Incident: PC Manufacturers' Preinstalled Software Vulnerabilities Lead to Security Risks

Published Date: 2016-05-31

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident happened in May 2016. - The incident was reported in articles published on May 31, 2016 ([44025], [43754]).
System 1. OEM software update tools preinstalled on Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo laptops [44025, 43754] 2. Dell Foundation Services updater [43754] 3. Lenovo Solutions Center and UpdateAgent updaters [43754] 4. Asus Live Update software [43754]
Responsible Organization 1. Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) such as Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo were responsible for causing the software failure incident by shipping computers with pre-installed updaters containing serious security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers [43754, 44025].
Impacted Organization 1. Laptop owners who purchased Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo laptops were impacted by the software failure incident [44025, 43754].
Software Causes 1. Critical security vulnerabilities in preinstalled OEM software update tools on laptops from Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo [43754, 44025] 2. Lack of basic security measures in the OEM update tools, such as consistent use of encryption, making the vulnerabilities easy to exploit [44025] 3. Failure to deliver updates over a secured HTTPS channel, failure to sign update files or validate them, and lack of digital signing of manifests by the OEM vendors [43754] 4. Vulnerabilities in the OEM update tools that allowed attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks, intercept update files, and install malicious code on victim machines [43754] 5. Inconsistent security measures across different OEMs, with some vendors like Dell being more secure in their update processes compared to others like Acer and Asus [43754]
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of basic security measures in OEM update tools provided by PC vendors [44025]. 2. Failure to deliver updates over a secured HTTPS channel or sign update files by OEMs [43754]. 3. Failure to digitally sign manifests and update files by some PC manufacturers [43754]. 4. Inconsistent security measures across different OEM update tools [43754]. 5. Lack of response or delayed response from some PC manufacturers to address security vulnerabilities [43754].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident exposed critical security vulnerabilities in software update tools preinstalled on laptops from popular brands like Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo, allowing hackers to easily exploit them [43754, 44025]. 2. The vulnerabilities in the OEM software could lead to remote-code execution abilities, giving attackers complete control of the system [43754]. 3. Laptop owners were left vulnerable to potential attacks as the safeguards against these vulnerabilities required significant time and effort, such as wiping the OEM system and reinstalling a bloatware-free copy of Windows [44025]. 4. Some PC vendors like HP and Lenovo have fixed the high-risk vulnerabilities, while others like Acer and Asus acknowledged the vulnerabilities but had not released fixes at the time of reporting [44025]. 5. The incident highlighted the risks associated with unnecessary software (bloatware) that comes preinstalled on laptops, as these programs can easily become out-of-date and pose security risks [44025]. 6. The failure of PC vendors to build basic security measures into their update tools transformed bloatware from being merely annoying to potentially dangerous [44025]. 7. The vulnerabilities in the OEM software update tools could allow attackers to intercept update files, replace them with malicious ones, and execute administrative-level commands on systems, compromising user security [43754]. 8. The incident underscored the importance of using HTTPS and certificate signing consistently and competently to significantly raise the bar to exploitation [43754]. 9. Vendors varied in their responses to the security problems identified, with HP patching the most egregious vulnerabilities, Lenovo removing the vulnerable software, and Acer and Asus showing delays or uncertainty in fixing the issues [43754].
Preventions 1. Implementing consistent and competent security measures such as using HTTPS and certificate signing in a robust manner could have significantly raised the bar to exploitation and prevented the software failure incident [43754]. 2. Ensuring that OEMs build basic security measures into their update tools, such as consistent use of encryption, could have made the vulnerabilities much more difficult to exploit [44025]. 3. Promptly addressing reported vulnerabilities and releasing updates to fix the security flaws in the OEM software could have prevented the incident [43754, 44025].
Fixes 1. Implement consistent use of encryption in OEM update tools to make vulnerabilities much more difficult to exploit [44025]. 2. Ensure that update tools deliver updates over a secured HTTPS channel and sign update files to prevent interception and tampering by attackers [43754]. 3. Validate the signatures of files and manifests in update tools to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the updates being installed [43754]. 4. Remove unnecessary bloatware and OEM software that pose security risks from laptops [44025]. 5. Establish direct channels for reporting security problems with software and respond promptly to security vulnerabilities reported by researchers [43754].
