Incident: Secure Boot Vulnerability in Windows Software System.

Published Date: 2016-08-12

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving the Secure Boot vulnerability in Windows software happened in August 2016 as per the article published on August 12, 2016 [46970].
System 1. Secure Boot feature in Windows operating systems, specifically affecting Windows RT and Windows Phone [46970].
Responsible Organization 1. Hackers Slipstream and MY123 were responsible for causing the software failure incident by exploiting the Secure Boot feature in Windows [46970].
Impacted Organization 1. Users of devices running Windows RT and Windows Phone were impacted by the Secure Boot vulnerability [46970].
Software Causes 1. Exploitation of the Secure Boot feature in Windows software by hackers, allowing them to install malicious software [46970].
Non-software Causes 1. Pressure on tech companies to include backdoors in their software due to public safety concerns [46970] 2. Leaked keys online [46970]
Impacts 1. The software failure incident involving the Secure Boot vulnerability in Windows software impacted the security and trust in Microsoft's operating systems, particularly Windows RT and Windows Phone [46970]. 2. The incident highlighted the risks associated with including backdoors in software for testing purposes, as it created a potential opening for hackers to exploit and install malicious software [46970]. 3. The incident raised concerns about the feasibility and effectiveness of patching the vulnerability, as the backdoor created by the Secure Boot workaround was deeply embedded in fundamental systems, making it challenging to fully resolve without causing other issues [46970]. 4. The failure incident underscored the argument against the implementation of backdoors in software systems, as even well-intentioned backdoors can ultimately compromise the security of the system [46970]. 5. The incident also sparked discussions about the concept of "secure golden key" models that involve installing secret backdoors in devices and software for law enforcement access, with technologists and cryptographers strongly opposing such proposals as they pose significant security risks [46970].
Preventions 1. Implementing stricter access controls and permissions to limit physical access and administrator rights to ARM and RT devices could have prevented the exploit described in the article [46970]. 2. Regularly updating and patching the software to address vulnerabilities and prevent exploitation of backdoors like the one found in the Secure Boot feature could have helped prevent the incident [46970].
Fixes 1. Microsoft releasing timely patches to address the Secure Boot vulnerability [46970]. 2. Implementing stricter controls on the distribution and management of Secure Boot keys to prevent leaks and unauthorized access [46970]. 3. Conducting thorough security audits and testing to identify and address potential vulnerabilities in software features like Secure Boot [46970].
References 1. Slipstream and MY123 2. Microsoft 3. Washington Post 4. Keybase co-creator Chris Coyne 5. Jeremy Gillulao of the Electronic Frontier Foundation 6. Update on 10:12 PM ET 08/13/2016

