| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) In the provided articles, there is information about a software failure incident related to Cisco. The incident involved the exposure of vulnerabilities in Cisco's networking appliances due to stolen data from the NSA hacking team, as reported by Shadow Brokers [46969]. This incident is reminiscent of a previous incident in 2014 when Edward Snowden's leaks revealed that the NSA was intercepting shipments of Cisco's equipment to install spyware, leading to concerns raised by Cisco's then-CEO John Chambers about compromising the company's business [46969].
(b) The software failure incident involving the exposure of vulnerabilities in networking equipment from multiple organizations was not explicitly mentioned in the articles. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident discussed in the articles is related to the design phase. The incident involves the NSA's dilemma of whether to report security flaws it discovers in software and hardware to the product's manufacturer or keep them secret for offensive purposes. The leaked data from the NSA hacking team, which contained exploits targeting networking appliances from companies like Cisco and Fortinet, highlights the risks associated with keeping zero-day vulnerabilities secret. The incident raises questions about the NSA's practice of hoarding zero days and not disclosing them to vendors, potentially leading to the exploitation of these vulnerabilities by unauthorized entities [46969].
(b) The software failure incident is not directly related to the operation phase or misuse of the system. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
The software failure incident reported in the articles can be categorized as both within_system and outside_system:
(a) within_system: The failure within the system is evident from the fact that the NSA's secret hacking tools, including zero-day exploits, were stolen and leaked by a group known as Shadow Brokers [46969]. This indicates a failure within the NSA's internal security measures and practices, leading to the compromise of sensitive hacking techniques and tools.
(b) outside_system: On the other hand, the failure can also be attributed to factors outside the system, particularly the actions of external threat actors like Shadow Brokers who were able to breach the NSA's security and steal the classified data [46969]. This external breach highlights vulnerabilities in the overall cybersecurity ecosystem and the risks associated with sophisticated cyberattacks targeting government agencies and their sensitive information. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case can be attributed to non-human actions, specifically the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities by the NSA for hacking purposes. The leaked data containing hacking tools and exploits, which were kept secret by the NSA, fell into the hands of an anonymous group known as Shadow Brokers [46969].
(b) On the other hand, human actions also played a significant role in this software failure incident. The decision by the NSA to keep zero-day vulnerabilities secret rather than reporting them to affected companies contributed to the vulnerability of various networking appliances from companies like Cisco and Fortinet. This decision-making process regarding the disclosure of vulnerabilities highlights the human factor in the incident [46969]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware can be seen in the article where networking equipment firms Cisco and Fortinet warned customers about vulnerabilities in their products that were exploited by hacking software leaked by the Shadow Brokers group [46969]. This incident highlights how hardware vulnerabilities can be exploited by software to compromise the security of the products.
(b) The software failure incident related to software can be observed in the same article where the NSA's secret hacking tools, which included software exploits, were stolen and leaked by the Shadow Brokers group [46969]. This breach exposed the vulnerabilities in the software used by the NSA for hacking purposes, leading to concerns about the security implications of keeping such zero-day flaws secret. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The incident involved the theft of NSA hacking tools by a group called Shadow Brokers, who then leaked the stolen data containing exploits targeting networking appliances from various companies like Cisco and Fortinet [46969]. The stolen data included secret zero-day flaws that had not been reported to the affected companies, raising concerns about the NSA's practice of keeping such vulnerabilities secret for offensive purposes rather than disclosing them to improve overall security [46969]. The incident highlighted the risks associated with government agencies hoarding zero-day vulnerabilities, as these exploits can potentially fall into the wrong hands and be used for malicious purposes [46969]. The NSA's actions in keeping these vulnerabilities secret for their own advantage ultimately led to the compromise of sensitive hacking tools, demonstrating a malicious intent behind the software failure incident. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
- The incident involving the NSA's hacking tools being leaked by the Shadow Brokers group raises questions about the NSA's practice of keeping zero-day vulnerabilities secret instead of reporting them to affected companies. This decision to hoard zero days for offensive purposes rather than disclosing them for defensive measures is seen as a poor decision that contributed to the software failure incident [46969].
- The leaked data containing hacking tools and exploits, which were allegedly stolen from the NSA, highlights the risks associated with the agency's choice to prioritize offense over defense in cybersecurity. This approach of keeping vulnerabilities secret for hacking purposes ultimately led to the exposure of sensitive tools and techniques, indicating a poor decision that contributed to the software failure incident [46969]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The articles do not provide information about the software failure incident being related to development incompetence [46969].
(b) The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to accidental factors. The incident involved the NSA's secret hacking tools falling into unknown hands due to a breach by the Shadow Brokers group, which obtained the data through hacking of an elite espionage team linked to the NSA [46969]. This accidental exposure of the hacking tools and vulnerabilities highlights the risks associated with keeping zero-day flaws secret and not properly securing sensitive information. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as a temporary failure. This is evident from the fact that the incident involved the leaking of secret hacking tools and exploits from the NSA, which were then disclosed by Shadow Brokers [46969]. The vulnerabilities revealed in the leaked data prompted urgent warnings from networking equipment firms like Cisco and Fortinet, leading to recommendations for customers to update their software or make configuration changes to mitigate the risks posed by the exploits [46969]. The incident was a result of specific circumstances, such as the unauthorized access to and disclosure of sensitive information, rather than a permanent failure inherent to the software itself. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The articles do not mention any specific software crash incident.
(b) omission: The incident described in the articles does not involve a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s).
(c) timing: The incident does not relate to a failure due to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early.
(d) value: The software failure incident discussed in the articles is related to the NSA's secret hacking tools falling into unknown hands, potentially compromising the security of networking equipment from companies like Cisco and Fortinet [46969].
(e) byzantine: The incident does not involve a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident described in the articles is primarily related to the NSA's dilemma of whether to report security flaws it exploits to product manufacturers or keep them secret for offensive purposes, leading to the risk of these vulnerabilities falling into unknown hands [46969]. |