References 1. Duo Labs [44025, 43754] 2. HP [44025, 43754] 3. Lenovo [44025, 43754] 4. Acer [44025, 43754] 5. Asus [44025, 43754] 6. Dell [44025, 43754] 7. CNET [44025] 8. Microsoft [43754]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to security vulnerabilities in OEM software update tools has happened again at multiple organizations. The investigation conducted by Duo Security's Duo Labs found serious security problems in the software updaters of five popular PC manufacturers - HP, Dell, Acer, Lenovo, and Asus [43754]. These vendors all shipped computers with pre-installed updaters that had high-risk vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to hijack the update process and potentially install malicious code on victim machines. The vulnerabilities included issues such as failure to deliver updates over a secured HTTPS channel, failure to sign update files, and failure to validate manifests, making it possible for attackers to intercept and manipulate update files [43754]. (b) The incident of security vulnerabilities in OEM software update tools has also occurred at other organizations. The investigation revealed that PC hardware makers in general were not careful with the security of their software updaters. The researchers noted that based on their findings, it's unlikely that other vendors are any more secure than the ones they examined [43754]. This indicates a broader issue within the industry regarding the security of pre-installed software update tools on computers.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase: - The incident was caused by critical security vulnerabilities found in software update tools preinstalled on laptops from Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo [44025, 43754]. - The vulnerabilities were due to OEM software, such as bloatware, that comes installed on laptops out of the box, which were largely unnecessary and weak links in the security chain [44025]. - The vulnerabilities were exploited by hackers due to the lack of basic security measures in the update tools, making bloatware a dangerous security risk [44025]. - The vulnerabilities could have been mitigated by consistent use of encryption in the OEM update tools [44025]. - Some vendors like HP, Lenovo, and Dell have fixed the high-risk vulnerabilities after being reported by Duo Labs [44025]. - Acer and Asus acknowledged the vulnerabilities but had not released a fix at the time of reporting [44025]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase: - The incident involved serious security problems in the software updaters of popular PC manufacturers, allowing attackers to hijack the update process and install malicious code on victim machines [43754]. - The vulnerabilities in the updaters allowed attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks to intercept and replace update files with malicious ones [43754]. - The updaters operated with the highest level of trust and privilege on machines, making it possible for attackers to gain complete control of the system [43754]. - The vendors failed to digitally sign their manifests, allowing attackers to intercept unsigned manifests and add malicious files to the list [43754]. - Dell's updaters were relatively more secure compared to other vendors, but HP, Lenovo, Acer, and Asus had varying degrees of security flaws in their update tools [43754]. - Some vendors like HP have already patched the most egregious vulnerabilities, while others like Acer and Asus had not indicated when they would fix the problems [43754].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident reported in the articles is primarily within the system. The vulnerabilities and security flaws were found in the OEM software update tools preinstalled on laptops from popular brands like Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo. These vulnerabilities allowed hackers to exploit the update process and potentially install malicious code on victim machines [43754]. The vulnerabilities were related to issues such as failure to deliver updates over a secured HTTPS channel, failure to sign update files, and failure to validate manifests, making it possible for attackers to intercept and manipulate update files [43754]. The lack of basic security measures in the OEM update tools made the bloatware a weak link in the security chain, exposing users to security risks [44025]. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident also involved factors originating from outside the system. The vulnerabilities in the OEM software update tools were exploited by hackers who could remotely run malicious code on systems and gain complete control over them [43754]. Attackers could conduct man-in-the-middle attacks to intercept update files and replace them with malicious ones, taking advantage of the lack of secure transmission channels and file validation [43754]. The incident highlighted the risk posed by unnecessary software that users have little use for, as these programs can easily become out-of-date and vulnerable to security threats [44025].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in the articles was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically vulnerabilities in OEM software update tools that were preinstalled on laptops from popular brands like Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo. These vulnerabilities were identified by Duo Labs, the research arm of Duo Security, during their investigation. The vulnerabilities in the OEM software were described as critical security vulnerabilities that hackers could easily exploit, leading to risks for laptop owners [44025, 43754]. (b) However, human actions were also involved in addressing the software failure incident. After identifying the vulnerabilities, Duo Labs reported them to the PC makers, and some companies like HP and Lenovo took action to fix the high-risk vulnerabilities. Lenovo, for example, worked swiftly with Duo Security to mitigate the issue and publish a security advisory. HP fixed the vulnerabilities, while Dell had already released an update fixing many of the issues before they were reported. On the other hand, Acer and Asus acknowledged the vulnerabilities but had not released a fix at the time of the articles [44025, 43754].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The software failure incident reported in the articles is primarily due to vulnerabilities found in the OEM (original equipment manufacturer) software update tools preinstalled on laptops from popular brands like Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo [44025, 43754]. - These vulnerabilities in the software update tools allowed attackers to exploit the update process and potentially install malicious code on victim machines, leading to a security risk originating from the hardware side [43754]. - The vulnerabilities included issues such as failure to deliver updates over a secured HTTPS channel, failure to sign update files or validate them, and lack of proper security measures in the update tools [43754]. - The hardware-related failure was exacerbated by the presence of bloatware, unnecessary software that comes preinstalled on laptops, making them more susceptible to security vulnerabilities [44025]. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The software failure incident is also related to software as it involves vulnerabilities found within the OEM software update tools themselves, which are considered part of the software ecosystem of the laptops [44025, 43754]. - The vulnerabilities in the software update tools allowed for remote-code execution abilities, giving attackers complete control over the system, indicating a software-related flaw in the design or implementation of these tools [43754]. - The software failure incident highlights the risks associated with unnecessary software, such as bloatware, which can introduce security vulnerabilities and weaken the overall security posture of the system [44025]. - The lack of basic security measures in the OEM update tools, such as consistent use of encryption, contributed to the software failure incident by making it easier for attackers to exploit the vulnerabilities [44025].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to malicious factors introduced by humans with the intent to harm the system. The investigation conducted by Duo Security's Duo Labs revealed serious security vulnerabilities in the software update tools preinstalled on laptops from popular brands like HP, Dell, Acer, Lenovo, and Asus. These vulnerabilities could allow attackers to hijack the update process and install malicious code on victim machines, giving them remote-code execution abilities and complete control of the system [43754]. The vulnerabilities found in the OEM software updaters included issues such as failure to deliver updates over a secured HTTPS channel, failure to sign update files or validate them, and the ability for attackers to intercept update files and replace them with malicious ones. Attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks, intercept update files, delete important update files, add malicious files to the list, and execute administrative-level commands on systems [43754]. The vendors examined in the investigation had varying levels of security flaws in their update tools, with some failing to digitally sign manifests, transmit updates over HTTPS, or validate updates properly. Some vendors also lacked secure channels for reporting security problems with their software, making it easier for attackers to exploit the vulnerabilities [43754]. In response to the vulnerabilities identified, some vendors like HP and Lenovo have taken steps to patch the most egregious vulnerabilities or remove the vulnerable software from affected systems. However, other vendors like Acer and Asus have not yet indicated when they will fix the problems or if they will address the vulnerabilities [43754]. Therefore, the software failure incident in this case is attributed to malicious factors introduced by human actors seeking to exploit security vulnerabilities in the OEM software update tools to compromise user systems.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The software failure incident related to the security vulnerabilities in OEM software update tools on laptops can be attributed to poor decisions made by PC vendors. The vulnerabilities were a result of OEM software being preinstalled on laptops without proper security measures, making them easy targets for hackers to exploit. The vendors failed to build basic security measures into these update tools, such as consistent use of encryption, which would have made the vulnerabilities much more difficult to exploit [44025, 43754]. Additionally, some vendors like Acer and Asus acknowledged the vulnerabilities but had not released fixes promptly, indicating a lack of proactive response to security issues [44025, 43754]. (b) On the other hand, the software failure incident can also be seen as a result of accidental decisions or unintended consequences. The presence of security vulnerabilities in the OEM software update tools was likely not intentional but rather a consequence of inadequate security practices and oversight during the development and deployment of the software. The vulnerabilities were described as being easily exploitable, indicating that they were not deliberately introduced but rather overlooked due to lack of attention to security best practices [44025, 43754].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence: - The software failure incident in the articles was primarily due to vulnerabilities in OEM software update tools that were preinstalled on laptops by popular brands like Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo [44025, 43754]. - These vulnerabilities were critical security flaws that hackers could easily exploit, indicating a lack of professional competence in ensuring the security of the software update tools [44025, 43754]. - The OEM software, often referred to as bloatware, was unnecessary and posed a weak link in the security chain, highlighting a lack of professional competence in software development practices [44025]. - The investigation by Duo Labs revealed that the level of sophistication required to exploit most of the vulnerabilities found was trivial, indicating a lack of professional competence in implementing robust security measures [44025]. - PC vendors failed to build basic security measures into the update tools, leading to the vulnerabilities that were identified, suggesting a lack of professional competence in ensuring software security [44025]. (b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally: - The vulnerabilities in the OEM software update tools were not introduced accidentally but were inherent in the design and implementation of the software by the PC manufacturers [44025, 43754]. - The vulnerabilities were a result of failures such as not delivering updates over secured HTTPS channels, not signing update files, and not validating manifests, indicating intentional design flaws rather than accidental introduction of vulnerabilities [43754]. - The researchers at Duo Labs found that the security flaws were consistent across the different PC manufacturers, suggesting a pattern of negligence rather than accidental oversight in ensuring the security of the software update tools [43754]. - The vendors' varying security stances and responses to the reported vulnerabilities also indicate a lack of accidental introduction but rather a systematic issue in how software security was approached by these companies [43754].
