| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to hacking the Tesla Model S' information systems has not been reported to have happened again within the same organization (Tesla) or with its products and services. The incident discussed in the article was a specific case where researchers were able to demonstrate vulnerabilities in the Model S' security systems, which prompted Tesla to quickly patch the vulnerabilities and enhance its security measures [38979].
(b) The software failure incident of hacking the Tesla Model S' information systems has not been reported to have happened again at other organizations or with their products and services in the articles provided. The focus of the incident was on the specific vulnerabilities found in the Model S and the subsequent actions taken by Tesla to address those vulnerabilities [38979]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. Researchers Kevin Mahaffey and Marc Rogers demonstrated vulnerabilities in the Tesla Model S' information systems, showing how they were able to remotely unlock the doors, start the vehicle, and issue a "kill" command to shut down the systems [38979]. They found weaknesses in the firmware, insecure storage of passwords, and a Wi-Fi connectivity issue at Tesla service centers, indicating design flaws that allowed for potential hacking. However, Tesla quickly patched these vulnerabilities and took steps to enhance the security of its systems.
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also highlighted in the article. The researchers needed constant physical access to the Model S to gain control over its infotainment software service and vehicle functions. They had to physically disassemble the car to access the Ethernet port and specific files containing digital keys, indicating that the operation of the system required physical manipulation for the hack to work effectively [38979]. This limitation suggests that the operational aspects of the Model S played a role in mitigating the impact of the software vulnerabilities discovered by the researchers. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incident discussed in the article is primarily within_system. The researchers were able to exploit vulnerabilities within the Tesla Model S' information systems by gaining physical access to the vehicle, accessing the onboard network, finding weak passwords stored locally, and exploiting the firmware updater. They also discovered issues with the Wi-Fi connectivity and the digital car keys data stored on an SD card within the system. Tesla quickly responded by issuing patches to address these vulnerabilities and enhancing its security measures [38979].
(b) The software failure incident also involved some elements outside_system. For example, the researchers were able to spoof a Tesla Service network to establish a wireless connection to the car, which relied on the static network key used at Tesla service centers. This external factor allowed them to gain wireless access to the vehicle. Additionally, the researchers needed to create a VPN connection to Tesla's servers to download and decompile the firmware, which involved interacting with Tesla's external servers [38979]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the Tesla Model S was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically vulnerabilities in the vehicle's software and systems. Researchers were able to exploit weaknesses in the firmware, digital keys stored on an SD card, insecurely stored passwords, and the vehicle's Wi-Fi connectivity to gain access to the infotainment software and control various vehicle functions [38979].
(b) However, human actions were also involved in the incident as the researchers, Kevin Mahaffey and Marc Rogers, actively probed and exploited the vulnerabilities in the Tesla Model S' information systems. They physically disassembled the vehicle, hacked together an adapter for the proprietary Ethernet connection, and took advantage of the VPN connection to Tesla's servers to download and decompile the firmware, among other actions [38979]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware can be seen in the article where researchers Kevin Mahaffey and Marc Rogers physically disassembled a Tesla Model S to gain access to its Ethernet port and the carKeys.tar file [38979]. This physical access to the hardware components of the vehicle allowed them to connect to the onboard network and exploit vulnerabilities in the system.
(b) The software failure incident related to software can be observed in the article where the researchers found weak passwords stored insecurely in one of the data folders of the firmware [38979]. Additionally, they discovered an exploit in the firmware updater that allowed them to gain access to certain functions of the vehicle's infotainment software service. These software vulnerabilities were addressed by Tesla through patches and updates. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident discussed in the article is malicious in nature. Researchers Kevin Mahaffey and Marc Rogers demonstrated how they were able to remotely unlock the Tesla Model S' doors, start the vehicle, drive away, and issue a "kill" command to shut down the vehicle's systems [38979]. They accessed the vehicle's onboard network by hacking together an adapter out of Ethernet cable and Scotch tape, gaining nearly complete access to the vehicle's infotainment software service and all the functions it controls. Additionally, they found weaknesses in the Wi-Fi connectivity of the Model S, allowing them to spoof a Tesla Service network and establish a wireless connection to the car [38979].
