| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to BIOS vulnerabilities and firmware hacking has been reported to have happened again within the same organization or with its products and services. Researchers Xeno Kovah and Corey Kallenberg, who presented a proof-of-concept attack at the CanSecWest conference, left MITRE, a government contractor that conducts research for the Defense Department and other federal agencies, to launch LegbaCore, a firmware security consultancy [34475].
(b) The software failure incident related to BIOS vulnerabilities and firmware hacking has also been reported to have happened at multiple organizations. The researchers found vulnerabilities in 80 percent of the PCs they examined, including ones from Dell, Lenovo, and HP. They disclosed these vulnerabilities to the vendors, and patches are in the works but have not yet been released. The researchers noted that even when vendors have produced BIOS patches in the past, few people have applied them, leaving the vulnerabilities open and available to attackers [34475]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. Researchers Xeno Kovah and Corey Kallenberg presented a proof-of-concept attack at the CanSecWest conference, showing how they could remotely infect the BIOS of multiple systems using new vulnerabilities they uncovered [34475]. They found vulnerabilities in 80% of the PCs they examined, including those from Dell, Lenovo, and HP, which they termed as incursion vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities were so easy to find that they wrote a script to automate the process. Despite disclosing these vulnerabilities to the vendors and patches being in the works, the article highlights that historically, few people have applied BIOS patches, leaving the systems vulnerable to attacks [34475].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also discussed in the article. The researchers found that if they had physical access to a system, they could infect the BIOS on some machines in just two minutes. This highlights the ease with which a government agent or law enforcement officer with a moment's access to a system could compromise it [34475]. The malware developed by the researchers, named LightEater, uses the incursion vulnerabilities to break into the system management mode and gain escalated privileges on the system. This mode allows the malware to read all data and code in a machine's memory, potentially compromising sensitive information such as encryption keys and passwords [34475]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is primarily within_system. The failure occurred due to vulnerabilities in the BIOS firmware, which is a core software component that operates below antivirus and other security products. The researchers were able to remotely infect the BIOS of multiple systems by exploiting new vulnerabilities they uncovered [34475]. The vulnerabilities, termed incursion vulnerabilities, allowed the researchers to bypass protections in the BIOS and implant malicious code, ultimately compromising the security of the systems [34475].
(b) The software failure incident can also be considered outside_system to some extent. This is because the vulnerabilities in the BIOS firmware were not intentionally designed by the system developers but were rather exploited by external actors (hackers) who discovered these weaknesses. The researchers highlighted that the security community should focus on firmware hacking like the BIOS attack they demonstrated, indicating that external threats can exploit such vulnerabilities [34475]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles is related to non-human actions, specifically vulnerabilities in the BIOS firmware that can be exploited by hackers without human intervention. Researchers Xeno Kovah and Corey Kallenberg demonstrated how they could remotely infect the BIOS of multiple systems using new vulnerabilities they uncovered [34475].
(b) The software failure incident can also be attributed to human actions, as the vulnerabilities in the BIOS firmware were discovered and exploited by the researchers themselves. They found ways to bypass protections in the BIOS, reflash it, and implant malicious code, highlighting the role of human actions in identifying and exploiting these vulnerabilities [34475]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware can be seen in the article where researchers Xeno Kovah and Corey Kallenberg presented a proof-of-concept attack at the CanSecWest conference in Vancouver, demonstrating how they could remotely infect the BIOS of multiple systems using new vulnerabilities they uncovered [34475]. This incident highlights vulnerabilities in the BIOS firmware, which is a core component of computer hardware responsible for booting the system and loading the operating system. The ability to compromise and control a system surreptitiously by infecting the BIOS chip showcases a hardware-related software failure incident.
(b) The software failure incident related to software can be observed in the same article where the researchers discovered vulnerabilities in the BIOS firmware that allowed them to bypass protections and reflash the BIOS to implant their malicious code [34475]. This software failure incident originates in the software aspect of the BIOS, which is a critical software component responsible for system initialization and operation. The exploitation of software vulnerabilities in the BIOS demonstrates a software-related failure incident. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. The incident involves researchers demonstrating a proof-of-concept attack at a conference where they remotely infected the BIOS of multiple systems using new vulnerabilities they uncovered [34475]. The malware they developed, named LightEater, was designed to compromise and control systems surreptitiously by gaining high-level system privileges and implanting malicious code in the BIOS chip, allowing for persistent and stealthy access to the compromised systems. The attack was aimed at undermining the security of specialized operating systems like Tails, used by journalists and activists for secure communications and handling sensitive data. The attackers were able to exploit vulnerabilities in the BIOS firmware to achieve their malicious objectives, highlighting the potential risks posed by such attacks. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions can be seen in the BIOS vulnerabilities that allowed for remote hacking and compromising of systems. The researchers demonstrated how they could remotely infect the BIOS of multiple systems using new vulnerabilities they uncovered [34475]. Additionally, the researchers found a way to gain high-level system privileges for their BIOS malware, undermining the security of specialized operating systems like Tails used by journalists and activists for stealth communications and handling sensitive data [34475].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental decisions can be seen in the vulnerabilities found in the BIOS firmware that were so easy to uncover that the researchers wrote a script to automate the process. They discovered vulnerabilities in 80 percent of the PCs they examined, including ones from major manufacturers like Dell, Lenovo, and HP [34475]. The researchers also noted that even when vendors have produced BIOS patches in the past, few people have applied them, leaving the vulnerabilities open to potential attackers [34475]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, unknown |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as researchers Xeno Kovah and Corey Kallenberg presented a proof-of-concept attack at the CanSecWest conference in Vancouver, showing how they could remotely infect the BIOS of multiple systems using new vulnerabilities they uncovered [34475]. This incident highlights the lack of professional competence in developing secure BIOS firmware, leading to vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers with moderately sophisticated skills.
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is more aligned with a permanent failure. The vulnerability in the BIOS firmware discovered by researchers Xeno Kovah and Corey Kallenberg allows for the implantation of malicious code that remains live and undetected even if the computer's operating system were wiped and re-installed. This indicates a long-lasting impact and persistence of the failure ([34475]). |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article is not related to a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the incident involves a security vulnerability in the BIOS firmware that allows attackers to compromise and control a system surreptitiously [34475].
(b) omission: The software failure incident is not related to a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). It is primarily about a security vulnerability in the BIOS firmware that can be exploited by attackers to implant malicious code and gain high-level system privileges [34475].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to a failure due to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The incident is focused on the vulnerability in the BIOS firmware that allows attackers to compromise systems and implant malware, rather than a timing issue [34475].
(d) value: The software failure incident is not related to a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Instead, it is about a security vulnerability in the BIOS firmware that can be exploited by attackers to gain control of a system and plant malware [34475].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions, which would align with a byzantine failure. The incident is centered around a security vulnerability in the BIOS firmware that can be exploited by attackers to infect systems with malware and gain escalated privileges [34475].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security vulnerability exploit that allows attackers to compromise the BIOS firmware, implant malicious code, gain high-level system privileges, and potentially steal sensitive data. This behavior falls under the category of a security breach rather than a traditional software failure like a crash or omission [34475]. |