researcher Brian Krebs and his blog Krebs on Security [30093, 30089]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to Home Depot's data breach involving the compromise of 56 million customers' credit cards has similarities to the Target data breach from the previous year. Both incidents involved the same malware strain known as "BlackPOS." The malware used in the Home Depot breach was a new variant of the same malicious software that was responsible for cyberattacks against Target [Article 30089]. (b) The software failure incident at Home Depot is part of a trend in the retail industry where there has been an increase in security breaches at various organizations. Other companies that have experienced security breaches aimed at stealing customers' credit card information include Michaels Stores, Neiman Marcus, and P.F. Chang's [Article 30093].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the Home Depot data breach incident. The incident was attributed to Home Depot's slow response to early threats, reliance on outdated software, irregular scanning of systems handling customer information, and dismissing concerns raised by the security team [29712]. These factors indicate a failure in the design and implementation of the security measures within the company's network. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the Home Depot data breach as well. The breach went unnoticed for months, indicating a failure in the operation and monitoring of the systems to detect unusual behavior or security breaches [29712]. Additionally, the malware used in the attack evaded detection, pointing to operational shortcomings in monitoring and response mechanisms within Home Depot's network.
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) The software failure incident at Home Depot was primarily within the system. The incident involved the use of unique, custom-built malware that evaded detection and was present in Home Depot store systems between April and September 2014 [Article 30093]. The malware used in the attack was a new variant of a known strain called "BlackPOS," specifically designed to steal credit and debit card information from the physical memory of point-of-sale devices [Article 30089]. Additionally, Home Depot's security measures, such as outdated software and irregular system scans, were internal factors contributing to the breach [Article 29712].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident at Home Depot was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically the use of unique, custom-built malware that evaded detection. The malware used in the attack had not been seen previously in other attacks, indicating that it was a new and sophisticated form of malware [Article 30093]. (b) However, human actions also played a role in the software failure incident at Home Depot. The company was criticized for being slow to respond to early threats, relying on outdated software, and not taking cybersecurity threats seriously enough. Additionally, the hiring of a security engineer who was later sentenced to prison for disabling computers at a previous company raised concerns about the company's vetting process for employees [Article 29712].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The articles do not specifically mention the software failure incident at Home Depot being caused by hardware issues. The focus is primarily on the malware and security vulnerabilities in the software systems. Therefore, there is no direct evidence of hardware-related contributing factors in the reported incident. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The software failure incident at Home Depot was primarily caused by software-related factors, specifically the presence of unique, custom-built malware that evaded detection [Article 30093]. The malware infected Home Depot store systems between April and September 2014, compromising credit card information of 56 million customers [Article 29712]. Additionally, the malware used in the attack was a new variant of a known strain called "BlackPOS," which targeted point-of-sale systems to steal credit and debit card information [Article 30089]. The software vulnerabilities and outdated security measures at Home Depot contributed to the successful cyberattack on their systems.
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident at Home Depot was malicious in nature. The incident involved a security breach where criminals used unique, custom-built malware to evade detection, compromising 56 million customers' credit cards [Article 30093]. The malware used in the attack had not been seen previously in other attacks, indicating a deliberate and targeted effort to breach Home Depot's systems [Article 30093]. Additionally, the malware responsible for the breach at Home Depot was linked to the same malicious software that hacked the accounts of Target customers the previous year, suggesting a coordinated effort by cybercriminals [Article 30089]. (b) The software failure incident was non-malicious in the sense that it was not caused by unintentional factors or errors. The breach was a result of deliberate actions by hackers who targeted Home Depot's systems with the intent to steal customer credit card information [Article 30093]. The incident involved the use of sophisticated malware that was specifically designed to steal payment data from Home Depot's store systems, indicating a premeditated attack rather than an accidental failure [Article 30093].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The software failure incident at Home Depot can be attributed to poor decisions made by the company. The company was slow to raise its defenses against potential cyber threats despite warnings dating back to 2008 [29712]. Home Depot relied on outdated software to protect its network, scanned systems irregularly, and some members of its security team left due to management dismissing their concerns [29712]. Additionally, the company hired a security engineer who was later sentenced to four years in prison for deliberately disabling computers at his previous workplace [29712]. Home Depot also failed to take security threats seriously, with managers relying on outdated antivirus software and not continuously monitoring the network for unusual behavior [29712]. Overall, the incident highlights a series of poor decisions and inadequate security measures taken by Home Depot. (b) The software failure incident at Home Depot can also be attributed to accidental decisions or unintended consequences. The company mentioned that criminals used unique, custom-built malware to evade detection, and this malware had not been seen previously in other attacks [30093]. Home Depot stated that the malware was present in its store systems between April and September 2014 and has since been eliminated from its systems [30093]. The company also rolled out enhanced encryption of payment data in all US stores to prevent future incidents [30093]. These actions suggest that the failure was not intentional but rather a result of unforeseen circumstances and vulnerabilities in the software systems.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The articles provide information related to the software failure incident at Home Depot that could be attributed to development incompetence. The incident involved a significant data breach compromising 56 million customers' credit cards due to the company's slow response to early threats, reliance on outdated software, irregular scanning of systems handling customer information, and dismissal of security concerns raised by the cybersecurity team [29712]. Additionally, Home Depot's hiring of a security engineer who was later sentenced to prison for disabling computers at a previous company raises concerns about the company's vetting process for hiring individuals responsible for overseeing security systems [29712]. (b) The software failure incident at Home Depot could also be considered accidental. The company mentioned that criminals used unique, custom-built malware to evade detection, and this malware had not been seen previously in other attacks [30093]. The malware was present in Home Depot store systems between April and September 2014, and the company took steps to eliminate it from its systems and enhance encryption of payment data in all US stores [30093].
