| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
- The European Commission was hacked in the spring of 2011 using a zero-day exploit [31765].
- Belgacom, a partly state-owned Belgian telecom, was also hacked in a sophisticated and complex attack targeting system administrators [31765].
- Prominent Belgian cryptographer Jean-Jacques Quisquater was targeted in another sophisticated hack [31765].
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
- The Regin espionage tool has been found to have infected victims in multiple countries, including Algeria, Afghanistan, Belgium, Brazil, Fiji, Germany, Iran, India, Malaysia, Syria, Pakistan, Russia, and Kiribati [31765].
- Targets of the Regin malware include entire networks, telecoms in multiple countries, government agencies, research institutes, academics, and hotels [31765].
- The Regin platform has been used in various attacks, including against the GSM network of a large, unidentified telecom in a Middle Eastern country [31765]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the sophisticated and widespread hack that targeted the European Commission and the European Council in the spring of 2011. The attackers used a zero-day exploit to gain access to the network and infected numerous systems belonging to these organizations [31765]. This incident highlights a failure due to contributing factors introduced during system development and the design phase, allowing attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in the system.
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be observed in the attack on Belgacom, the Belgian telecom company. The attackers targeted system administrators working for Belgacom and used their credentials to gain access to routers controlling the telecom's cellular network. This operation failure allowed the attackers to manipulate the cellular network and potentially monitor cellular traffic or even shut down the network [31765]. This incident showcases a failure due to contributing factors introduced during the operation or misuse of the system. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the Regin espionage tool, as reported in the articles, can be categorized as within_system. The incident involved a highly sophisticated and complex malware platform called Regin, which was designed to infiltrate and compromise various systems, including those belonging to the European Commission, the European Council, Belgacom, and prominent individuals like Jean-Jacques Quisquater [31765].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident can also be categorized as outside_system due to the fact that the attackers behind the Regin malware used external factors such as zero-day exploits, sophisticated hacking techniques, and possibly state-sponsored resources to breach the targeted systems. The attackers targeted system administrators to gain access to critical infrastructure like routers controlling telecom networks, indicating an external origin of the contributing factors [31765]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- The software failure incident described in the articles is related to a sophisticated and widespread hack using a zero-day exploit to infiltrate the European Commission's network [31765].
- The attack involved the use of a malicious platform called "Regin," which is capable of taking over entire networks and infrastructures and has been around since at least 2008 [31765].
- Regin is described as a nation-state tool and is considered the most sophisticated espionage machine uncovered to date [31765].
- The Regin platform was first publicly identified in 2009 when components of the tool were uploaded to the VirusTotal website [31765].
- Regin uses complex techniques such as nested decrypting, hiding data in Extended Attributes in Windows, and a unique communication structure to manage network-wide infections [31765].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- The attack on the European Commission's network was sophisticated and complex, indicating human involvement in planning and executing the hack [31765].
- The attackers targeted system administrators working for Belgacom and used their credentials to gain access to the telecom's cellular network, suggesting a level of social engineering and targeted human actions [31765].
- The attackers used a man-in-the-middle technique to hijack the browser of Belgacom system administrators and infect their machines with malware [31765].
- The attackers behind the Regin platform orchestrated a series of attacks targeting various entities, including government agencies, research institutes, academics, and telecoms, indicating deliberate human actions in selecting targets and executing the attacks [31765].
- The Regin attack involved multiple stages and payloads, indicating a well-planned and coordinated effort by human actors [31765]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The incident involving the Regin malware was not directly attributed to hardware failure but rather to a sophisticated cyberattack that targeted various organizations and networks [31765].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The Regin malware incident was a result of a highly complex and sophisticated cyber espionage tool that was designed to infiltrate and compromise networks, demonstrating a failure in software security measures [31765]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident discussed in the articles is malicious in nature. The incident involved a sophisticated and widespread hack targeting various entities such as the European Commission, Belgacom, and prominent individuals like Belgian cryptographer Jean-Jacques Quisquater. The attackers used zero-day exploits, targeted system administrators to gain access, infected numerous systems, and remained undetected for a long period. The malware involved in the attack, known as Regin, is described as a nation-state tool and is considered one of the most sophisticated espionage tools uncovered to date [31765]. The attack was part of a larger espionage operation involving multiple countries and organizations, indicating a deliberate and targeted effort to infiltrate and compromise systems for espionage purposes.
(b) The software failure incident is non-malicious in nature. The incident involved the discovery of a sophisticated malware tool called Regin, which was designed to remain stealth on systems for years and had the capability to take over entire networks and infrastructures. The malware was highly complex, modular, and customizable based on the target and attackers' needs. The attack unfolded in multiple stages, with various payload options for data theft and system manipulation. The malware used advanced techniques to hide its data and communicate within infected networks, demonstrating a high level of technical sophistication [31765]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions:
- The software failure incident involving the Regin espionage tool was not due to poor decisions but rather a highly sophisticated and deliberate attack orchestrated by a nation-state actor [31765].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions:
- The software failure incident involving the Regin espionage tool was not accidental but a carefully planned and executed attack targeting various entities and networks [31765]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, unknown |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the sophisticated and widespread hack that targeted the European Commission and the European Council in 2011. The attackers used a zero-day exploit to gain access to the network, indicating a high level of technical expertise and knowledge of vulnerabilities ([31765]).
(b) The accidental software failure incident is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles is more aligned with a **temporary** failure rather than a permanent one. This is evident from the fact that the attackers were able to infiltrate the systems of the European Commission, the European Council, Belgacom, and target individuals like Jean-Jacques Quisquater through sophisticated and complex hacking techniques. The attackers used zero-day exploits, targeted system administrators, and remained undetected for a significant period, indicating a temporary breach rather than a permanent failure [31765]. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, byzantine, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not specifically mention a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions.
(b) omission: The software failure incident could be related to omission as it describes a failure where the system omits to perform its intended functions at instances. For example, the attackers targeted system administrators working for Belgacom and used their credentials to gain access to routers controlling the telecom's cellular network, indicating an omission in the system's security measures [31765].
(c) timing: The software failure incident does not seem to be related to timing, where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early.
(d) value: The software failure incident could be related to a failure in value, where the system performs its intended functions incorrectly. For instance, the attackers used their access to manipulate GSM base station controllers, potentially leading to incorrect functioning of the cellular network [31765].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident could be related to a byzantine failure, where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The sophisticated and widespread nature of the attack, the stealthy behavior of the malware, and the ability to take over entire networks indicate a level of inconsistency and deception in the system's behavior [31765].
(f) other: The other behavior observed in the software failure incident is the sophisticated and complex nature of the attack, involving multiple stages, payloads, and a high level of customization based on the target and attackers' needs. This intricate behavior goes beyond a simple crash, omission, timing issue, or value failure, showcasing a highly advanced and adaptable system behavior [31765]. |