Duration temporary The software failure incident reported in the articles can be categorized as a temporary failure. The vulnerabilities found in the OEM software update tools on laptops from Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo were identified by Duo Labs, and the vendors were informed about these vulnerabilities. Some vendors like HP and Lenovo have already fixed the high-risk vulnerabilities, while others like Acer and Asus acknowledged the vulnerabilities but have not yet released a fix [43754]. This indicates that the failure was temporary and could be rectified by addressing the identified security vulnerabilities.
Behaviour omission, value (a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [43754, 44025]. (b) omission: The incident involves a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Specifically, the OEM software update tools on laptops from Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo contained critical security vulnerabilities that hackers could exploit, leading to the omission of proper security measures [43754, 44025]. (c) timing: The incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early [43754, 44025]. (d) value: The failure in this incident is due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, as the OEM software update tools contained vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers, compromising the security of the laptops [43754, 44025]. (e) byzantine: The incident does not involve a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [43754, 44025]. (f) other: The other behavior observed in this incident is the presence of vulnerabilities in OEM software update tools that were preinstalled on laptops, making them susceptible to exploitation by hackers. This vulnerability stemmed from the lack of proper security measures in the update tools, highlighting the risks associated with unnecessary and potentially insecure software [43754, 44025].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence (a) death: There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident in the provided articles [43754, 44025]. (b) harm: The articles do not mention any physical harm caused to individuals due to the software failure incident [43754, 44025]. (c) basic: The incident did not impact people's access to food or shelter [43754, 44025]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data were impacted due to the software failure incident. The vulnerabilities in the OEM software could have allowed attackers to exploit the update tools and potentially install malicious code on victim machines, leading to a compromise of data security [43754, 44025]. (e) delay: There is no mention of any activities being postponed due to the software failure incident [43754, 44025]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure incident. The vulnerabilities in the OEM software could have allowed attackers to compromise the security of the laptops and potentially access or manipulate data stored on the machines [43754, 44025]. (g) no_consequence: The articles clearly outline the security risks and vulnerabilities present in the OEM software update tools, indicating real consequences of the software failure incident [43754, 44025]. (h) theoretical_consequence: The articles discuss potential consequences of the software failure incident, such as the risk of attackers exploiting the vulnerabilities to gain control of systems and install malicious code. However, these consequences were not just theoretical as the vulnerabilities were identified and reported by Duo Labs, leading to actions taken by some PC makers to address the issues [43754, 44025]. (i) other: There are no other consequences described in the articles beyond the impact on data security and potential unauthorized access to laptops due to the software vulnerabilities [43754, 44025].
Domain information, utilities (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to the information industry. The incident involved vulnerabilities in software update tools preinstalled on laptops from popular brands like Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Lenovo. These vulnerabilities could be exploited by hackers to compromise the security of the laptops [43754, 44025]. (g) The incident also has implications for the utilities industry as it involves security vulnerabilities in OEM software that comes preinstalled on laptops, which could potentially impact the security of power, gas, and water services if the laptops are used in utility companies [43754, 44025]. (m) The software failure incident is not directly related to any other industry mentioned in the options provided.

Sources

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