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization (a) The software failure incident related to the Secure Boot vulnerability in Windows was specific to Microsoft products. This incident highlighted the potential risks associated with backdoors in software, particularly in the context of security features like Secure Boot [46970]. (b) While the article did not mention similar incidents happening at other organizations specifically related to the Secure Boot vulnerability, it did discuss the broader debate around the inclusion of backdoors in software and encryption systems, with some advocating for the installation of secret backdoors in various devices and software for law enforcement purposes [46970].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. The incident involving the Secure Boot vulnerability in Windows software was a result of a design flaw. The feature, which was intended to protect users by confirming trusted software during system launch, inadvertently included a backdoor that could be exploited by attackers. This flaw was not intended for hackers or law enforcement but was present nonetheless, highlighting the risks associated with incorporating such features into software [46970]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also apparent in the article. The Secure Boot vulnerability could be exploited by attackers mainly on tablets and Windows Phones, as most users of Windows servers and business PCs disable Secure Boot. This indicates that the operation or configuration of the system, such as disabling security features, could contribute to the vulnerability being exploited [46970].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) The software failure incident related to the Secure Boot vulnerability in Windows was within the system. The vulnerability allowed attackers to exploit a feature designed to protect against malicious software, essentially creating a backdoor within the system [46970].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions (a) The software failure incident in this case is related to non-human actions. The vulnerability in the Secure Boot feature of Windows, which allowed attackers to exploit the system, was a result of a design flaw in the software itself rather than any direct human action [46970].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware can be seen in the article where hackers demonstrated how attackers could exploit a feature called Secure Boot, which is a hardware-based security feature designed to protect against loading malware by confirming trusted software during the operating system launch [46970]. This hardware-based vulnerability allowed attackers to bypass the intended security measures and install malicious software, highlighting a failure originating in the hardware component of the system. (b) The software failure incident related to software can be observed in the same article where it is mentioned that Microsoft included a workaround in Secure Boot for developers to test their software without fully validating it. This workaround, intended for legitimate testing purposes, inadvertently created a backdoor that hackers could exploit, leading to a software failure originating in the software design itself [46970].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident discussed in the articles is malicious in nature. The incident involves hackers exploiting a feature called Secure Boot in Windows software to install malicious software, despite Secure Boot being designed to protect against such attacks. The hackers published evidence showing how attackers can take advantage of this vulnerability, highlighting the intentional actions taken to harm the system [46970].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions: The software failure incident related to the Secure Boot vulnerability in Windows was primarily due to poor decisions made by Microsoft. The company included a workaround in Secure Boot to allow developers to test software without full validation, which inadvertently created a backdoor that could be exploited by hackers. This poor decision led to the vulnerability being exposed and exploited, highlighting the futility of using backdoors for any purpose, even if well-intentioned [46970].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is highlighted in the article. The incident involves a vulnerability in the Secure Boot feature of Windows, which was exploited by hackers despite being designed to protect against malicious software [46970]. This vulnerability was not intended for hackers or law enforcement but was essentially a backdoor that could be exploited. The article discusses how Microsoft released patches to address the issue, but the fundamental problem of the backdoor remains, indicating a failure due to contributing factors introduced by the development team's lack of professional competence in foreseeing the potential risks associated with such a feature. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also evident in the article. The existence of the vulnerability in the Secure Boot feature, which allowed hackers to exploit the system, was not intentional. Microsoft likely did not intend for the workaround in Secure Boot to become a backdoor for malicious actors. The accidental introduction of this vulnerability led to the exploitation of the system, showcasing a failure due to contributing factors introduced accidentally [46970].
Duration permanent (a) The software failure incident described in the article is more of a permanent nature. The vulnerability in the Secure Boot feature in Windows, which was exploited by hackers, is a fundamental flaw that cannot be entirely fixed without causing other problems. The article highlights that even though Microsoft released patches to address the issue, the backdoor created by the Secure Boot workaround remains embedded in too many fundamental systems, making the system fundamentally insecure [46970]. This indicates that the failure is permanent in nature due to the inherent design flaw in the software.
Behaviour crash, omission, value, byzantine, other (a) crash: The article discusses a vulnerability in the Secure Boot feature in Windows that could allow attackers to exploit the system and install malicious software, potentially leading to a system crash or failure [46970]. (b) omission: The article mentions that the Secure Boot feature in Windows had a workaround that allowed developers to test software without fully validating it, which could lead to the omission of performing the intended function of fully validating software before execution [46970]. (c) timing: There is no specific mention of a timing-related failure in the articles provided. (d) value: The vulnerability in the Secure Boot feature could lead to a failure in performing the intended function of verifying and loading trusted software, potentially resulting in incorrect software execution [46970]. (e) byzantine: The article highlights the inconsistency and potential security risks associated with the backdoor created by the Secure Boot workaround, which could lead to inconsistent responses and interactions within the system, making it vulnerable to exploitation [46970]. (f) other: The article discusses the fundamental insecurity introduced by the backdoor in the Secure Boot feature, which could lead to various other types of failures not explicitly categorized in options (a) to (e) [46970].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence theoretical_consequence The consequence of the software failure incident discussed in the articles is mainly theoretical. The articles highlight the potential risks and vulnerabilities posed by the Secure Boot feature exploit, emphasizing the debate around the inclusion of backdoors in software for law enforcement purposes. The vulnerability exposed by the hackers Slipstream and MY123 could potentially impact users of Windows RT, Windows Phone, and tablets, but it requires physical access and administrator rights to exploit. Microsoft released patches to address the issue, but the fundamental insecurity introduced by the backdoor remains a concern. The articles discuss the theoretical implications of such vulnerabilities and the challenges in fully mitigating them, rather than reporting on actual observed consequences such as harm, death, or property loss [46970].
Domain unknown (a) The software failure incident discussed in the article is related to the technology industry, specifically focusing on the security vulnerabilities in Microsoft's Secure Boot feature designed to protect users from malware [46970].

Sources

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