Duration permanent, temporary (a) The software failure incident at Home Depot was more of a permanent nature. The breach involving the compromise of 56 million customers' credit cards was a significant and long-lasting event that had lasting consequences for the company and its customers [29712, 30093, 30089]. The incident was not a one-time occurrence but rather a prolonged exposure of customer data to potential theft, indicating a permanent failure in the security measures in place at Home Depot. The breach lasted for several months, from April to September 2014, before being detected and addressed by the company [30093]. (b) However, there were temporary aspects to the failure as well. The specific malware used in the attack was described as unique and custom-built, indicating a temporary vulnerability that was exploited by hackers [30093]. The malware had not been seen in previous attacks, suggesting a temporary nature to the specific method of breach. Additionally, the company took immediate actions to eliminate the malware from its systems and enhance encryption of payment data in all US stores, indicating a temporary response to address the immediate threat [30093].
Behaviour crash, omission, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident related to the Home Depot data breach can be categorized as a crash. The incident involved the compromise of 56 million customers' credit cards due to a security breach that went unnoticed for months, indicating a failure of the system to maintain its state and perform its intended functions [29712, 30093, 30089]. (b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. Home Depot's security system omitted to detect the malware that was present in its store systems between April and September 2014, leading to the theft of credit card information [30093, 30089]. (c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident can be considered a factor in the breach. Despite efforts to enhance encryption and security measures, the detection of the breach and the elimination of the malware were delayed, allowing hackers to steal customer data over an extended period before being noticed [29712, 30093]. (d) value: The software failure incident can be attributed to a failure in value as well. The system failed to protect customer data by allowing the theft of credit card information, indicating a failure in performing its intended functions correctly [29712, 30093, 30089]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with a byzantine failure, which involves inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident at Home Depot primarily involved a breach that led to the theft of credit card information, indicating a more straightforward failure in security measures rather than erratic or inconsistent behavior [29712, 30093, 30089]. (f) other: The software failure incident can be further described as a failure in maintaining security protocols and responding adequately to early threats. The incident highlighted missteps in cybersecurity practices, reliance on outdated software, irregular scanning of systems, and a lack of continuous monitoring for unusual behavior, all contributing to the breach [29712, 30093, 30089].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, theoretical_consequence (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure The software failure incident at Home Depot resulted in a massive data breach compromising 56 million customers' credit cards [29712]. The stolen data was being sold on black markets and could potentially be used for illegal purchases amounting to $3 billion [29712]. Customers who used their cards at Home Depot between April and September 2 were vulnerable to fraudulent use of their information [29712]. Additionally, the breach led to the theft of credit card data, causing inconvenience and anxiety to customers [30093]. Home Depot offered free identity protection services, including credit monitoring, to affected customers and reassured them that they would not be liable for fraudulent charges [30093].
Domain sales, finance (a) The failed system was related to the sales industry, specifically affecting Home Depot, a home improvement chain, compromising 56 million customers' credit cards [29712, 30093, 30089]. (h) The failed system was also related to the finance industry as it involved the theft of credit card information, potentially leading to $3 billion in illegal purchases [29712, 30093, 30089].

Sources

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