Published Date: 2016-05-27
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident involving Tesla's Autopilot system occurred in May 2016 [Article 43884]. |
| System | 1. Tesla's Full Self-Driving software 2. Autopilot feature suite 3. Automatic emergency-braking system 4. Tesla Vision system 5. Adaptive cruise control (TACC) 6. Automatic Emergency Brake (AEB) 7. Autosteer feature 8. Auto Lane Change feature 9. Automatic Emergency Steering and Side Collision Warning feature 10. Ultrasonic sensors 11. Forward radar 12. Forward-looking camera [124210, 120760, 43884] |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Tesla - The software failure incident involving phantom braking in Tesla vehicles was caused by issues with the Full Self-Driving software, particularly related to false positives in the automatic emergency-braking system [124210]. 2. Driver - In a separate incident involving a Tesla Model S crashing into the back of a van while the autopilot, active cruise control, and automatic emergency brake were activated, the driver mentioned that the automatic emergency brake did not deploy, and he was late in applying the brakes himself [43884]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Tesla owners who experienced phantom braking incidents [124210] 2. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) received complaints about phantom braking incidents [124210] 3. Drivers using Tesla's "full self-driving" software [120760] 4. Tesla Model S driver who crashed into the back of a van while the car's autopilot, active cruise control, and automatic emergency brake were activated [43884] |
| Software Causes | 1. The software issue in Tesla vehicles causing phantom braking incidents was related to false positives in the automatic emergency-braking system triggered by a software update, leading to complaints and safety concerns among owners [124210]. 2. The Full Self-Driving software in Tesla vehicles had issues such as sudden braking, erratic behavior, neglecting road closure signs, attempting to steer around obstacles, and plotting courses into fixed objects, indicating inconsistencies and flaws in the software [120760]. 3. In a separate incident, a Tesla Model S driver crashed into the back of a van while the car's autopilot, active cruise control, and automatic emergency brake were activated, with the driver blaming the crash on the automatic emergency brake and cruise control not deploying properly [43884]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. The failure incident involving Tesla vehicles slamming on their brakes was attributed to the automaker's decision to stop using radar sensors in its vehicles to supplement the suite of cameras that perceive their surroundings, known as "Tesla Vision" [124210]. 2. Owners reported issues with the automatic emergency-braking system and forward collision warning systems, which were triggered by false positives and led to phantom braking incidents [124210]. 3. Some owners mentioned that the cars seemed overly sensitive to trucks in the opposite lane, causing sudden and unexpected automatic braking [124210]. 4. The failure incident was also linked to the lack of cross-checking between different types of sensors, such as radar and lidar, which could have helped prevent false alarms and phantom braking [124210]. 5. The failure incident was exacerbated by the inability of the automatic emergency-braking system to deploy in certain situations, leading to delayed braking responses by the drivers [43884]. |
| Impacts | 1. Tesla vehicles experienced "phantom braking" incidents, where the cars unexpectedly slammed on their brakes in response to imagined hazards, leading to complaints and safety concerns from owners [124210]. 2. The "phantom braking" issue coincided with Tesla's decision to stop using radar sensors in its vehicles, transitioning to a new approach known as "Tesla Vision," which may have contributed to the erratic behavior of the systems [124210]. 3. The software failure incident involving Tesla's Full Self-Driving software led to a safety recall due to false forward-collision warnings and automatic emergency braking, impacting the functionality and safety of the vehicles [120760]. 4. Tesla's Autopilot system, part of the Full Self-Driving suite, exhibited inconsistencies and flaws, such as veering out of lanes, neglecting road signs, and failing to react appropriately to obstacles, raising concerns about the reliability and safety of the autonomous driving features [120760]. 5. The software failure incident involving a Tesla Model S driver crashing into the back of a van while the car's autopilot, active cruise control, and automatic emergency brake were activated highlighted the potential dangers and limitations of the Autopilot system, leading to questions about the legality and safety of self-driving features [43884]. |
