| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
- HSBC experienced a major IT glitch in August 2015 when 275,000 bank payments failed to go through just before the bank holiday weekend. This incident is similar to the recent online banking disruption where millions of customers were locked out of their accounts for up to nine hours [39580].
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
- Last week, NatWest and Royal Bank of Scotland customers also faced a banking glitch affecting debit card transactions in shops, where cards were declined at tills and pins were blocked. This incident shows a similar issue occurring at multiple organizations [39580]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident at HSBC was primarily due to issues related to system development and updates. The article mentions a "major IT glitch in August 2015" where 275,000 bank payments failed to go through just before a bank holiday weekend. Additionally, John Hackett, HSBC’s UK chief operating officer, stated that there was a "complex technical issue with our internet banking systems" that the IT team has been working on to find a solution [39580]. These instances point towards failures introduced during the development and maintenance phases of the system.
(b) The software failure incident at HSBC also had elements related to operation and customer misuse. Customers were unable to log in to their accounts, and there were complaints about the online services being down, impacting users' ability to carry out transactions and check their balances. The article mentions that customers were venting their anger due to the banking glitch affecting debit card usage in shops, with cards being declined at tills and pins being blocked [39580]. These issues highlight the operational aspect of the software failure incident. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident at HSBC was due to a complex technical issue with their internet banking systems, as mentioned by John Hackett, HSBC’s UK chief operating officer. The IT team at HSBC has been working non-stop to find a solution, involving tests, diagnostics, and trial runs. It was clarified that the issue was not a cyber-attack or any other malicious act, indicating that the problem originated within the system [39580].
(b) outside_system: There is no specific mention in the articles about the software failure incident at HSBC being caused by contributing factors originating from outside the system. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident at HSBC was attributed to a complex technical issue with their internet banking systems, as mentioned by John Hackett, HSBC’s UK chief operating officer. He clarified that it was not a cyber-attack or any other malicious act, indicating that the failure was due to contributing factors introduced without human participation [39580].
(b) On the other hand, the article also mentions that HSBC had experienced a major IT glitch in August 2015 when 275,000 bank payments failed to go through just before the bank holiday weekend. This incident could be attributed to human actions, such as potential errors in system updates, maintenance, or configuration changes made by IT personnel [39580]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The article does not mention any specific hardware-related issues contributing to the software failure incident at HSBC [39580].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The software failure incident at HSBC was attributed to a complex technical issue with their internet banking systems, as stated by John Hackett, HSBC’s UK chief operating officer [39580]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident at HSBC was classified as non-malicious. The article mentions that the issue was due to a complex technical issue with the internet banking systems, and HSBC's UK chief operating officer confirmed that it was not a cyber-attack or any other malicious act [39580].
(b) The incident at NatWest and Royal Bank of Scotland, where customers faced issues with debit cards in shops, could potentially be classified as non-malicious as well, as there is no indication in the provided article that the glitch was caused by malicious intent. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident at HSBC seems to be more related to poor_decisions rather than accidental_decisions. The incident was described as a major IT glitch that caused disruptions to online banking services for millions of customers. HSBC's UK chief operating officer, John Hackett, mentioned that there was a complex technical issue with their internet banking systems that the IT team had been working non-stop to resolve. Additionally, HSBC had faced a similar IT glitch in August 2015 where 275,000 bank payments failed to go through, indicating a recurring issue that may have been exacerbated by poor decisions in the management of their IT systems [39580]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident at HSBC was not attributed to development incompetence. The article mentions that the issue was due to a complex technical problem with the internet banking systems, and the IT team was working non-stop to find a solution. HSBC's UK chief operating officer mentioned that it was not a cyber-attack or any other malicious act [39580].
(b) The software failure incident at HSBC was described as a major IT glitch, indicating that it was an accidental failure rather than a deliberate act of incompetence. The article mentions that the bank was experiencing further issues with online and mobile banking, and the IT team was working to find a solution. The chief operating officer mentioned that the problem was not caused by a cyber-attack or any other malicious act [39580]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the articles was temporary. The incident caused online banking services for millions of HSBC customers to be disrupted for several hours on Monday, with customers being locked out of their accounts for up to nine hours [39580]. Additionally, on Tuesday, customers were still experiencing issues with the bank's internet services, indicating a temporary disruption rather than a permanent failure. The bank acknowledged the ongoing problems with online and mobile banking but assured customers that efforts were being made to restore all services and that regular updates would be provided [39580]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, timing, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as a crash. The HSBC online banking system experienced a significant disruption where customers were unable to log in for several hours, indicating a failure of the system to perform its intended functions [39580].
(b) omission: The incident also involved omission as customers were locked out of their accounts and unable to access online banking services, leading to the system omitting to perform its intended functions [39580].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident is also relevant as it occurred during a busy period when customers were returning to work after the holidays and needed to check their bank balances. The system's failure to function correctly at this critical time highlights a timing-related issue [39580].
(d) value: There is no specific mention of the system performing its intended functions incorrectly in the articles.
(e) byzantine: The incident does not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The other behavior observed in this software failure incident is the system experiencing a complex technical issue with its internet banking systems, requiring extensive testing and diagnostics to find a solution. This behavior falls under the "other" category as it involves a specific technical problem not covered by the other options [39580]. |