(b) The software failure incident is non-malicious in the sense that the researchers, Mahaffey and Rogers, were conducting a security analysis to identify vulnerabilities in the Tesla Model S' information systems. They were not attempting to harm the system but rather to demonstrate potential weaknesses and help improve the security of the vehicle. Tesla responded quickly by patching the vulnerabilities outlined by the researchers, offering cash bounties for reported bugs, and actively participating in the Defcon Car Hacking Village [38979]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was not due to poor decisions. The incident was a result of researchers Kevin Mahaffey and Marc Rogers demonstrating vulnerabilities in the Tesla Model S' information systems at the Defcon digital security conference. The researchers carefully analyzed the car's electronics, found weaknesses in the system, and exploited them to gain access to various functions of the vehicle. Tesla, on the other hand, acted quickly to patch the vulnerabilities and enhance the security of its systems [38979].
(b) The software failure incident was not due to accidental decisions. The researchers intentionally sought to uncover vulnerabilities in the Tesla Model S' information systems by physically disassembling the car, accessing its electronics, and exploiting weaknesses in the system. Their actions were deliberate and aimed at demonstrating potential security risks in the vehicle's software [38979]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as researchers Kevin Mahaffey and Marc Rogers were able to identify vulnerabilities in the Tesla Model S' information systems. They were able to remotely unlock the Model S' doors, start the vehicle, drive away, and issue a "kill" command to shut down the vehicle's systems [38979]. This incident highlights the importance of professional competence in software development to prevent such vulnerabilities from being exploited.
(b) The accidental software failure incident is demonstrated in the article when the researchers discovered weaknesses in the Wi-Fi connectivity built into every Model S. The cars were programmed to automatically connect to the wireless network at any Tesla service center, which used a static network key. By spoofing a Tesla Service network, the researchers gained a wireless connection to the car, showcasing an accidental vulnerability in the system [38979]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident discussed in the article was temporary. The incident was caused by specific vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the Tesla Model S' information systems that were exploited by researchers Kevin Mahaffey and Marc Rogers. They were able to remotely unlock the Model S' doors, start the vehicle, issue a "kill" command to shut down the vehicle's systems, and gain access to various vehicle functions through their hacking methods. However, Tesla acted quickly to patch the vulnerabilities outlined by the researchers, offer cash bounties for reported bugs, and push out updates to its entire fleet of vehicles within a week, thereby addressing the temporary software failure incident [38979]. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article did not involve a crash where the system lost state and did not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the researchers were able to access and control various functions of the Tesla Model S, indicating that the system was operational to a certain extent [Article 38979].
(b) omission: The software failure incident did not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The researchers were able to access and control various functions of the Model S, indicating that the system was functioning, albeit with vulnerabilities that allowed unauthorized access [Article 38979].
(c) timing: The software failure incident did not involve the system performing its intended functions correctly, but too late or too early. The incident focused on vulnerabilities that allowed remote access and control of the Model S, rather than issues related to timing of functions [Article 38979].
(d) value: The software failure incident did not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The incident highlighted vulnerabilities that allowed unauthorized access and control of the Model S, rather than the system malfunctioning in its intended functions [Article 38979].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The researchers were able to consistently access and control various functions of the Model S once they identified the vulnerabilities, indicating a level of predictability in their actions [Article 38979].
(f) other: The software failure incident involved the system being accessed and controlled by researchers who identified vulnerabilities in the Tesla Model S' information systems. The incident showcased how the researchers were able to exploit these vulnerabilities to remotely unlock doors, start the vehicle, issue a "kill" command, and access various functions of the car's infotainment system. Tesla responded by patching the vulnerabilities and implementing a bug bounty program to address such issues in the future [Article 38979]. |