| Preventions | 1. Proper testing and validation of the software update before release could have prevented the phantom braking incidents in Tesla vehicles [124210]. 2. Utilizing multiple sensors such as radar and lidar for cross-checking could have improved the accuracy of the decision-making process in the autonomous driving system, potentially preventing false alarms and erratic behavior [124210]. 3. Ensuring that the software is consistent and reliable in various scenarios, including handling road closures, detecting objects accurately, and responding appropriately to different traffic situations, could have prevented unexpected behaviors and accidents [120760]. 4. Clear communication and guidelines to users about the limitations and requirements of the autopilot or full self-driving features, including the need for driver attention and intervention, could have prevented misunderstandings and misuse of the technology [43884]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implementing a more robust and diverse sensor system that includes multiple types of sensors such as radar and lidar to cross-check information and improve accuracy in detecting hazards [124210]. 2. Conducting thorough testing and validation of the software to ensure it can accurately differentiate between real hazards and false alarms, setting decision thresholds properly [124210]. 3. Addressing the issue of phantom braking by refining the software algorithms to reduce instances of sudden and unexpected automatic braking, especially on two-lane roads [124210]. 4. Enhancing the Autopilot driver-assistance feature suite to improve safety and reliability, especially in scenarios where the software may struggle, such as recognizing road closures and responding appropriately to surrounding vehicles [120760]. 5. Providing clearer guidelines and warnings to drivers about the limitations of the software, emphasizing the need for driver attention and intervention in critical situations to prevent accidents [43884]. | References | 1. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) - The articles gather information about the software failure incident from complaints lodged by Tesla owners to the NHTSA regarding phantom braking issues with Tesla vehicles [124210]. 2. Tesla - The articles mention information provided by Tesla regarding the Full Self-Driving software, recalls, and the company's stance on the safety of their driver-assistance features [124210, 120760, 43884]. 3. Experts and Professionals - The articles include insights and comments from experts and professionals in the field of autonomous vehicles and safety, such as Phil Koopman, a Carnegie Mellon University professor [124210]. 4. Drivers and Owners - The articles feature accounts and complaints from Tesla owners who experienced issues with the Full Self-Driving software, including instances of phantom braking and other erratic behavior [124210, 120760, 43884]. 5. Various Social Media Platforms - The articles refer to videos posted on social media platforms by Tesla owners and members of the public showcasing the behavior of Tesla vehicles with Full Self-Driving capabilities [120760, 43884]. |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) In the articles, there are instances of software failure incidents happening again within the same organization, Tesla. The incidents involve issues with Tesla's Full Self-Driving software, specifically related to phantom braking. Owners of Tesla Model 3 and Model Y vehicles reported complaints about sudden, unexpected automatic braking, known as "phantom braking," which has been a persistent issue for Tesla vehicles [124210]. The incidents of phantom braking have led to safety concerns and complaints from Tesla owners, indicating a recurring problem with the software within the same organization. (b) The articles also highlight software failure incidents related to autonomous driving features in vehicles from different organizations. For example, a Tesla Model S driver crashed into the back of a van while the car's autopilot, active cruise control, and automatic emergency brake were activated, leading to a collision [43884]. This incident raises concerns about the reliability and safety of autonomous driving features in vehicles beyond just Tesla, indicating similar issues with software failures in vehicles from multiple organizations. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) In the software failure incident related to the Tesla vehicles experiencing phantom braking, the incident can be attributed to the design phase. The issue of phantom braking was linked to false positives in the automatic emergency-braking system triggered by a software update. Tesla was forced to recall a version of its Full Self-Driving software due to these false positives, indicating a failure introduced by the system development and updates [124210]. (b) On the other hand, in the software failure incident where a Tesla Model S driver crashed into the back of a van while the car's autopilot, active cruise control, and automatic emergency brake were activated, the incident can be attributed to the operation phase. The driver mentioned that the Autopilot was on, but it did not cause the crash. Instead, the issue was with the automatic emergency brake and cruise control, which did not deploy as expected, leading to the crash. This failure was due to the operation or misuse of the system during the driving scenario [43884]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system, outside_system | (a) The software failure incident related to the Tesla vehicles experiencing phantom braking and issues with the Full Self-Driving software can be categorized as within_system. The incidents were primarily caused by issues within the