| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the iPhone spyware attack in Article 47020 involved the NSO Group, an Israeli security firm, which was also involved in a similar incident in Article 85521. In both cases, the NSO Group developed spyware that targeted mobile devices, specifically iPhones, to take control of the operating systems. The spyware was used to conduct surveillance activities on individuals, and in both incidents, the NSO Group claimed that its technology was licensed to governments to combat crime and terrorism. The incidents highlight a pattern of the NSO Group being associated with the development and deployment of spyware for surveillance purposes [47020, 85521].
(b) The software failure incident involving the NSO Group and the spyware attack on iPhones in Article 47020 is not explicitly mentioned to have occurred at multiple organizations. However, the article does mention that the NSO Group sells surveillance software called Pegasus to nation states, indicating that the spyware may have been used by various governments for surveillance purposes. This suggests that similar incidents involving the NSO Group's spyware may have occurred at multiple organizations or government entities [47020]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase:
- The incident described in Article 47020 involved a sophisticated spyware attack on an iPhone that exploited three previously undisclosed weaknesses in Apple's iPhone operating system. The spyware took advantage of zero-day exploits in Safari, the kernel of the operating system, and the core of iOS, allowing complete control of the device [47020].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase:
- The incident described in Article 85521 involved a vulnerability in the WhatsApp messaging app that allowed attackers to install spyware onto phones through the app's phone call feature. The spyware could be transmitted even if the target victim didn't answer their phone, indicating a failure in the operation of the app's phone call feature [85521]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incidents reported in the articles are primarily within_system failures. In both cases, the failures were caused by vulnerabilities within the software systems themselves that were exploited by malicious actors to install spyware on users' devices. In the first article [47020], the failure involved a sophisticated spyware attack on an iPhone through previously undisclosed weaknesses in Apple's mobile operating system. Similarly, in the second article [85521], a vulnerability in the WhatsApp messaging app allowed attackers to install spyware on phones through the app's phone call feature. These incidents highlight how vulnerabilities within the software systems can be exploited by external actors to compromise user devices. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- In Article 47020, the software failure incident occurred due to a sophisticated piece of spyware that exploited three previously undisclosed weaknesses in Apple's iPhone, allowing complete control of the devices without human participation. The spyware took advantage of zero-day exploits in the iPhone's operating system, enabling attackers to compromise the device with the tap of a finger [47020].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- In Article 85521, the software failure incident was caused by a vulnerability in the messaging app WhatsApp that allowed attackers to install spyware onto phones. The malicious code, developed by the Israeli company NSO Group, was transmitted through the app's phone call feature, indicating human actions in developing and deploying the spyware [85521]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The incident reported in Article 47020 involved a software failure that exploited three previously undisclosed weaknesses in Apple's iPhone hardware to take complete control of the devices. The spyware used zero-day exploits to compromise the iPhone's hardware, including vulnerabilities in Safari and the phone's operating system kernel [47020].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The incident reported in Article 85521 involved a vulnerability in the messaging app WhatsApp that allowed attackers to install spyware onto phones. The malicious code, developed by NSO Group, was installed through the app's phone call feature, indicating a software vulnerability within the application itself [85521]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incidents described in both articles are malicious in nature. In Article 47020, a spyware attack using hitherto unknown espionage software targeted an Arab activist's iPhone, exploiting three previously undisclosed weaknesses in Apple's iPhone to take complete control of the devices. The spyware, named "Trident," was designed to jailbreak the iPhone, bypassing security controls put in place by Apple, and allowing attackers to spy on virtually everything the activist did on his phone [47020].
Similarly, in Article 85521, a vulnerability in the messaging app WhatsApp allowed attackers to install spyware onto phones. The malicious code, developed by the Israeli company NSO Group, was transmitted through the app's phone call feature, enabling the spyware to take over the functions of mobile phone operating systems. This attack has the hallmarks of a private company reportedly working with governments to deliver spyware, indicating a malicious intent to compromise information stored on mobile devices [85521]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions:
- In Article 47020, the software failure incident involving the spyware attack on an iPhone was a result of poor decisions made by the attackers. The attackers exploited three previously undisclosed weaknesses in Apple's iPhone to take complete control of the devices. They used sophisticated spyware that bypassed security controls put in place by Apple, allowing them to spy on virtually everything the victim did on the phone [47020].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions:
- In Article 85521, the software failure incident involving the WhatsApp vulnerability that allowed attackers to install spyware onto phones was not due to accidental decisions but rather intentional actions by the attackers. The malicious code developed by the NSO Group was used to exploit a vulnerability in the messaging app, allowing for the installation of spyware on both iPhones and Android phones [85521]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence can be seen in Article 47020, where a sophisticated spyware attack targeted an Arab activist's iPhone by exploiting three previously undisclosed weaknesses in Apple's iPhone operating system. The spyware, named "Trident," took advantage of zero-day exploits in Safari and the iPhone's kernel, allowing complete control of the device's operating system. This incident highlights the high level of technical expertise and professional competence required to develop such advanced spyware that bypassed Apple's security controls [47020].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors can be observed in Article 85521, where a vulnerability in the WhatsApp messaging app allowed attackers to install spyware onto phones. The malicious code, developed by the Israeli company NSO Group, was transmitted through the app's phone call feature, even if the target victim didn't answer the call. This unintentional vulnerability in the app's functionality led to the installation of spyware on both iPhones and Android phones, highlighting the accidental introduction of a security flaw that could compromise user data [85521]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incidents described in the articles are temporary. In both cases, the vulnerabilities exploited by the spyware were addressed and fixed by the respective companies after the incidents were discovered. For example, in the case of the iPhone spyware incident described in Article 47020, Apple fixed the vulnerability immediately after learning about it. Similarly, in the WhatsApp spyware incident described in Article 85521, engineers at WhatsApp were working to close the vulnerability and issued a patch for customers. These actions indicate that the software failures were temporary and not permanent [47020, 85521]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, byzantine, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in Article 47020 involving the spyware attack on an iPhone can be categorized as a crash. The spyware took advantage of three previously undisclosed weaknesses in Apple’s iPhone to take complete control of the devices, leading to a situation where the system lost control and was compromised [47020].
(b) omission: The software failure incident in Article 85521 involving the WhatsApp vulnerability can be categorized as an omission. The vulnerability allowed attackers to install spyware onto phones through the app's phone call feature, even if the target victim didn't answer their phone. This omission to perform the intended function of securing the app led to the installation of spyware [85521].
(c) timing: There is no specific information in the provided articles to categorize the software failure incident as a timing issue.
(d) value: The software failure incident in Article 47020 can be categorized as a value failure. The spyware attack allowed attackers to spy on virtually anything the victim did on the iPhone, including phone calls, text messages, Gmail, Skype, Facebook, calendar, and steal passwords and personal information. This incorrect performance of the system's intended functions led to a breach of privacy and security [47020].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident in Article 47020 can be categorized as a byzantine failure. The spyware attack involved a sophisticated piece of spyware that jailbroke the iPhone, took complete control of the operating system, and bypassed security controls. The attack used three separate "zero-day exploits" and replaced the kernel, leading to inconsistent responses and interactions within the compromised device [47020].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in Article 85521 can be categorized as an "other" failure. The spyware attack through the WhatsApp vulnerability allowed attackers to install spyware onto phones through the app's phone call feature, even if the target victim didn't answer their phone. This behavior does not fit precisely into the crash, omission, timing, value, or byzantine categories, hence it can be considered as an "other" type of failure [85521]. |