Tesla vehicles' software systems, such as false positives in the automatic emergency-braking system triggered by software updates, changes in sensor configurations, and erratic behavior of the driver-assistance features like Autopilot and traffic-aware cruise control [124210, 120760]. (b) Additionally, the incidents were influenced by external factors such as the regulatory environment and the lack of clear laws regarding autonomous driving systems. The legal ambiguity surrounding self-driving cars in various states in the U.S. and the need for regulatory approval for such software updates also played a role in the context of the incidents [43884]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - In Article 124210, Tesla vehicles experienced a phenomenon known as "phantom braking," where the cars unexpectedly slammed on their brakes in response to imagined hazards, such as oncoming traffic on two-lane roads. This issue was persistent and led to a surge of complaints to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The problem was linked to false positives in the automatic emergency-braking system triggered by a software update, and complaints increased after Tesla stopped using radar sensors in its vehicles to supplement cameras, transitioning to "Tesla Vision" with only cameras and ultrasonic sensors. The software issue of phantom braking was a non-human action that caused safety concerns for Tesla owners [124210]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - In Article 43884, a Tesla Model S driver crashed into the back of a van while the car's autopilot, active cruise control, and automatic emergency brake were activated. The driver mentioned that the Autopilot system was on, but the crash was not directly caused by Autopilot. The driver explained that the adaptive cruise control was speeding up, leading to a situation where the car did not stop in time, and the automatic emergency brake did not deploy as expected. The driver admitted to being late in applying the brakes manually. This incident highlighted a scenario where human actions, such as relying on the autopilot system and not intervening in time, contributed to the software failure incident [43884]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - In Article 43884, a Tesla Model S driver crashed into the back of a van while the car's autopilot, active cruise control, and automatic emergency brake were activated. The driver blamed the crash on Tesla and claimed the entire front of his car must be replaced. The driver mentioned that the Automatic Emergency Brake did not deploy, and he was late in applying the brakes himself, indicating a hardware-related failure in the automatic emergency braking system [43884]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - In Article 124210, Tesla vehicles experienced a phenomenon known as "phantom braking," where the cars unexpectedly slammed on their brakes in response to imagined hazards. This issue was linked to the Full Self-Driving software and the decision threshold set by developers, indicating a software-related failure in the automatic emergency braking system [124210]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | non-malicious | (a) The articles do not mention any malicious intent behind the software failure incidents reported in the context of Tesla vehicles experiencing phantom braking and issues with the Full Self-Driving software. The incidents are attributed to technical issues and flaws in the software rather than any deliberate actions to harm the system [124210, 120760, 43884]. (b) The software failure incidents reported in the articles are categorized as non-malicious. The incidents are described as resulting from technical issues, false positives, erratic behavior, and inconsistencies in the software, such as phantom braking, unexpected automatic braking, failure to react appropriately to road conditions, and issues with Autopilot features. These failures are attributed to flaws in the software and its algorithms, rather than any intentional actions to harm the system [124210, 120760, 43884]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions, accidental_decisions | (a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions: - The software failure incident involving Tesla vehicles experiencing phantom braking incidents can be attributed to poor decisions made in the development and implementation of the software. - Tesla faced issues with phantom braking after a software update that led to false positives in the automatic emergency-braking system, causing the vehicles to brake unexpectedly in response to imagined hazards like oncoming traffic on two-lane roads [124210]. - The complaints of phantom braking increased after Tesla stopped using radar sensors in its vehicles to supplement cameras, transitioning to a vision-based approach known as "Tesla Vision" [124210]. - Experts mentioned that the issue of phantom braking could be due to the lack of cross-checking between different types of sensors, as Tesla vehicles rely mainly on cameras and lack the cross-check from sensors like radar and lidar [124210]. (b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions: - The software failure incident involving a Tesla Model S crashing into the back of a van while the autopilot, active cruise control, and automatic emergency brake were activated can be attributed to accidental decisions or unintended consequences. - The driver blamed the crash on the automatic emergency brake and cruise control, stating that the Autopilot was on but did not directly cause the crash [43884]. - The driver mentioned that the automatic emergency brake did not deploy, and he was late in applying the brakes himself, leading to the crash [43884]. - The incident highlighted the dangers of relying too heavily on the autopilot system and not being prepared to intervene when necessary, showcasing unintended consequences of the technology [43884]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development_incompetence: - The incident of Tesla vehicles unexpectedly slamming on their brakes, known as "phantom braking," was attributed to false positives in the automatic emergency-braking system triggered by a software update. This issue persisted even after a safety recall and the discontinuation of radar sensors in Tesla vehicles [124210]. - The Full Self-Driving software by Tesla faced issues such as false forward-collision warnings and automatic emergency braking, leading to a recall of the software version. The software was described as inconsistent and having major issues, with instances of neglecting road closure signs and braking unexpectedly [120760]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to accidental factors: - A Tesla Model S driver crashed into the back of a van while the car's autopilot, active cruise control, and automatic emergency brake were activated. The driver blamed the crash on the automatic emergency brake and cruise control, stating that the Autopilot was on but had nothing to do with the crash. The driver mentioned that the car did not stop in time due to the adaptive cruise control speeding up and the automatic emergency brake not deploying [43884]. |
| Duration | temporary | From the articles, it is evident that the software failure incidents related to Tesla vehicles experiencing phantom braking and issues with the Full Self-Driving software are temporary in nature. These incidents are not permanent failures but are occurring due to contributing factors introduced by certain circumstances, such as changes in software updates, sensor configurations, and driving conditions. The incidents are not ongoing continuously but are triggered by specific scenarios or conditions, leading to unexpected behaviors in the vehicles. 1. The article [124210] reports on Tesla vehicles unexpectedly slamming on their brakes in response to imagined hazards, known as "phantom braking." This issue has been persistent and has led to a surge of complaints from owners. The complaints of phantom braking have risen in the past three months, coinciding with changes in radar sensors and the transition to Tesla Vision, indicating a specific timeframe and circumstances triggering the problem. 2. In article [120760], the Full Self-Driving software from Tesla is highlighted as having accompanying flaws that can lead to alarming and frustrating experiences for drivers. The software is described as inconsistent, excelling in one scenario but failing in another. Issues such as turn signals going on and off randomly, neglecting road closure signs, and unexpected braking are mentioned, indicating that the software's failures are not permanent but are situation-specific. Therefore, based on the information provided in the articles, the software failure incidents related to Tesla vehicles are temporary and are triggered by specific circumstances rather than being permanent failures. |
| Behaviour | crash, omission, timing, other | (a) crash: The incident reported in Article 43884 describes a Tesla Model S driver crashing into the back of a van while the car's autopilot, active cruise control, and automatic emergency brake were activated. The driver blamed the crash on the automatic emergency brake not deploying, and the car not stopping in time, leading to a crash [Article 43884]. (b) omission: The incident in Article 43884 also highlights an omission failure where the automatic emergency brake did not deploy as expected, leading to the driver having to apply the brakes himself but being too late to prevent the crash [Article 43884]. (c) timing: The incident in Article 43884 could also be related to a timing failure as the car's Autopilot system was speeding up, thinking the driver would follow the car in front, which led to a situation where the car did not stop in time to avoid a crash [Article 43884]. (d) value: The incident in Article 43884 does not directly mention a value failure related to the software incident. (e) byzantine: The articles do not describe the software failure incident as exhibiting byzantine behavior. (f) other: The incident in Article 43884 could also be categorized as a failure due to the system's inability to properly interpret the situation and respond appropriately, leading to the crash with the van. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | sensor, embedded_software | (a) sensor: The incidents reported in the articles suggest that the failure could be related to the sensor layer of the cyber physical system. In Article 124210, Tesla vehicles experienced issues like phantom braking, where the cars reacted unexpectedly to perceived hazards. The vehicles are equipped with cameras and ultrasonic sensors to detect objects around them. The complaints from owners indicated that the cars seemed overly sensitive to certain objects, such as trucks in the opposite lane, leading to sudden braking incidents [124210]. (b) actuator: The articles do not specifically mention any failures related to the actuator layer of the cyber physical system. (c) processing_unit: The incidents reported in the articles do not directly point to failures related to the processing unit of the cyber physical system. (d) network_communication: The articles do not highlight any failures related to network communication errors in the cyber physical system. (e) embedded_software: The incidents reported in the articles suggest that the failure could be related to the embedded software layer of the cyber physical system. In Article 124210, Tesla vehicles experienced issues like phantom braking, which were attributed to false positives in the automatic emergency-braking system triggered by a software update. The timing of the complaints coincided with Tesla's transition to using only cameras and discontinuing radar sensors, indicating a software-related change affecting the vehicle's behavior [124210]. |
| Communication | unknown | The software failure incidents reported in the provided articles do not directly relate to a failure at the communication layer of the cyber-physical system. The incidents discussed in the articles are primarily related to the functionality and performance of Tesla's Autopilot and Full Self-Driving software features, specifically issues such as phantom braking, false positives in automatic emergency braking, erratic behavior in response to surroundings, and failures in features like Autosteer and Autopark. Therefore, the failure incidents discussed in the articles do not align with the options provided for failure at the communication layer of the cyber-physical system. |
| Application | TRUE | The software failure incidents reported in the provided articles were related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. The incidents involved issues such as phantom braking in Tesla vehicles due to false positives in the automatic emergency-braking system triggered by a software update, as well as erratic behavior of Tesla's "full self-driving" software causing unexpected braking, lane changes, and interactions with other vehicles on the road. These issues were attributed to bugs, faults, and errors in the software applications used in Tesla vehicles, leading to safety concerns and complaints from owners ([124210], [120760], [43884]). |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | property, non-human, theoretical_consequence | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There were no reports of people losing their lives due to the software failure incidents described in the articles [124210, 120760, 43884]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - There were no reports of people being physically harmed due to the software failure incidents described in the articles [124210, 120760, 43884]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There were no reports of people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure incidents described in the articles [124210, 120760, 43884]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incidents described in the articles led to property damage in the form of car accidents and potential vehicle damage [43884]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - There were no reports of people having to postpone activities due to the software failure incidents described in the articles [124210, 120760, 43884]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incidents described in the articles impacted Tesla vehicles, causing issues such as phantom braking and erratic behavior in autonomous driving features [124210, 120760, 43884]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incidents described in the articles had real observed consequences, including vehicle accidents, phantom braking, and erratic behavior in autonomous driving features [124210, 120760, 43884]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles discussed potential consequences of the software failures, such as the risk of accidents and the need for regulatory approval for autonomous driving features [120760, 43884]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - There were no other specific consequences of the software failure incidents mentioned in the articles [124210, 120760, 43884]. |
| Domain | information, transportation | (a) The failed system was intended to support the production and distribution of information. The incidents reported in the articles are related to software failures in Tesla vehicles, specifically the Full Self-Driving software, which is designed to assist drivers in navigating roads and avoiding hazards [124210, 120760]. (b) The incidents are also related to the transportation industry, as Tesla vehicles equipped with the Full Self-Driving software are meant to assist in the movement of people on roads [124210, 120760]. (m) The software failure incident is not directly related to any other industry mentioned in the options. |
Article ID: 124210
Article ID: 120760
Article ID: 43884